rials; and, from the facility and certainty of communication between them, it will be useless to incur, at these depots, the expense of similar machinery, especially that used in preparing the usual metallic and wooden furniture of vessels.

Another improvement would be effected, by dispensing altogether with the navy board, as now constituted, and substituting in its stead bureaus similar to those already existing in the war department. Each member of the board transferred to the head of a separate bureau, charged with specific duties, would feel, in its highest degree, that wholesome responsibility which can not be divided without a far more than proportionate diminution of its force. Their valuable services would become still more so when separately appropriated to distinct portions of the great interests of the navy; to the prosperity of which each would be impelled to devote himself by the strongest motives. Under such an arrangement, every branch of this important service would assume a more simple and precise character; its efficiency would be increased, and scrupulous economy in the expenditure of public money promoted.

I would also recommend that the marine corps be merged in the artillery or infantry, as the best mode of curing the many defects in its organization. But little exceeding in number any of the regiments of infantry, that corps has, besides its lieutenant-colonel commandant, five brevet lieutenant-colonels, who receive the full pay and emoluments of their brevet rank, without rendering proportionate service. Details for marine service could as well be made from the infantry or artillery, there being no peculiar training requisite for it.

With these improvements, and such others as zealous watchfulness and mature consideration may suggest, there can be little doubt that, under an energetic administration of its affairs, the navy may soon be made everything that the nation wishes it to be. Its efficiency in the suppression of piracy in the West India seas, and wherever its squadrons have been employed in securing the interests of the country, will appear from the report of the secretary, to which I refer you for other interesting details. Among these I would bespeak the attention of Congress for the views presented in relation to the inequality between the army and navy as to the pay of officers. No such inequality should prevail between these brave defenders of their country; and where it does exist, it is submitted to Congress whether it ought not to be rectified

The report of the postmaster-general is referred to as exhibiting a highly satisfactory administration of that department. Abuses have been reformed, increased expedition in the transmission of the mail secured, and its revenue much improved. In a political point of view, this department is chiefly important as affording the means of diffusing knowledge. It is to the body politic what the veins and arteries are to the natural-conveying rapidly and regularly to the remotest parts of the system, correct information of the operations of the government, and bringing back to it the wishes and feelings of the people. Through its agency, we have secured to ourselves the full enjoyment of the blessings of a free press.

In this general survey of our affairs, a subject of high importance presents itself in the present organization of the judiciary. A uniform operation of the federal government in the different states is certainly desirable; and, existing as they do in the Union, on the basis of perfect equality, each state has a right to expect that the benefits conferred on the citizens of others should be extended to hers. The judicial system of the United States exists

in all its efficiency in only fifteen members of the Union; to three others, the circuit courts, which constitute an important part of that system, have been imperfectly extended; and to the remaining six, altogether denied. The effect has been, to withhold from the inhabitants of the latter the advantages afforded (by the supreme court) to their fellow-citizens in other states, in the whole extent of the criminal, and much of the civil authority of the federal judiciary. That this state of things ought to be remedied, if it can be done consistently with the public welfare, is not to be doubted; neither is it to be disguised that the organization of our judicial system is at once a difficult and delicate task. To extend the circuit courts equally throughout the different parts of the Union, and, at the same time, to avoid such a multiplication of members as would encumber the supreme appellate tribunal, is the object desired. Perhaps it might be accomplished by dividing the circuit judges into two classes, and providing that the supreme court should be held by those classes alternately, the chief justice always presiding.

If an extension of the circuit court system to those states which do not now enjoy its benefits should be determined upon, it would of course be necessary to revise the present arrangement of the circuits; and even if that system should not be enlarged, such a revision is recommended.

A provision for taking the census of the people of the United States will, to insure the completion of that work within a convenient time, claim the early attention of Congress.

