The People v. Stiner. The report and judgment must be set aside and a new trial ordered; costs to abide the event. Case referred back to the referee. [NEW YORK GENERAL TERM, September 19, 1865. Ingraham, Leonard and Sutherland, Justices.] THE PEOPLE, ex rel. Stover, vs. STINER and others. One who has acknowledged the right of another, to premises, and made an agreement with him for the occupation thereof by himself as tenant, for a Imited period, can not dispute his landlord's title, by setting up an outstanding title held by himself, of which the landlord had no notice. If a lease is invalid, as against subsequent conveyances, for want of being recordel, a sublease of the same premises will also be of no validity. N this case the relator, claiming to be the holder of a lease IN of premises on Eighth avenue in the city of New York, was sought to be removed from the occupation of them on the ground that his term had expired. The original owner, Hertzel, had leased the premises for five years from 1st May, 1861, which lease by assignment had passed to one Reynolds, who subleased the premises to Stover for two years from 1st May, 1864. Afterwards, Hertzel gave a lease to Stiner of the same premises, in Febuary, 1865. He finding Stover in possession, claims to have made an agreement with him for the hiring of the premises from that date to the 1st May next ensuing, and that Stover paid the rent to that time. The testimony of Stover contradicted this alleged hiring, and it became a question of fact to be decided by the court below whether such hiring ever took place. Upon this question the justice decided in favor of the respondent. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent, and the relator now asks to have the proceedings reversed. The People v. Stiner. By the Court, INGRAHAM, P. J. The only question in the case is whether Stover can take the benefit of the lease from Reynolds to him. Such lease would have been valid and would have entitled him to the property, if he has not by his contract with Stover, acknowledged his title as landlord and made an agreement with him up to May, 1865. It does not appear that he ever made any claim under the two year lease, or gave any notice of its existence to Stiner, but as the justice has found the existence of an agreement for letting between Stover and Stiner, we are bound to consider that such a contract was made, and that Stover became the tenant of Stiner up to the 1st May, 1865. Having thus acknowledged the landlord's right to the premises and made an agreement with him as tenant for a limited period, he can not dispute his landlord's title, under an outstanding title held by him, of which the landlord had no notice. (9 N. Y. Rep. 45.) It may also be doubted whether the lease to Stover was of any validity as against Stiner. That lease was given by one holding a lease for five years, which does not appear to have been recorded, and which would not be valid against any subsequent conveyance. If the lease to Angevine became invalid as against Stover for want of being recorded, the sublease to Stover, would be also of no validity. Stiner was entitled to the possession of the premises whenever Stover's title ended, and he was the only person who could maintain. these proceedings. The case of Griffin v. Clark, (33 Barb. 45,) is not in conflict with this ruling. I entertain doubt from the evidence as to the fact of the new hiring by Stover from Stiner. The facts as stated might be construed as a mere attornment by Stover to Stiner under his lease, but as the justice has held otherwise and the evidence of Stiner will warrant this finding, we can not interfere on that ground. The judgment should be affirmed. [NEW YORK GENERAL TERM, September 19, 1865,, Ingraham, Leonard and Sutherland, Justices.] VOSE and JOYCE vs. COCKROFT and LEARY. Where the master of a vessel is sailing her under an agreement between him and the owner by which he, the master, is to sail her "on shares," paying all bills for wages of officers and crew, and furnishing provisions therefor, and as "wages for himself," receiving one half of the gross amount of freight, the knowledge of the existence of such a contract, by persons furnishing supplies for the use of the vessel, on the order of the master, will not import an exclusive credit to the master, or prevent the enforcement of a lien upon the vessel, for such supplies. Such an agreement between the owner of a vessel and the master, being only for the mode of compensating the master, does not release the vessel from the ordinary liability for supplies. HIS action was brought upon a bond given by the defend THIS ants, for the purpose of releasing the brig Jachin from an attachment issued against her upon the application of the plaintiff to enforce an alleged lien for supplies, furnished said vessel by the plaintiffs. The supplies consisted of a bill of provisions, furnished by