The harvests of 1917 were below the average and on July 30 reports to the Washington Food Offices were that fresh fowls brought $1.01 a pound, young laying hens, $3.32 each, well-fed geese, $11 to $19 each; that the egg ration at Hamburg for one week was one egg for each person; that horses were in great demand for food, with horse-flesh selling at from 53 cents to 86 cents a pound and rabbits at $2 each. According to similar statements on Oct. 18 the weekly German ration then was, approximately, 41⁄2 pounds of bread, half a peck of potatoes, a cupful of beans, peas or oatmeal, half a pound of meat, 12 cubes of sugar, 6 individual patties of butter and an equal amount of other fats. The caloric value of these foods in the aggregate was less than half the amount estimated by the U. S. Food Administration as sufficient for a person in a sedentary occupation. At this time it appeared that leather for boots and shoes was almost at an end, that a big shortage in vegetables existed, that the material allowed for clothes had to be further lessened. Carl W. Ackerman, a correspondent who returned with Mr. Gerard, gave the following list of food supplies which could not be obtained in Germany: Rice Fruit Flavours Cream Candy Syrups Ice Cream Olive Oil Coffee Nuts Macaroni Beer (malt or hops) Chocolate Dried Vegetables Mr. Ackerman's opinion, as expressed in newspaper articles in November, was as follows: "In their present under-nourished condition the public cannot face a defeat. If the War ends this year Germany will not be so starved that she will accept any peace terms. But if the War continues another year or two Germany will have to give up." Herbert Corey, another correspondent, who spent much time in 1917 with German refugees on the Swiss borders, put the situation in another way at this time: "Germany is suffering from progressive mechanical deterioration and cumulative human misery. There will be more food in Germany during the next 12 months than there was during the 12 months past. The weakness in the German war fabric is not one of material, but of morale." He illustrated this statement in a despatch dated Berne, Oct. 20, in which he said: "Already the weakness occasioned by persistent under-feeding is making itself felt in the death rate. Men and women of more than 45 years of age and children under 6 or 7 years have slight chance of regaining their strength when attacked by an illness that at other times would be considered of a minor class. Deaths are being reported from catarrhal colds, from rheumatism, anæmia, and various stomach and digestive troubles, which are in reality occasioned by the under-nourishment of the past 2 years. An epidemic of dysentery is sweeping through Germany." Of course, the war-map victories in Italy and the possible peace with Russia pending at this time gave a factitious strength for the meeting of such conditions but there seemed no doubt that at the close of 1917 the German food situation was serious. Starvation, however, was not so near as the London Post or Express and some British correspondents thought, though the blockade had become wonder fully efficient and much more so as the United States pressure of war action became operative. In the general situation Germany still had certain specific advantages over her enemies-(1) the absence of experiments or improvisation in types of guns and weapons through a careful preparedness policy-except as new inventions might develop; (2) regulated wages which gave cheaper war materials; (3) slave labour in the forcible enlistment of about 2,000,000 prisoners of war and the requisitioned workers from conquered populations totalling 42,000,000; (4) free coal and iron from conquered mines in France, Belgium and Poland; (5) a geographical position which gave speedier and cheaper war transportation; (6) seizure of much war material, foodstuffs, finished products, personal property, specie, jewels and securities; (7) War imports and exploitation of natural resources in captured territories. War Methods Allies. The Germans The German occupation of Belgium had begun. in Belgium with a crime-a self-acknowledged offence-against and France; International law and treaties; it proceeded in a of the Teuton spirit of cruel terrorism over the population with a ruthless ravaging of life and home and public rights and private property; it was practiced in 1917 along lines of systematic exploitation of the resources, labour, incomes and industry of the country. There had been, and there continued, forced requisitions upon industry, municipalities and individuals in defiance of all international laws and regulations. Up to July 6, 1917, there were 140 Administrative Orders* issued in the Official Bulletin dealing with all kinds of natural products and raw materials and deliberately calculated to fetter or limit Belgian industries by restrictions upon factories and farms, exports and imports, transport of merchandise, etc. They were made absolutely subsidiary to German industries while the Belgian workmen were deported in tens of thousands to help in operating those of Germany; this slavelabour policy was pursued also in Poland and Roumania. Even Belgian trade secrets and industrial methods were utilized and operated in Germany, while tools and machinery were