DOCUMENT 23.

Letter to President Wilson, April 9, 1919, from Rear-Admiral W. S. Benson (autographed original), submitting memorandum dated April 7, of United States Naval Advisory Staff on "United States Naval Policy" (typewritten original).

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

Paris, April 9, 1919.

I am sending you herewith a paper which we have prepared after much thought and study.

If I may presume to say so, I urge you to read it, as it will undoubtedly assist you in forming definite conclusions on this most important subject without consuming the time that would otherwise be necessary for independent investigation.

My own opinion is that the necessity for at least two approximately equal naval powers is absolute in order to stabilize the League of Nations. This fact should be recognized, and the United States should give it as a reason for building up and maintaining its Navy.

Sincerely yours,

[Signed] W. S. BENSON.

The President of the United States.

7 April, 1919.

(Confidential.)

U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY STAFF, PARIS.

Memorandum No. XXV.

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES NAVAL POLICY.

There is no subject in connection with the League of Nations that has caused so much perplexity, both at home and abroad, as the apparent inconsistency of the United States in advocating a general reduction of armaments, while itself undertaking an intensified Naval Building programme.

It is natural that a hostile foreign press should seize upon this apparent inconsistency as an evidence of hypocrisy on the part of the American Government, which is accused of aiming to obtain an advantage over other Powers by inducing them to trust in the ideal strength of an unarmed League, while continuing itself to rely on the practical strength of an armed nation. We hope that the following examination of the subject will make clear to all that American aims are legitimate aims, and that the step America is taking is one demanded by world interest, and one that menaces the just aspirations of no Power whatever.

Every great change in world conditions makes it incumbent on each of the several States of the world to reexamine its special situation, and to determine from this examination the policies that will enable it best to fulfil its duties to the world and to itself. Such a change in world conditions has come and such a duty now falls upon us as Americans. There are many interrelated external policies which America must determine, but this paper deals with naval policy only. Naval policy is a means to an end, a means designed to assist the State in the attainment of its international mission. This mission for the United States is twofold-a duty to itself and a duty to the world.

I. To promote and guard the interests of the United
States in every way consonant with justice.

II. To assist in promoting the welfare of the world. We can make no progress in promoting our international interests, or in promoting the welfare of the world, except through international relations. Whenever we enter into such relations we meet with other national aims, with other national desires for the advancement of the interests of other nations. The result is in part a system of exchange of advantages between States. If all international relations were but systems of exchange of advantages and concessions, and if no advantages were sought by any State except on the basis of equal exchange, there might be no occasion for the use of force in international relations, but such is not the case.

The growth of populations, the development of national character, changes in national life, all introduce at times insistent demands on other nations that are not consonant with the interests of those nations. As our principle is the promotion of national interests and world interests in harmony with justice, we have to consider how extraordinary international demands may be resisted where they are not just.

Just and friendly relations are stimulated when national aims may be attained through the reciprocal granting of advantages on an equitable basis. The aim, of course, on either side of a negotiation is profit in some form or other. The natural aim is toward the maximum profit. This is as true in international negotiation as in private negotiation, so there is a constant tendency for nations to devise means for obtaining by negotiation advantages as great as possible. The negotiations of individuals and of corporations are governed by written law, which has a distinctly limiting influence on attempts to obtain unjust profits. When States negotiate, they are free from the restraining influence of law and may exact every advantage which their position makes it possible for them to exact. On minor questions we expect them to apply equitable principles in their negotiations, but when questions of great national importance are at issue, expediency rather than principle governs.

The question then becomes not so much a question of

exchange of advantages as the acceptance by the weaker state of demands made, rather than submission to the penalties that otherwise would be inflicted by the more powerful State. In other words, the attention of the negotiators is shifted from the principle of exchange to the principle of power, the decisions are arrived at by an estimate of relative power, and this whether force be used or not.

If Liberia cannot prevent occasional crimes within her borders, she is compelled to yield territory to neighbouring colonies as compensation, the alternative being still more drastic action.

If Japan cannot get from China the concessions she desires, she presents China with twenty-one demands and intimates that the exchange China has to make is the granting of those demands in return for the non-infliction on her of the alternative penalties of war measures. Potential military force slips in and closes the bargain that China maintains is an unjust bargain.

If England cannot get by the mild terms of diplomatic notes the decisions she desires regarding equal rights in the use of the Panama Canal, she presents a note that uncovers the idea of a military superiority sufficient to enforce what she considers a just decision.

When we examine our own world situation in the new order of things, we realize that all of our important international relations and all of our important international questions hinge upon matters relating to the sea and sea communications. We cannot advance our external interests, nor can we influence world policy, except by way of the sea. Practically all of our great commerce is sea commerce. If any foreign State desires to bring military pressure to bear upon us, it must be a pressure based upon possible operations by way of the sea. The attack of our Colonies, of our commerce, of our frontiers, depends first of all upon what happens at sea. Conversely if we desire

to retaliate or to exert opposing military pressure, we must base our efforts upon our sea power.

In the past our naval position has derived great strength from the potential hostility of the British and German fleets. Neither the German nor the British fleet could venture abroad without grave risk that the other would seize the opportunity thus presented to crush a rival. This condition gave to America a position of special strength both in council and in decision, because her navy was so strong that no other navy could neglect its influence. All that is now changed. The German fleet has ceased to exist, with the result that we suddenly find the British Navy in a position of unparalleled strength. No navy is left in Europe capable of offering any real resistance to the British Navy.

Under present conditions the British Navy, with its world-wide supporting organization, is strong enough to dominate the seas in whatever quarter of the globe that domination may be required. We do not consider this a condition calculated to advance either our own just interests or the welfare of the world. A power so absolute that it may disregard other powers with impunity, is less apt to act with justice than if there be a balancing influence of force as well as of world opinion to oppose it. This is true within a league of nations as well as without a league of nations.

Even when force is not applied, the knowledge of its readiness is always an asset in negotiation. The smooth and leisurely phrases of diplomacy derive their pungency from a vision of the force in readiness that lies behind them. Governments are influenced less by words than by material facts. We are conscious of this in every phase of the proceedings of the Peace Conference now in progress. Everyone, except ourselves, looks to British Naval Representatives for suggestions in naval matters and to French Military Representatives for suggestions in military matters. This phenomenon is the unavoidable tendency of the strong to dominate, and of the weak to accept domination.

Since we are considering naval policy as affecting Amer