tempt to plant there an American colony? If its power would be provoked, and its pride exerted, to repress and punish such a presump. tuous act, it is high time that it should be recollected and felt, that Americans, themselves descended from Europeans, have also their sensibilities and their rights.

To prevent any such new European colonies, and to warn Europe beforehand that they are not here. after to be admitted, the President wishes you to propose a joint de claration of the several American States, each, however, acting for, and binding only itself, that, within the limits of their respective territories, no new European colony will hereafter be allowed to be established. It is not intended to commit the parties who may concur in that declaration, to the support of the particular boundaries which may be claimed by any one of them; nor is it proposed to commit them to a joint resistance against any fu ture attempt to plant a new European colony. It is believed that the moral effect alone of a joint declaration, emanating from the authority of all the American nations, will effectually serve to prevent the effort to establish any such new co. lony; but if it should not, and the attempt should actually be made, it will then be time enough for the American powers to consider the propriety of negotiating between themselves, and, if necessary, of adopting in concert the measures which may be necessary to check and prevent it. The respect which is due to themselves, as well as to Europe, requires that they should rest in confidence that a declaration, thus solemnly put forth, will command universal deference. It will not be necessary to give to the de

claration now proposed the form of a Treaty. It may be signed by the several Ministers of the Congress, and promulgated to the world as evidence of the sense of all the American powers.

Among the subjects which must engage the consideration of the Congress, scarcely any has an interest so powerful and commanding as that which belongs to Cuba and Porto Rico, the former especially. Cuba, from its position, the present amount and the character of its population, that which it is capable of sustaining, its vast, though almost latent resources, is at present the great object of attraction both to Europe and America. No power, not even Spain itself, has, in such a variety of forms, so deep an interest in its future fortunes, whatever they may happen to be, as the United States. Our policy in regard to it is fully and frankly disclosed in the before-mentioned note to Mr. Middleton. It is there stated, that, for ourselves, we desire no change in the possession or political condition of that island; and that we could not, with indifference, see it transferred from Spain to any other European power. We are unwilling to see its transfer or annexation to either of the new American States. If the present war should much longer continue, there are three conditions, into some one of which that island may fall during its further progress, and all of them deserve the most particular and se. rious consideration. The first is, its independence, resting at the close of the war upon its own unassisted resources to maintain that independence. 2dly. Its independence, with the guaranty of other powers, either of Europe or of America, or both. And, 3dly. Its

conquest and attachment to the dominions of the Republic of Colombia or Mexico. We will now exa

mine each of those predicaments of the island, in the order in which they have been stated.

1. If Cuba had the ability, within itself, of maintaining an independent self-government against all assaults from without or within, we should prefer to see it in that state; because we desire the happiness of others as well as ourselves, and we believe that it is, in general, most likely to be secured by a local go. vernment springing directly from, and identified in feeling, interest, and sympathy, with the people to be governed. But a mere glance at the limited extent, moral condition, and discordant character of its population, must convince all of its incompetency, at present, to sustain self-government, unaided by other powers. And if at this premature period an attempt at independence should be so far attended with success as to break the connexion with Spain, one portion of the inhabitants of the island, as well as their neighbours in the United States, and in some other directions, would live in continual dread of those tragic scenes which were formerly exhibited in a neighbouring island, the population of which would be tempted, by the very fact of that independence, to employ all the means which vicinity, similarity of origin, and sympathy, could supply, to foment and stimu. late insurrection, in order to gain ultimate strength to their own

cause.

2. A guarantied independence of Cuba, although it might relieve the island from the dangers which have been just noticed, would substitute others not less formidable,

and which, it is believed, are almost insuperable. Who shall be the guaranteeing powers? Shall they be exclusively American, or mixed, partly American and partly European? What shall be the amount of their respective contributions to the protecting force, military and naval, and to the other means necessary to uphold the local govern. ment? Who shall have the command of that force? Will not the guaranteeing powers, not in command, entertain continual apprehensions and jealousies of the commanding power? The candid must own that these are perplexing questions; and that, upon the whole, although all thought of that modification of independence should not, perhaps, be dismissed as absolutely inadmissible, under any possible circumstances, it must be agreed to be one, to which, if assent is ultimately yielded, it must be reluct antly, from a train of unforeseen and uncontrollable events.