carried away by wholesale. Financially, the German mark was established at a compulsory rate in francs; the illegal principle of collective responsibility for individual infraction of complex German-imported regulations was made the excuse for heavy fines upon communities and heads of large families; war contributions exacted and fines imposed were estimated in the middle of 1917 at $40,000,000; military levies were exacted out of all proportion to the only legal purpose involved -the needs of the occupying army-and by Order of May 21, 1917, they amounted to $12,000,000 a month, or a total up to Aug. 10 of $288,000,000 since the outbreak of war; various new taxes and imports were established by the Government of occupation in direct violation of the Hague Convention and, on Sept. 12, 1916, the cash balances of two large Banks (private corporations) to a total of $100,000,000 were seized and transferred to the Berlin Reichsbank; *NOTE.-A volume by Fernand Passelecq published at Paris. the value of requisitioned raw material and seized machinery and tools was estimated up to Jan. 31, 1915, by Dr. Ludwig Gaughofer in the Münchener Neueste Nachtrichten (Feb. 26. 1916) at $400,000,000. General Von Bissing, the late Military Governor, in his wellknown "Political Testament" described this general situation as follows: I must call attention to the fact that the industrial territory of Belgium is of great value, not only in time of peace, but also in case of war. The supplementary advantages which we have derived in the present war from Belgian industries, by the carrying away of machines, etc., must be accounted fully as great as the injury caused to the enemy by the deprivation of these resources. The immediate importance of the industrial region of Belgium does not exhaust the interest of the subject for us. Without Belgian coal, what would have become of our policy of exchange with Holland and the northern countries? The 23,000,000 tons taken annually from the Belgian coal mines have given us a monopoly on the Continent which has contributed to assure our existence. The deportation and forced labour of the Belgians was the cruellest action and condition of 1917. Commenced in the preceding autumn it had elicited official protests from the United States, Spain, Switzerland and Holland. According to a formal document issued by the Belgian State Department conditions showed (1) the cessation of the larger part of Belgian industries owing to the systematic economic war carried on by Germany with the consequent reduction to idleness of 300,000 to 400,000 workmen; then (2) the organized deportation of many thousands of these men for the alleged reason of aid to unemployment and the real reason of providing forced war-labour of civilians behind the German front or in depleted German factories and workshops. A Belgian Mission to the United States-headed by Baron Moncheur -followed and told the President and American leaders, at close range, something of local conditions; in February Cardinal Mercier wrote continued and vigorous protests to Baron Von Huehne, acting Governor-General in succession to the late General Von Bissing, against the renewed "kidnapping of thousands of my fellow-countrymen." Referring to the fines levied upon priests for refusing to aid in the make-up of lists for deported labour he added: "We await our vengeance in patience. I am not speaking of our earthly vengeance. We have that already, for the régime of occupation that you force us to undergo is despised by everything that is decent in the whole world. I am speaking of the judgment of history, of the inescapable punishment of the God of Justice." The treatment of these workmen as shown in varied and numerous reports was that of slaves; the Belgian Government for instance issued a statement describing the various "punishments" resorted to in order to make men work for their own enemies. In February these raids or deportations ceased for a time and, in reply to neutral protests and the appeal of the Pope, it was announced that all who did not wish to remain in Germany would be returned. Many did come back but later on they were seized and again deported. In the summer there was a renewal of general deportation. *NOTE.-Published in U.S. Official Bulletin, June 9, 1917. One of the worst phases of this policy was that it included women and young girls estimates ranging as high as 20,000-who were thus torn from their homes and deported for enforced labour amongst and for the roughest of soldiers. Press stories of their treatment, private letters made public or known to a few, gave details too horrible for full narration here. After reading some of these statements the most impartial historian will appreciate the conclusion of J. H. Baker of the Minneapolis Tribune, and latterly of the Ambulance Service in France, that: "No story of the German's treatment of women can be exaggerated. Ambulance men and soldiers agree on that." Of these German slaves (both men and women) as Mr. Gerard called them, 30,000 men and women were estimated to have been taken from Antwerp and surrounding regions and 20,000 from the Belgian Province of Luxembourg. Of the whole situation a Canadian home from the front, Major, the Rev. Dr. C. W. Gordon, said in Winnipeg on Dec. 31: "Then there is