history, had these things in mind when, as President, he said in his great address before the Senate on January 22, 1917:

And in holding out the expectation that the people and government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named, I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfillment rather of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. They all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

One objection is sometimes made to the league which indicates a complete misunderstanding of its proposals. It is said that if we and Germany were now in such a league we should have to sit supinely by during the process of arbitration or conciliation while Germany continued to sink our ships and kill our people. Nothing could be farther from the truth. On the exact contrary, Germany would be bound to discontinue the particular acts of which we complain until the report of the board of arbitration or the council of conciliation, or we and all the other signatory powers would unite against her. The very language of the third proposal is:

The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith, both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as in the foregoing.

The discussion as to this league would not be complete without the voice that cries that it would be unconstitutional. We may entangle ourselves by agreement to defend the national independence of Panama or Cuba, we may agree not to use dum-dum bullets or to engage in privateering, we may agree to arbitrate our differences about the Alabama claims or the Newfoundland fisheries, but we must not agree to present future disputes to any tribunal

or council before we plunge ourselves and perhaps the world in war. There are always those to assert that it is unconstitutional to do whatever they do not want done; but the Constitution of the United States contains few limitations of the treaty-making power and none that prohibit such treaties as are involved in establishing a league to enforce peace. It is not proposed to take away the treaty making power, but to act under it. We are a sovereign nation for the assumption of obligations as well as for the assertion of rights. The obligations we assume will be far outweighed by the rights we shall gain. Whatever it may cost will be but a fraction of the tax in manhood and in money that is involved in preparation for war, to say nothing of participation in war.

The allied powers in their reply to President Wilson give to the previous statements of the responsible statesmen of most of the great neutral and belligerent nations, including Germany, this solemn sanction:

In a general way they (the Allies) desire to declare their respect for the lofty sentiments inspiring the American note and their whole-hearted agreement with the proposal to create a league of nations which shall assure peace and justice throughout the world.

They recognize all the benefits which will accrue to the cause of humanity and civilization from the institution of international arrangements designed to prevent violent conflicts between nations and so framed as to provide the sanctions necessary to their enforcement, lest an illusory security should serve merely to facilitate fresh acts of aggression.

Here then is a proposal, which, so far as it goes, as useful as it may prove, whether it succeeds or fails in accomplishing all its advocates expect, is at least a move in the right direction. It will at least diminish the causes and the occasions of war. Therefore we, the people of the United States, desiring peace, willing to take our part in the great family of nations, should be willing to contribute. whatever is necessary to further the most practical plan which has thus far been suggested for avoiding another unspeakable catastrophe such as the one now plunging the world in misery; and thus to aid those forces which work for civilization and for the peaceful progress of mankind.

OUR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION TREATIES SHOULD BE AMENDED

BY GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM,

New York.

As a preface to the statements I am about to make, I must state that I am strongly opposed to the United States of America becoming a party to a League for the Maintenance of Peace or any other form of permanent international alliance. The counsel of Washington is in my opinion as wise today as it was in 1796, and it still is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. . . . . Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we can safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

During more than a thousand years, many experiments have been attempted at securing a continued peace in the world by means of compacts, alliances and treaties. All have failed to gain more than temporary breathing spells in the long history of human strife. Conflicting or coincident interests and ambitions are more powerful than written stipulations. The century of peace with Great Britain which we celebrated a short time ago was the result of no peace compact, but the product of common traditions, like moral standards and similar interests. Even the Constitution of the United States, the most perfect example of a "League for the Maintenance of a Just and Durable Peace," was ineffectual, despite identity of tradition and language, to prevent one of the bloodiest wars in history among the states composing the Union, and a durable peace was secured only by removing the institution of slavery whose continued existence created an irrepressible conflict stronger than any written compact.

There is a positive danger to our essential national interests in looking to others to secure for us those conditions which strong nations should themselves obtain and keep. The period of frantic effort to put away all sense of responsibility to prepare our nation to defend its vital interests by force of arms, through which we have passed in the last few years, among other ways found expression in the making of a large number of ill-considered international agreements which, now that our national eyes are reopened to actualities,

we would do well to abrogate before becoming entangled by their provisions in serious international embarrassments.

The Tageblatt, of Berlin, a recognized government organ, has commented upon President Wilson's war message of April 2, by saying:

We realize now what a big mistake it was that German policy saw fit to refuse to conclude the Bryan peace treaty such as England and other powers entered into with the United States. If such a contract existed today the United States would be compelled to submit even the gravest differences to a court or arbitration before breaking relations. This would mean gaining at least a year. It is not at all impossible that President Wilson in his embarrassment would have taken that course to get away from the serious position into which his one track policy has led him.1

This expression pointedly calls attention to the possible effect upon our national interests of the series of treaties which under the pacifistic emotionalism of William Jennings Bryan, when Secretary of State, the United States was induced to promote and enter into with most of the European countries (with the exception of Germany, Austria and Turkey), with many of the South and Central American countries, and with China. These treaties, ratified by the Senate during the years 1914 and 1915, committed the United States to submit all disputes which may arise between the contracting parties concerning questions of an international character, which cannot be solved by direct diplomatic negotiation and are not embraced in the terms of any treaty of arbitration in force between them, to a commission for investigation and report, with the agreement that the parties will not declare war or begin hostilities pending the investigation and report of such commission. Chile and Uruguay reserved from the operation of the agreement questions affecting their vital interests, and in the case of Uruguay, those affecting its honor. Previous to Mr. Bryan's advent in the state department, the United States had been foremost in the extension by treaty of the principle of deciding by arbitration all disputes with foreign nations justiciable in their nature and not involving matters purely of national policy.

'New York Times, April 5, 1917.

2 That is with France, Great Britain, Spain, Russia, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal.

3

Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Haiti.

The Senate of the United States always had been careful to preserve its prerogative under the Constitution of ratifying or concurring in the making of every treaty negotiated by the President, and in consenting to the ratification of the convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes formulated at the Hague Conference of 1907, the Senate expressly resolved that:

Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.

The resolution further recited that the approval of the convention was given with the understanding that recourse to the permanent court for the settlement of differences could be had only by agreement thereto, through general or special treaties of arbitration theretofore or thereafter concluded between the parties in dispute.

Following the Hague Conference of 1907, arbitration conventions were entered into with Great Britain and France, dated August 3, 1911, each of which provided as follows:

All differences hereafter arising between the high contracting parties which it has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy, relating to international matters, in which the high contracting parties are concerned by virtue of claim of right made by one against the other, by treaty or otherwise, and which are justiciable in their nature, by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law or equity, shall be submitted

to arbitration under the provisions of the convention. In order that there might be no possible doubt as to the meaning of these words, the Senate, in ratifying the treaties, did so upon the expressed understanding

to be made part of such ratification that the treaty does not authorize the submission to arbitration of any question which affects the admission of aliens into the United States or the territorial integrity of the several states or of the United States, or concerning the question of the alleged indebtedness or moneyed obligations of any state of the United States, or any question which depends upon or involves the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions, commonly described as the Monroe Doctrine, or other purely governmental policy.

Perhaps one of the strongest motives which led to this careful avoidance of committing the United States to arbitrate, or submit