Land's End-Azores-Halifax cable on the ground that it is no longer German, having been incorporated into the British cable system. The French will probably argue that they should not give up the Pernambuco-Monrovia cable until they have been compensated for their expenditures on it. The Japanese may claim that the island of Yap is theirs and that the ownership of the cable is an incident to the ownership of the island. It is entirely clear that no trust arrangement can be satisfactory unless all the German cables are included and in addition such cables as have resulted from the division of German cables.

11. In any event it should now be decided to hold later in the year an international conference to deal with the entire subject of international communication by telephone, telegraph, cable and radio. Such a conference should be charged especially with devising ways and means of providing small nations with adequate service and further with the development of plans for facilitating the distribution of intelligence throughout the world at uniform, nominal rates.

I am, my dear Mr. President,
Sincerely yours,

[Signed] WALTER S. ROGERS.

PART IX

GERMANY AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE

DOCUMENT 65.

Memorandum of Major General Tasker H. Bliss for President Wilson, "Some Considerations for the Peace Conference before They Finally Draft Their Terms," dated March 25, 1919 (typewritten original).

SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PEACE CONFERENCE BEFORE THEY FINALLY DRAFT THEIR TERMS

When nations are exhausted by wars in which they have put forth all their strength and which leave them tired, bleeding and broken, it is not difficult to patch up a peace that may last until the generation which experienced the horrors of the war has passed away. Pictures of heroism and triumph only tempt those who know nothing of the sufferings and terrors of war. It is therefore comparatively easy to patch up a peace which will last for 30 years.

What is difficult, however, is to draw up a peace which will not provoke a fresh struggle when those who have had practical experience of what war means have passed away. History has proved that a peace which has been hailed by a victorious nation as a triumph of diplomatic skill and statesmanship, even of moderation, in the long run has proved itself to be shortsighted and charged with danger to the victor. The Peace of 1871 was believed by Germany to ensure not only her security but her permanent supremacy. The facts have shown exactly the contrary. France itself has demonstrated that those who say you can make Germany so feeble that she will never be able to hit back are utterly wrong. Year by year France became numerically weaker in comparison with her victorious neighbor, but in reality she became

ever more powerful. She kept watch on Europe, she made alliance with those whom Germany had wronged or menaced; she never ceased to warn the world of its danger and ultimately she was able to secure the overthrow of the far mightier power which had trampled so brutally upon her. You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth rate power; all the same in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of 1919 she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors. The impression, the deep impression, made upon the human heart by four years of unexampled slaughter will disappear with the hearts upon which it has been marked by the terrible sword of the great war. The maintenance of peace will then depend upon there being no causes of exasperation constantly stirring up the spirit of patriotism, of justice or of fair play to achieve redress. Our terms may be severe, they may be stern and even ruthless, but at the same time they can be so just that the country on which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no right to complain. But injustice, arrogance, displayed in the hour of triumph will never be forgotten or forgiven.

For these reasons I am, therefore, strongly averse to transferring more Germans from German rule to the rule of some other nation than can possibly be helped. I cannot conceive any greater cause of future war than that the German people, who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous and powerful races in the world should be surrounded by a number of small states, many of them consisting of people who have never previously set up a stable government for themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Germans clamouring for reunion with their native land. The proposal of the Polish Commission that we should place 2,100,000 Germans under the control of a people which is of a different religion and which has never proved its capacity for stable self-government throughout its history must, in my judgment, lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of Europe. What I have said about the Germans