3. With respect to the conquest and annexation of the island to Colombia or Mexico, it should be remarked that, if that be attempted, the whole character of the present war will be entirely changed. Hitherto, on the part of the republics, the contest has been for independence and self-government, and they have had, on their side, the good wishes and the friendly sympathies of a large portion of the world, and those especially of the people of the United States. But in the event of a military enterprise directed against Cuba, it will become a war of conquest. In such a war, whatever may be the result of that enterprise, the interests of other powers, now neutral, may be seriously affected, and they may be called upon to perform important

Na

duties, which they may not be at liberty to neglect. The issue of such a war may have great influ. ence upon the balance and stability of power in the West Indies. tions of Europe may feel themselves required to interpose forcibly, to arrest a course of events to which they cannot be indifferent. If they should limit their interposition merely to the object of preventing any change in the existing state of things, in respect to the islands, the United States, far from being under any pledge, at present, to oppose them, might find themselves, contrary to their inclination, re. luctantly drawn by a current of events to their side. In considering such an enterprise as has been supposed, if it be undertaken, there ought to be an anxious and deliberate examination, first, into the means of Colombia and Mexico to accomplish the object; and, secondly, their power to preserve and defend the acquisition, if made. We have not the data necessary to form a certain judgment on the first point. We ought to possess, to enable us to form such a judgment, a knowledge, first, of the force, military and naval, which the republics can apply to the operation; secondly, that which Spain can exert in resistance; and, thirdly, what portion of the inhabitants of the island would take part on the one and on the other side of the belligerents. Although we have not this information in ample detail, we know that Spain is in ac. tual possession, with a very consi. derable military force; that this force, recently much strengthened, occupies the Moro Castle, deemed almost impregnable, and otherstrong holds in the island; that driven, as she has been, from the continent of

America, all her means and all her efforts will now be concentrated on this most valuable of her remaining American possessions ; that to this end she will apply her attention, which has been hitherto too much distracted by the multi. tude of her belligerent exertions in North and South America, exclusively to this most important point; that to its succour she will gather up from her vast wreck, the resi. due of her once powerful army in Europe and America; and that there is reason to believe, that if she should not be openly assisted by any of the European powers, she may receive from them covert but irresponsible aid.

With all these resources and favourable circumstances combined, it must be admitted that the conquest of Cuba is very difficult, if not impracticable, without extensive and powerful means, both naval and military. But, secondly, do either Colombia or Mexico possess such means? We doubt it. They have both to create a marine. A single ship of the line, two frigates, and three or four vessels of a smaller grade, badly manned, compose the whole naval force of the United Mexican States. That of Colombia is not much greater, nor better manned. But the means of transporting and defending, during its voyage, the military force necesary to achieve the conquest, are absolutely indispensable. Nay, more; it would be in the last degree rash and imprudent to throw an army into Cuba, unless the two republics possessed and could retain a naval superiority, at least in the Gulf of Mexico, to provide for those contingencies which ought always to be anticipated in the vicissitudes of war. And, in the third place,

But if all difficulties were sur. mounted, and the conquest of the island was once effected, we should not be without continual fears of the instability of its future condition. The same want of naval power, which would be felt in reducing, would be subsequently experienced in defending and preserving it. Neither Colombia nor Mexico is destined to be a first rate naval power. They both, (Mexico still more than Colombia,) want an extent of sea coast, bays, inlets, and harbours, the nurseries of seamen; in short, all the essential elements of a powerful marine. England, France, the Netherlands, Spain herself, when she shall, as at some no very distant day she must, recover from her present debility, will, for a long time to come, if not for ever, as naval powers, outrank either Mexico or Colombia. A war with any

of those European nations would place Cuba, in the hands of either of those two republics, at the most imminent hazard. It is impossible for the government of the United States to close their eyes to the fact, that, in the event of a military enterprise being prosecuted by the republics against Cuba, the ships, the seamen, the cannon, and the other naval means necessary to conduct it, will have been principally obtained in the United States. Although, far from giving any countenance to the procurement of those supplies, determined

they have directed a strict enforcement of their laws; the fact, nevertheless, of their being collected within their ports, subjects them to unfriendly and injurious suspicions. And they would see, with much repugnance, resources drawn from themselves applied to the accom. plishment of an object to which their policy and their interests are opposed.

The President hopes that these considerations, enforced by such others as may present themselves to you, if they should not be deemed of sufficient weight to prevent altogether any invasion of Cuba, will, at least, dissuade from any rash or premature enterprise with inadequate or doubtful means. And it is required, by the frank and friendly relations which we most anxiously desire ever to cherish with the new Republics, that you should, without reserve, explicitly state, that the United States have too much at stake in the fortunes of Cuba, to allow them to see, with indifference, a war of invasion, prosecuted in a desolating manner; or to see employed, in the purposes of such a war, one race of the inhabitants combating against another, upon principles and with motives that must inevitably lead, if not to the extermination of one party or the other, to the most shocking excesses. The humanity of the United States, in respect to the weaker, and which, in such a terrible struggle, would probably be the suffering portion, and their duty to defend themselves against the contagion of such near and dan. gerous examples, would constrain them, even at the hazard of losing the friendship, greatly as they value it, of Mexico and Colombia, to em