which, having a system of connexions and of interests remote and different from ours, it was thought most advisable that we should not mix ourselves up with them. And it is also true, that long since the origin of the maxim, the new American powers have arisen, to which, if at all, it is less applicable. Without, therefore, asserting that an exigency may not occur in which an alliance of the most intimate kind, between the United States and the other American Republics, would be highly proper and expedient, it may be safely said, that the occasion which warrant a departure from that established maxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that none such is believed now to exist. Among the objections to such alliances, those which at all times have great weight are, first, the difficulty of a just and equal arrangement of the contributions of force and of other means, between the respective parties, to the attainment of the common object; and, secondly, that of providing, beforehand, and determining with perfect precision, when the casus fœderis arises, and thereby guarding against all controversies about it. There is less necessity for any such alliance at this conjuncture, on the part of the United States, because no compact by whatever solemnities it might be attended, or whatever name or character it might assume, could be more obligatory upon them than the irresistible motive of self preservation, which would be instantly called into operation, and stimulate them to the utmost exertion, in the supposed contingency of an European attack upon the liberties of America.

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The considerations to which I have now adverted, together with

such others as may present themselves to you, will, it is hoped, satisfy the representatives of the other American States, that an alliance, offensive and defensive, between them and the United States, for the object which has been stated, is unnecessary, if not mischievous.Should you, however, be unable to bring that conviction home to them, and should you have reason to believe that the positive rejection of such an alliance would be regarded in an unfriendly light, and have a pernicious effect on your other negotiations, you will invite them to reduce their proposals of the terms of such an alliance as they may conceive proper, to a written precise form, and state that you will take them ad referendum. That will afford to the government here opportunity of reconsideration, with the advantage of all the information that may be evolved in the interve. ming period. The alliance, if ever admissible, having been a question of time, the delay incident to the reference home, by further demon. strating its inexpediency, will better prepare the Congress at Panama for the final rejection, which, it is most probable, this government will give to the project.

II. In treating of those subjects in which all the nations of America, whether now at war or in peace, may be supposed to have a common interest, you will, on all suitable occasions, inculcate the propriety of terminating the existing war as soon as may be, and of cherishing the means best adapted to the preservation of peace among themselves, and with the rest of the world. The cultivation of peace is the true interest of all nations, but it is especially that of infant states. Repose is not more necessary to the growth

and expansion of individuals in their youth, than it is to that of young nations which have, in the midst of war, commenced the career of independence and self-government. Peace is now the greatest want of America. Desirable, however, as it unquestionably is, there is nothing in the present or in the future, of which we can catch a glimpse, that should induce the American Republics, in order to obtain it, to sacrifice a particle of their independent sovereignty. They ought, therefore, to reject all propositions founded upon the principle of a concession of perpetual commercial privileges to any foreign power. The grant of such privileges is incompatible with their actual and absolute independence. It would partake of the spirit, and bring back, in fact, if not in form, the state of ancient colonial connexion. Nor would their honour and national pride allow them to entertain, or deliberate, on propositions founded upon the notion of purchasing, with a pecuniary consideration, the Spanish acknowledgment of their independence.

Next to the more pressing object of putting an end to the war between the new Republics and Spain, should be that of devising means to preserve peace in future, among the Ameriean nations themselves, and with the rest of the world. No time could be more auspicious than the present for a sucessful inquiry, by the American nations, into the causes which have so often disturbed the repose of the world; and for an earnest endeavour, by wise precaution, in the establishment of just and enlightened principles, for the government of their conduct, in peace and in war to guard, as far as possible, against all misunderstandings. They have no old prejudices to combat; no long

established practices to change; no entangled connexions or theories to break through. Committed to no particular systems of commerce, to any selfish belligerent code of law,they are free to consult the expe. rience of mankind, and to establish, without bias, principles for them. selves, adapted to their condition, and likely to promote their peace,security, and happiness. Remote from Europe, it is not probable that they will often be involved in the wars with which that quarter of the globe may be destined, hereafter, to be afflicted. In these wars, the policy of all America will be the same, that of peace and neutrality, which the United States have, heretofore, constantly laboured to preserve.