the plaintiffs for the brig Jachin, for a voyage she was about to make from the port of New York to Trinidad. The cause was tried on the 5th day of November, 1863, before Mr. Justice ALLEN, without a jury; who found as matter of fact, that in the month of March, 1859, Lorenzo W. Lovejoy was master of the brig Jachin, owned by the defendant Cockroft. That Lovejoy, as such master, on March 9, 1859, contracted a debt to the plaintiffs on account of materials and supplies, and articles furnished for or towards the fitting, furnishing and equipping the brig Jachin, and for provisions and stores fit and proper for the use of the brig Jachin, and which were of the value of $231.56. That the plaintiffs duly filed specifications, as required by the statute, giving liens on domestic vessels, and duly applied for a warrant to enforce the lien, and the vessel was duly arrested under said warrant, and the defendants gave the bond set up in the pleadings to release her from the same. He further found as matter of fact, that at the time said provisions and stores were furnished, as aforesaid, Lovejoy was sailing said Vose v. Cockroft. vessel under a written agreement with her owner, the defendant Jacob H. V. Cockroft, of which the following is a copy: "New York, May 54, 1858. It is this day mutually agreed between J. H. V. Cockroft, owner of the brig Jachin, and Lorenzo W. Lovejoy, that the latter shall take charge of the said brig Jachin, and sail her on shares, as is customary in such cases, that is, the master shall pay all bills for wages of officers and crew, and furnish provisions therefor, also one half of all bills for extra labor, stevedores, towages, wharfage, dunnage, commissions, chronometer hire, and other port charges; he shall conduct the business of the vessel in a proper manner, and in consideration of these services, and as wages for himself, shall receive one half of the gross amount of freight earned by said brig Jachin during the period that he remains master of the vessel aforesaid. J. H. V. CoCKROFT. That Lovejoy remained in charge of said brig as master, under said agreement, until the provisions and supplies furnished by the plaintiffs, and claimed in this action, were furnished for said brig, and were put on board, when the said Cockroft assumed the control of the said brig, and discharged said master, and the said supplies, &c. were afterwards used in and upon, and for the benefit of said vessel. The plaintiffs had previously owned this vessel, and had sold her to Cockroft, and Lovejoy had sailed the vessel for the plaintiffs under an agreement similar to that with Cockroft. Lovejoy had bought his stores of the plaintiffs for this vessel for several voyages before, for which he had paid them out of his share of the earnings of the vessel when the vessel returned from the voyage for which the stores were furnished. Lovejoy ordered this bill of stores from the plaintiffs, and understood from the plaintiffs that he was liable for them. That none of said debt has ever been paid to the plaintiffs. And the judge found, as matter of law, that the said debt Vose v. Cockroft. was a subsisting lien upon said vessel, and was duly exhibited, and that by reason of the non-payment thereof the condition of the bond has been broken; and that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover of the defendants the amount of said debt and interest, amounting in all to the sum of $306.91, with costs. Judgment being entered accordingly, the defendants appealed. Chas. N. Black, for the appellants. Benedict, Burr & Benedict, for the respondents. LEONARD, J. The contract between Lovejoy, the master, and Cockroft, the owner, was not a chartering of the vessel; but was a mode for fixing the wages of the master. He was to take a share of the gross earnings, from which he was to bear certain expenses of running the vessel; and this share he was to receive "as wages." There is no time fixed for the continuance of the agreement. The owner could remove the master at any time, without his consent; and it appears that he finally did so, having the supplies furnished by the plaintiffs, then on board, for which they never had been paid, and of which, it follows, that the owner had the exclusive benefit. The master ordered the supplies, and the plaintiffs furnished them on that order, for the use of the vessel, and they were such as were proper. The knowledge of such a contract does not import an exclusive credit to the master, or any inconsistency with the present position of enforcing a lien for the supplies, so far as I can understand it. The plaintiffs probably expected the master to pay for the supplies; but that does not indicate that they were not to look to their lien if he did not do so. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. INGRAHAM, P. J. The agreement with the captain, made by the owner, being only for the mode of compensation, did |