the present slave drive in Belgium. It is a real slave drive; no other words can describe it. It has all the pain, all the anguish, the indignity and the inhumanity which roused such resentment against slavery in the United States." The German organization of the country, however, showed much care in hygienic and educational matters, skill and some success in the promotion of agricultural production and the management of war factories, simplicity and directness in the drafting of enactments, a skilful use of the bi-lingual situation under which nearly half the country spoke Flemish-a sort of German dialect dating back to the days of the Roman Empire. Toward the close of the year it was announced that Belgium would be forcibly divided into two Provinces running roughly along bi-lingual lines of French and Flemish. It does not appear, according to a statement by Baron Moncheur, that prices of food ranged very much higher than they did in many parts of Germany itself-though there was, of course, little money to buy it with. As to the military and political situation the German intention to hold Belgium was stiffened by the close of 1917. The belief of General Von Bissing that the War would be lost if Belgium were not kept at its end was an essential faith of the Pan-German party. In the official Memorandum prepared by him shortly before his death on Apr. 18* he urged annexation, because, otherwise, Belgium would be a centre for enemy plot and aggressive action in the next war; because it was, on the other hand, the natural passage to France for German armies, and should be a shield for German manufacturing interests and regions: "Belgium must be seized and held as it now is, and as it must be in future. If only on account of the necessary bases for our fleet, and in order not to cut off Antwerp from the Belgian trade area, it is necessary to have the adjacent hinterland." Meanwhile Dr. Stresemann, a leading Liberal member of the Reichstag, had stated in a public speech on Jan. 7 that: "If peace is concluded without Germany's possessing the Flemish coast, *NOTE. Published by the late Governor's friend, N. W. Bacmeister, in Bergisch Markische Zeitung, May 18, 1917. England is the winning, and we are the losing side. A neutral Belgium is an historical impossibility after the War. Without the future possibility of marching through Belgium the Germans must fight the next war on the Rhine and not in France." To him Von Bissing had written (Jan. 14) congratulations upon this point of view, mentioned his Memorandum, as above quoted, and added: "We must push as far northwards as possible the frontier which in future will protect Belgium from England and France. As the coast is part of that frontier, the coast must be our frontier. I was delighted to see this point brought forward at a recent meeting of the Navy League." The Pan-German party expressed their feelings clearly in a pamphlet-manifesto early in 1917: "Above all, the domination of Belgium improves our position against England. . Nothing can prevent the construction of a fortified harbour on the marshy coast of Flanders, which could not be successfully attacked even by the most powerful fleet." Even more significant was the conversation in January, 1917, described by J. W. Gerard, U.S. Ambassador to Berlin*, with Herr Von Bethmann-Hollweg, then Chancellor: Mr. Gerard: 'Are the Germans willing to withdraw from Belgium?' The Chancellor: 'Yes, but with guarantees.' Mr. Gerard: 'What are these guarantees?' The Chancellor: 'We must possibly have the forts of Liège and Namur. We must have other forts and garrisons throughout Belgium. We must have possession of the railroad lines. We must have possession of the ports and other means of communication. The Belgians will not be allowed to maintain an army, but we must be allowed to retain a large army in Belgium. We must have commercial control of Belgium.' No thought of such a possibility as annexation appeared in Allied documents, policy or public expression and during this year steps were taken to estimate the damages which Germany would have to pay a free and restored Belgium. The Belgian Government's preliminary figures were as follows: German war exactions $238,000,000, private and municipal assessments $40,000,000, confiscation of machinery and raw materials $400,000,000, destruction of sources of economic wealth-not including private property$1,000,000,000. As to this latter point a Belgian Government map was issued showing 43,000 estates destroyed by German occupation. On May 31 King Albert enacted and declared, upon advice of his Ministers, that "all acts of disposal or transfer of movable property or real estate belonging to the State, and the seizure of which has been made or ordered by the enemy since the 4th of August, 1914, unless they fall within the scope of a normal management, are null and void. As a result of the necessary withdrawal of the U.S. Ambassador at Berlin, H. C. Hoover of the Relief Commission and Brand Whitlock, Minister in Belgium, from control of the Belgian Relief Commission early in 1917, that great organization passed into the hands of other neutrals and suffered considerably in its work. Lord Robert Cecil, British Minister of Blockade, on Feb. 14 paid high *NOTE.-Four Years in Germany, Page 365. |