If the principles, which that probable state of neutrality indicates as best for the interests of this hemisphere, be, at the same time, just in themselves, and calculated to prevent wars, or to mitigate the rigour of those great scourges, they will present themselves to the ge. neral acceptance with an union of irresistible recommendations. Both those qualities are believed to be possessed by the maritime principles for which the United States have ever contended, and especially throughout the whole period of the late European wars. The President wishes you to bring forward those principles on an occasion so auspicious as that is anticipated to be of the Congress of Panama. Uncontrolled power, on whatever element it is exerted, is prone to great abuse. But it is still more liable to abuse on the sea, than on the land; perhaps, because it is there exercised beyond the prescence of impartial spectators, and, therefore, with but little moral restraint resulting from the salutary

influence of public opinion, which, if applied at all, has always to be subsequently, and consequently, less efficaciously applied. The moral cognizance, when it comes to be taken, finds, too, a more doubtful or contested state of fact, than if the theatre had been where there were more numerous and less prejudiced witnesses. At all times there has existed more inequality in the distribution among nations, of maritime, than of territorial power. In almost every age, some one has had the complete mastery on the ocean, and this superiority has been occasionally so great as to more than counterbalance the combined maritime force of all other nations, if such a combina. tion were practicable. But when a single nation finds itself possessed of a power any where, which no one, nor all other nations, can successfully check or countervail, the consequences are too sadly unfolded in the pages of history. Such a nation grows presumptuous, impatient of contradiction or opposition, and finds the solution of national problems easier, and more grateful to its pride, by the sword, than by the slow and less brilliant process of patient investigation. If the superiority be on the ocean, the excesses in the abuses of that power become intolerable. Al. though, in the arrangement of things, security against oppression should be the greatest where it is most likely to be often practised, it is, nevertheless, remarkable, that the progress of enlightened civilization has been much more advanced on the land than on the ocean. And, accordingly, personal rights, and especially those of property, have both a safety and protection on the former, which they do not

enjoy on the latter element. Scarcely any circumstance would now tend more to exalt the character of America, than that of uniting its endeavours to bring up the arrears of civilization, as applied to the ocean, to the same forward point which it has attained on the land, and, thus rendering men and their property secure against all human injustice and violence, leave them exposed only to the action of those storms and disasters, sufficiently perilous, which are comprehended in the dispensations of Providence.

It is under the influence of these, and similar considerations, that you will bring forward, at the contemplated Congress, the proposition to abolish war against private property and non-combatants upon the ocean. Private property of an enemy is protected when on land from seizure and confiscation. Those who do not bear arms there are not disturbed in their vocations. Why should not the same humane exemptions be extended to the sea? If the merchandise in a ware-house on shore remains unmolested, amidst the ravages of modern war, can any good reason be assigned for allowing the same merchandise, when transferred to a ship which is peaceably navigating the ocean, to be an object of legitimate cap. ture and condemnation? If artizans and husbandmen are permitted, without hindrance, to pursue their respective callings, why should not the not less useful mariners be allowed peaceably to dis. tribute the productions of their industry in exchanges for the common benefit of mankind? This has been an object which the United States have had much at heart, ever since they assumed their place among the nations. More than

forty years ago, Dr. Franklin, one of their most enlightened and successful ministers, thus expressed himself: "It is time, it is high time, for the sake of humanity, that a stop were put to this enormity. The United States of America, though better situated than any European nation, to make profit by privateering, are, as far as in them lies, endeavouring to abolish the practice, by offering, in all their treaties with other powers, an arti. cle, engaging solemnly that, in case of future war, no privateer shall be commissioned on either side, and that unarmed merchant ships, on both sides,shall pursue their voyages unmolested. This will be a happy improvement of the law of nations. The humane and the just cannot but wish general success to the proposition." What the sagacious forecast of that illustrious man enabled him to anticipate at that early day of our national existence, has been fully confirmed in our subsequent progress. We are better situated than any other nation, and, in the event of war, we now have ample means to enable us to make profit by privateering; but, faithful to our principles, we now offer, in our maturer and stronger condition, the same stipulations which were offered by Franklin and other American negotiators, but which might then have been attributed to our infancy and weakness.

