IN INSURANCE CASES, RENDERED IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME AND CIRCUIT COURTS, AND IN THE STATE 81. MARINE.-Includes total Insurable Interest.-P. insured a vessel for $11,000, stated in the policies to be worth $13,500. The policy provided that no abandonment should be valid unless sufficient to vest in the company " an unincumbered and perfect title to the subject abandoned, and the valuation of said vessel, expressed in this policy, shall be considered the value in adjusting losses covered by this policy." The vessel was lost, and P. abandoned to the companies "all right, title and interest possessed by me in said vessel, tackle and apparel under said policy." The vessel was afterward recovered by the underwriters and repaired. A libel against the vessel filed by the carpenters mak 22759 ing the repairs, was contested by P. on the ground that he had only abandoned 22-27ths of the vessel. Held, that P.'s insurable interest was the whole vessel, which was the subject of the policy, and not an undivided share; that entire interest was included in the abandonment. P. had no further interest in the vessel, and was not entitled to defend the suit. Mills vs. Schooner Perew. Rep'd Jour❜l, p. 59. U. 8. C. C., N. Y. AGENT. § 2. LIFE.-Right to Commissions after Removal.-Parol and Written Contract.-The agent entered into a written contract, agreeing to pay over the balance due the company before the end of each month. He was subsequently removed, and alleged a parol agreement by which he was to be allowed commissions for three years afterward in the event of removal, in answer to a suit for the recovery of the balance claimed by the company. Held, that where, by virtue of the contract, it is the duty of a party to pay over money collected by him as agent for the other party at a time certain, no demand is necessary before action brought to recover the same. Wharton on Agency, 303, 304. Held, that parol agreement cannot be established, by custom or otherwise, to add to, vary, or contradict a written cont entered into contemporaneously with such alleged parol agreement. 2 Pars. Contr., 546; 1 Greenl. Ev., 275; Wright vs. RR. Co., 16 B. Monr., 6; McKegney vs. Widekin, 5 Bush., 109; Wilson vs. Shelburne, 6 Cush., 68; Doyle vs. Dixon, 12 Allen, 576; Kimball vs. Bradford, 9 Gray, 243; Clark vs. Houghton, 12 Gray, 38; Hakes vs. Hotchkiss, 23 Vt., 232. Castleman vs. Southern Mut. Life Ins. Co. Rep'd Jour'l, p. 64. KY. C. A.. ARSON. 83. FIRE.-Evidence.-Proof of Legal Existence of Company or Validity of Policy.—Payable to Mortgagee.—Intent to Defraud.— Upon an information for burning a building with intent to defraud an insurance company, it was Held, that it was not neces sary to prove the legal existence of the company. That if the company had a de facto organization, and was actually doing business, and the accused believed the policy to have been legally issued, and burned the building with the expectation that the money would be paid, and for the purpose of obtaining it, it was sufficient. Held, that if it was necessary to prove the legal existence of the company, which was a foreign one, a certificate of the insurance commissioner of this State that the company had complied with the laws of the State, and was authorized to carry on business here, (the statute requiring the commissioner to issue such certificate only on proof of the facts, and on a deposit with him of a copy of the charter and a sworn statement of its officers,) and the testimony of the agent of the company here that he had issued numerous policies for the company, were prima facie evidence of such legal existence; the case not being one in which the company was asserting its rights, or in which its legal existence was directly in issue. United States vs. Amedy, 11 Wheat., 392. The fact that the policy was made payable to a mortgagee of the building, was not inconsistent with the allegation that the company insured the building to the accused. The intent to defraud the insurance company could be inferred from the circumstances, though the mere act of burning might not be sufficient. State vs. Byrne. Rep'd Jour'l, p. 28. CT. S. C. E. ASSIGNMENT. $4. LIFE.-Of Policy to Wife when Testamentary.-Conrad Schadd insured his life for his own benefit, and his widow claimed the fund on the strength of the following document contained in a book belonging to insured, and remaining in his possession until his death. Pittsburgh, December 11, 1875. I, Conrad Schadd, husband of Margaretta Schadd, have insured my life with the Knickerbocker Company of New York, for $4,000. I, Conrad Schadd, assign the whole amount, $4,000, to my wife, Mrs. Margaretta Schadd, after my death, when she can do with it according to her best |