League of Nations will never have anything to fear from the United States.

With two navies of equal strength, the world would breathe free from the fear of a naval domination that has the power at any moment of threatening the economic life of any nation. The resulting mutual respect of Great Britain and the United States would go further than anything else toward the establishment of just maritime law upon the high seas both in peace and in war.

The success of the League of Nations will rest in large part on the honesty, integrity and strength of the United States. The political and economic weakness of Europe as a result of the World War have thrust upon us the burden of imparting vital force to a Covenant that attempts to reconcile the conflicting interests of the world.

Our ability to sustain the League in its formative period and establish it eventually on a secure foundation will depend chiefly on the strength we give it to resist the domination of any single Power. We ourselves have no desire to dominate the League, but we believe it to be our duty to the world to make our counsels heard as attentively as the counsels of any other Power.

CONCLUSION.

As one of an unorganized society of nations we need a navy equal to the greatest

1. To guard our great and greatly growing interests. 2. To give our voice in the councils of the world the weight our world position warrants.

3. To give our ideals full expression and to obtain for them a just recognition in the development_of the world organization that is about to be undertaken.

As a member of the League of Nations we need a navy equal to the greatest―

1. So that there may be within the League a power strong enough to restrain any Power whatever seeking unjust advantage by force.

2. So that the League may be relieved from the dominance of any single Power, and thereby ensure to it

a greater stability and a greater probability of just administration.

We believe that a better way in which to obtain two equal navies in the world is for the British Navy to be reduced in strength, and for Great Britain and America to determine jointly from time to time what the strength of the two fleets shall be.

DOCUMENT 24.

Confidential report of Major General F. J. Kernan, chief American representative on the Inter-Allied Commission to Poland, to President Wilson, dated April 11, giving his views of conditions in central Europe (autographed original).

AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE.

Paris, France 11 April, 1919.

Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Subject: Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland.

On March 20th, last, the Great Powers sent identical telegrams to the Ukrainian and Polish Commanders in Eastern Galicia requesting, in substance, that a suspension of arms should be forthwith effected, following the lines of the former one, dated February 24th, 1919, this to be followed by a formal armistice to be arranged preferably in Paris under the direct supervision of the Peace Commission. A copy of this identical telegram was furnished the undersigned with instructions to see that it reached the hands of each of the Commanding Generals in Eastern Galicia, together with a second explanatory telegram. As directed I delivered these telegrams personally to General Jwaszkiewricz, Polish Commander at Przemysl on March 24th, and on March 25th I met General Pavlenko, the Ukrainian Commander, at Sambor and delivered the same messages to him. These had already

been received directly by wireless and both parties had, so I was informed, accepted the proposition of the Great Powers and the two Commanding Generals were in communication with each other for the purpose of arranging a meeting between delegates. Both parties requested me to be present at this meeting and left me to designate the place. Pursuant to this arrangement five delegates from each side met on the afternoon of March 27th at Chyrow, just within the Polish lines.

I had suggested to each party the advisability of going to the Conference with a prepared draft for the convention and this course was followed. Before the actual meeting of the delegates, each side read to me their propositions. The Polish proposition contained an article providing that the Poles should have the right to denounce the suspension of arms at the end of three days unless, within that period, the Ukrainian authorities had accepted in toto the armistice terms drawn up February 28th, 1919, by Dr. Lord, General Berthelemy and General DeWiatt of the Inter-Allied Mission to Poland. This armistice had been rejected by the Ukrainian authorities and it was practically certain that their injection into the new effort to bring about a cessation of hostilities meant the failure of that effort. I told the Polish delegates this, and also pointed out that the procedure they were following did not conform to the request of the Great Powers, as accepted by them; that is to say, instead of attempting to make a simple suspension of arms, leaving the formal armistice for subsequent arrangements, they were tacking the one to the other and so defeating both. They replied that their instructions had come from their government and that they had no power to abate the conditions respecting the armistice as written in their draft. The Ukrainians had drawn up a simple plan for a suspension of arms, each party remaining on the ground occupied, and with the necessary stipulations for securing its execution. When the delegates met and the Polish terms were unfolded, the Ukrainians at once stated that they had come to make a suspension of arms merely, in agreement with their promise to Paris, and not an armis

tice such as the Poles were proposing. They added that they were willing to abide by whatever armistice terms their delegates agreed to in Paris. Since the Polish delegation was without authority to modify their demands the meeting broke up.

Before leaving the Polish Headquarters at Przemysl the following day I addressed to the Polish Commander a letter outlining what I thought should be the substance and nature of a brief convention establishing a suspension of arms. On arrival in Warsaw I enclosed a copy of this letter to Mr. Paderewski, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, indicating my views of what the Polish Government should do in order to comply with the clear and earnest desire of the Great Powers. Copies of these letters are

attached hereto, marked "A."

While en route to Paris with the other members of the Inter-Allied Commission, I received a message from the Peace Commission directing me to proceed again to the Ukrainian front and to make a further effort to bring about a suspension of arms. I did so and found that the Polish Commanding General was powerless to make a truce except upon the terms already stated above. He told me that the matter was not in his hands, but in the hands of higher authority and that he could do nothing. In this state of affairs, and knowing that the head of the Polish Government was en route to Paris, I left Przemysl and proceeded to this city where I arrived yesterday, April 10th.

The distinct impression I brought away from Eastern Galicia was that the Ukrainians were exceedingly anxious for a truce and that their leaders were intelligent men by no means Bolshevik and sincerely desirous of building up a great Ukrainian Republic. General Pavlenko was quite frank and stated that the Russian Soviet forces were pressing the Ukrainians on the East and that his government was anxious to secure a truce on the Polish side in order to bring as strong a Ukrainian force as possible into action against the Russian Soviets. Besides my own observations I talked with quite a number of disinterested observers who had been travelling through The Ukraine