The great and constant increase of business in the department of state forced itself, at an early period, upon the attention of the executive. Thirteen years ago it was, in Mr. Madison's last message to Congress, made the subject of an earnest recommendation, which has been repeated by both of his successors; and my comparatively limited experience has satisfied me of its justness. It has arisen from many causes, not the least of which is the large addition that has been made to the family of independent nations, and the proportionate extension of our foreign relations. The remedy proposed was the establishment of a home department—a measure which does not appear to have met the views of Congress, on account of its supposed tendency to increase, gradually and imperceptibly, the already too strong bias of the federal system toward the exercise of authority not delegated to it. I am not, therefore, disposed to revive the recommendation, but am not the less impressed with the importance of so organizing that department, that its secretary may devote more of his time to our foreign relations. Clearly satisfied that the public good would be promoted by some suitable provision on the subject, I respectfully invite your attention to it.

The charter of the bank of the United States expires in 1836, and its stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from precipitancy in a measure involving such important principles, and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I can not, in justice to the parties interested, too soon present it to the deliberate consideration of the legislature and the people. Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law creating this bank are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens; and it must be admitted by all, that it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency.

Under these circumstances, if such an institution is deemed essential to he fiscal operations of the government, I submit to the wisdom of the legislature whether a national one, founded upon the credit of the government

and its revenues, might not be devised, which would avoid all constitutional difficulties, and at the same time secure all the advantages to the government and country that were expected to result from the present bank.

I can not close this communication without bringing to your view the just claim of the representatives of Commodore Decatur, his officers and crew, arising from the recapture of the frigate Philadelphia, under the heavy batteries of Tripoli. Although sensible, as a general rule, of the impropriety of executive interference under a government like ours, where every individual enjoys the right of directly petitioning Congress, yet, viewing this case as one of a very peculiar character, I deem it my duty to recommend it to your favorable consideration. Besides the justice of this claim, as corresponding to those which have been since recognised and satisfied, it is the fruit of a deed of patriotic and chivalrous daring, which infused life and confidence into our infant navy, and contributed, as much as any exploit in its history, to elevate our national character. Public gratitude, therefore, stamps her seal upon it, and the meed should not be withheld which may hereafter operate as a stimulus to our gallant tars.

I now commend you, fellow-citizens, to the guidance of Almighty God, with a full reliance on his merciful providence for the maintenance of our free institutions; and with an earnest supplication that whatever errors it may be my lot to commit, in discharging the arduous duties which have devolved on me, will find a remedy in the harmony and wisdom of your counsels.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

JANUARY 5, 1830.

To the Senate of the United States :

I HAVE been requested by the legislature of South Carolina, as will appear from the documents accompanying this communication, to submit to the consideration of Congress certain claims against the United States for advances made by that state during the last war. It is conceded that the redress sought for can only be obtained through the interposition of Congress. The only agency allowed to me is, to present such facts in relation to the subject as are in the possession of the executive, in order that the whole may be fairly considered.

This duty I perform with great pleasure, being well satisfied that no inducement will be wanting to secure to the claims of a member of the confederacy that has, under all circumstances, shown an ardent devotion to the cause of the country, the most ample justice.

By a reference to the department of war, for information as to the nature and extent of these claims, it appears that they consist of:

1st. Interest upon moneys advanced for the United States which have been heretofore reimbursed;

2d. Certain advances which, on a settlement between South Carolina and the United States, were disallowed, or suspended, by the accounting officers of the treasury.

In regard to the former, the rule hitherto adopted by Congress has been to allow to the states interest only where they had paid it on money borrowed, and had applied it to the use of the United States. The case of South Carolina does not come strictly within this rule, because, instead of borrowing, as she alleges, for the use of the United States, upon interest, she applied to the use of the United States funds for which she was actually receiving an interest; and as she is understood to insist that the loss of interest in both cases being equal, and the relief afforded equally meritorious, the same principle of remuneration should be applied.

Acting upon an enlightened sense of national justice and gratitude, it is confidently believed that Congress will be as mindful of this claim as it has been of others put forward by the states that, in periods of extreme peril, generously contributed to the service of the Union, and enabled the general government to discharge its obligations. The grounds upon which certain portions of it have been suspended or rejected, will appear from the communications of the secretary of war, and third auditor, herewith submitted.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

JANUARY 26, 1830.

