Crawford. Collins. persons who composed the firm known as the "Union Towing Company," the real owners of the debt and the legal holders of the bond. The parties to a copartnership may give it just such name as they please, and all contracts, obligations, or notes, made with or given to such firm, may be prosecuted in the individual names of its members. It is different with corporations; but the Union Towing Company was not a corporation. Chapter 482, of the Laws of 1862, has application to canal boats. The first section is made applicable to sea going or ocean bound vessels, or to any other vessel; and its fifth subdivision includes, among other items for which a vessel may be seized, that of towing. Bouvier says: "In maritime law, vessel is a ship, brig, sloop, or any other craft used in navigation." When a legislature in its enactments distinguishes between sea going and other vessels, the latter clause should be received in its largest sense, and be held to include all craft used in navigating any of the waters or canals of the state. The case of Many v. Noyes, (5 Hill, 34,) was decided under the Revised Statutes, (2 R. S. 493,) which only contained the words "ships or vessels," and did not name "towing" as one of the debts which might be a lien. The act of 1862 was a substitute for the Revised Statutes, repealing the latter, and its enlarged terms show a design to extend its benefits beyond the narrow construction given, by the courts, to the repealed statute. The third section of the statute requires the specification of lien to be filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which the debt shall have been contracted. This claim was for towing the canal boat Sidney L. Cross from Troy to New York. The offer to tow the boat to New York was made at Troy, and there accepted; but no time of payment was specified, no payment made, or negotiable obligation given, and hence the money did not become due until the delivery of the boat at New York. The place of bargain was Troy, but the agreement did not become a debt until performance; it was completed in New York; and hence, in a legal sense, Crawford v. Collins. the debt may properly be said, within the spirit and intent of said statute, to have been contracted in New York. A careful consideration of the statute will demonstrate this. A lien is given by said act against vessels for work done, or materials fnrnished; for provisions or stores; for wharfage or keeping of vessels in port; for loading or unloading; and for towing. Some of these are matters which can only be performed or rendered at the port where the vessel lies, while others may be contracted for elsewhere, to be performed at such port, to be paid for when performed. If a vessel lay in the port of Albany, a contract for loading or unloading might be made in Troy, but could only be performed in Albany. While executory, no debt is created; but when performed, a debt would exist. So if provisions were contracted for in Schenectady, to be delivered on board in Albany, or goods on a wharf at Albany, were contracted for in New York to be paid for at Albany; or a contract made by a steamer in the Narrows off Richmond county to tow a vessel into New York, to be paid for on reaching port. In each case the executory contract would be in one county, to be completed in another; until completed no debt would exist; and can there be a doubt that the legislature intended the specification of lien should be filed in the latter county. No purpose would be subserved by a filing in Rensselaer in the one case, or in Schenectady, New York or Richmond in the others. The intention of the legislature was to furnish a record where creditors and purchasers might seek information; and in the counties where were the ports at which the vessel had touched. What the legislature meant by the term "the county in which such debt shall have been contracted," was the port where a contract was performed, or completed, and became a debt; not the locality where a bargain was made. In this view, the specification was properly filed in the New York clerk's office. The statute requires that to constitute a lien, a specification of the same shall be sworn to by the person having Crawford v. Collins. the same, his legal representatives, agents or assigns. The specifications in this case stated that the Union Towing Company composed, &c. had a lien upon the canal boat Sidney L. Cross for towing, &c. and was signed and sworn to by C. T. Benjamin, agent. The proof of the agency of Benjamin was sufficient. As general agent he had the authority to sign and verify such specification, it being an act in the business of his agency, and such signing and verification was the act of his principal. For enforcing the lien given by the act, it provides that any person having a lien may apply for a warrant to any officer "authorized to perform the duties of a Justice of the Supreme Court at chambers." In this case application was made to a Justice of the Supreme Court and the warrant granted by him. It is insisted that no authority to issue such warrant is vested in a Justice of the Supreme Court by the act, but only in such officers as are authorized by law to do what a Justice can do at chambers. In this we differ from the learned counsel of the defendants, and hold that the authority exists with the Justices of this court equally with those authorized by law to perform their duties at chambers. The bond sued upon seems to have been executed by all the defendants. Upon its face, all are liable for such an amount as was established as due the plaintiffs. It was insisted that because Vincent, one of the sureties thereon, was objected to as not being a freeholder, and held not competent for that reason, and another surety, Day, afterwards added, the bond again presented and then approved, Vincent was not liable thereon. But objecting to Vincent for insufficiency, even though the objection was sustained, and another surety added, would not release Vincent, so long as his name was on the bond when finally accepted and the property released. On the trial the plaintiffs' claim for towing was proved; the claim had been made a lien upon the boat, and was in force when the boat was seized; it was released upon the delivery of the bond in suit; its execution by the defendants Breese v. United States Telegraph Company. was duly proved; the jury have assessed that claim at $101.06; and for that sum judgment should be directed for the plaintiffs with costs. [SCHENECTADY GENERAL TERM, January 2, 1866. Bockes, James and Rosekrans, Justices.] 45 274 124a 267 BREESE and MUMFORD vs. UNITED STATES TELEGRAPH A telegraph company furnished to the public printed blanks, upon which per- And that this legal consequence was not varied by the fact that the sender of Against such a claim the principle of estoppel in pais applies in full force. Telegraph companies are not common carriers. The two kinds of business have but a mere fanciful resemblance, and can not be subjected to the same legal rules and liabilities. But even if they were common carriers, their right to limit their liability, by express contract, is well settled. The plaintiffs delivered to the defendant, for transmission from Palmyra to their correspondents in New York, a message directing the purchase of "$700 Breese v. United States Telegraph Company. in gold," written upon such a printed blank as above described, and signed by them, without ordering the message to be repeated, or providing for its being insured. Through the error of some of the defendant's operators, the message, as delivered to the correspondents, required them to purchase "$7000" instead of the smaller sum; in consequence of which error the plaintiff's suffered serious loss. Held that they could not recover the amount, of the company. ONTROVERSY without action, submitted under section 372 of the Code. The following are the facts: On the 16th of March, 1865, George W. Cuyler, president of the First National Bank of Palmyra, acting for the plaintiffs, presented to the defendant, a corporation duly incorporated, and engaged in the business of transmitting messages and dispatches by electric telegraph for hire, over its line of wires, extending from the city of New York northwardly and westwardly, at its office in Palmyra, a certain dispatch written upon the ordinary blank of the defendant, and requested the same to be transmitted to the parties to whom the same was addressed, and paid for such transmission the fee charged by the defendant, but did not pay for, nor request to have the same repeated. The blank and message thereon written were as follows: "No. To all points in the United States and British Provinces. Reg'd. UNITED STATES TELEGRAPH COMPANY.-E. C. Fellows, Gen'l Supt., Syracuse, N. Y. W. H. Kirtland, Ass't Supt. Rochester, N. Y. N. Randall, President, Syracuse, N. Y. S. C. Hay, Secretary, N. Y. In order to guard against errors or delays in the transmission or delivery of messages, every message of importance ought to be repeated by being sent back from the station to which it is directed to the station from which it is sent, and compared with the original message. Half the tariff price will be charged for thus repeating and comparing. And it is hereby agreed, between the signer or signers of this message and this company, that this company shall not be held re |