If, by the common consent of nations, private property on the ocean was no longer liable to capture as lawful prize of war, the principle that free ships should make free goods would lose its importance, by being merged in the more liberal and extensive rule. But, judging from the slow progress of civilization in its operation on the

practices of war, and the tenacity with which power ever clings to advantages which it conceives it. self to possess, it would be too much to indulge any very sanguine hope of a speedy, universal concurrence, in a total exemption of all private property from capture. Some nations may be prepared to admit the limited, who would withhold their assent from the more comprehensive principle. You will, therefore, also propose the adoption of the rule, that free ships shall make free goods, and its converse, that inimical ships shall make ini. mical goods. The one seems ne. cessarily to follow from the other, and in their practical application there is a simplicity and certainty in both, which strongly recommend them to general adoption. Both operate in favour of neutrality, and thus present a new dis. suasive to nations from rashly en gaging in war. It will occur, of course, to you, to insert a provision restricting the operation of these principles to those nations which shall agree to observe them.

You will propose a definition of blockade. The experience of the United States, and that of some of the new American nations, short as has been the term of their existence, alike indicate the utility of a plain and intelligible description of the facts which constitute a legitimate blockade. The want of such a definition has been the prin. cipal cause of any difficulties which have arisen between them and the United States. The belligerent interest is to extend, the neutral to contract, as much as possible, the range of a blockade. The belligerent interest is to insist upon the smallest possible, that of the neutral upon the largest practical

amount of force, to give validity to the blockade. In this conflict of opposite pretensions, as the belligerent has arms in his hands, ready to support his, the neutral generally suffers. The best security against abuses on either side, is a clear definition which, by presenting circumstances notorious in their nature and character, admits of no controversy, among those who have a proper sense of justice, and entertain a mutual regard for their respective rights. You will find in the treaty with Colombia, and that with the Central Republic, recently concluded and ratified here, (copies of both of which are herewith,) a definition of blockade which may be proposed and safely followed. In the same treaties are also contained articles supplying a list of contraband, and several other articles having reference to a state of war, in which the contracting parties may be belligerent or neutral, as the case may be, all of which you are authorized to propose.

In connexion with this interesting subject, you are furnished among the accompanying docu. ments, with a letter from my predecessor, under the date of 28th July, 1823, addressed to Mr. Rush, Min. ister of the United States at London, with the draft of articles for a treaty which he was authorized to propose to Great Britain. They may facilitate your labours. The articles, having been prepared with much consideration, may serve as models for any that may be agreed on at the Congress, upon corresponding topics. It it hardly necessary to add, that this recent experiment with Great Britain, like all others which preceded it, proved abortive.

Among the most important ob.

The

In

jects which are likely to engage the attention of the congress, is that of endeavouring to fix some general principles of intercourse, applica. ble to all the powers of America, for the mutual regulation of their commerce and navigation. United States, from the origin of the present war, have, on all proper occasions, uniformly proclaimed that they entertained no desire to procure for themselves, from any of the new powers, pecu. liar commercial advantages. They continue to adhere to this disinterested doctrine. You will state in your conferences, that, as they have not sought, in treating with the American States, separately, neither will they seek, in joint negotiations with them, for any privileges, which are not equally extended to every one of them. deed, they are prepared, themselves, to extend to the powers of Europe the same liberal principles of commercial intercourse and navigation, on which the United States are ready to treat. The President hopes that you will meet with corresponding dispositions in the other American States; and that you will have no difficulty in obtaining their ready concurrence to the equitable bases of perfect equality and reciprocity, which you are hereby empowered at once to propose for the commerce and navigation between all the American nations. The whole of what is very material to their commerce and navigation may be comprised under two general principles, both of which are founded on those bases. The first is, that no American nation shall grant any favours in commerce or navigation to any foreign power whatever, either upon this or any other continent,