To the Senate and House of Representatives :

I FIND it necessary to recommend to Congress a revision of the laws relating to the direct and contingent expenses of our intercourse with foreign nations, and particularly of the act of May 1, 1810, entitled, “An act fixing the compensation of public ministers, and of consuls residing on the coast of Barbary, and for other purposes."

A letter from the fifth auditor of the treasury, to the secretary of state, herewith transmitted, which notices the difficulties incident to the settlement of the accounts of certain diplomatic agents of the United States, serves to show the necessity of this revision. This branch of the government is incessantly called upon to sanction allowances which not unfrequently appear to have just and equitable foundations in usage, but which are believed to be incompatible with the provisions of the act of 1810. The letter from the fifth auditor contains a description of several claims of this character, which are submitted to Congress as the only tribunal competent to afford the relief to which the parties consider themselves entitled.

Among the most prominent questions of this description are the following:

I. Claims for outfits by ministers and chargés des affaires duly appointed by the president and senate.

The act of 1790, regulating the expenditures for foreign intercourse, provided, "that, exclusive of an outfit, which shall in no case exceed one year's full salary to the minister plenipotentiary or chargé d'affaires to whom the same may be allowed, the president shall not allow to any minister plenipotentiary a greater sum than at the rate of nine thousand dollars per annum, as a compensation for all his personal services and other expenses; nor a greater sum for the same than four thousand five hundred

dollars per annum to a chargé d'affaires." By this provision, the maximum of allowance only was fixed, leaving the question as to any outfit, either in whole or in part, to the direction of the president, to be decided according to circumstances. Under it, a variety of cases occurred, in which outfits, having been given to diplomatic agents on their first appointment, afterward, upon their being transferred to other courts, or sent upon special and distinct missions, full or half outfits were again allowed. This act, it will be perceived, although it fixes the maximum of outfit, is altogether silent as to the circumstances under which outfits might be allowed indeed, the authority to allow them at all is not expressly conveyed, but only incidentally adverted to in limiting the amount. This limitation continued to be the only restriction upon the executive until 1810; the act of 1790 having been kept in force till that period, by five successive re-enactments, in which it is referred to by means of its title, or its terms are repeated verbatim. In 1810, an act passed, wherein the phraseology which had been in use for twenty years is departed from. Fixing the same limits precisely to the amount of salaries and outfits to ministers and chargés as had been six times fixed since 1790, it differs from preceding acts by formally conveying an authority to allow an outfit to "a minister plenipotentiary or charge d'affaires, on going from the United States to any foreign country;" and, in addition to this specification of the circumstances under which the outfits may be allowed, it contains one of the conditions which shall be requisite to entitle a chargé or secretary to the compensation therein provided.

Upon a view of all the circumstances connected with the subject, I can not permit myself to doubt, that it was with reference of multiplying outfits to the same person, and in the intention of prohibiting it in future, that this act was passed.

It being, however, frequently deemed advantageous to transfer ministers already abroad, from one court to another, or to employ those who were resident at a particular court, upon special occasions, elsewhere, it seems to have been considered, that it was not the intention of Congress to restrain the executive from so doing. It was further contended, that the president being left free to select for ministers citizens, whether at home or abroad, a right on the part of such ministers to the usual emoluments, followed as a matter of course. This view was sustained by the opinion of the law officer of the government; and the act of 1810 was construed to leave the whole subject of salary and outfit where it found it under the law of 1790; that is to say, completely at the discretion of the president, without any other restriction than the maximum already fixed by that law. This discretion has, from time to time, been exercised by successive presidents; but, while I can not but consider the restriction in this respect, imposed by the act of 1810, as inexpedient, I can not feel myself justified in adopting a construction which defeats the only operation of which this part of it seems susceptible; at least, not unless Congress, after having the subject distinctly brought to their consideration, should virtually give their consent to that construction. Whatever may be thought of the propriety of giving an outfit to secretaries of legation or others, who may be considered as only temporarily charged with the affairs intrusted to them, I am impressed with the justice of such an allowance in the case of a citizen who happens to be abroad when first appointed, and that of a minister already in place, when the public interest requires his transfer, and, from the breaking up of his establishment, and other circumstances