1 Opinion of the Court materially altered the bid made by plaintiff and therefore plaintiff was misled. As we have pointed out, there was no attempted concealment by an officer of the Government in not furnishing these drawings. In Midland & Improvement Co. v. United States, 58 C. Cls. 671, 683, 684, the court held: * * * It is not to be presumed, and one may not, either under the Christie or Hollerbach case, simply show a different condition in some respects from that which the chart or blueprints of borings discloses, and rest his case upon the theory that the court must infer a misrepresentation. There must be some degree of culpability attached to the makers of the maps and charts, either that they were knowingly untrue or were prepared as the result of such a serious and egregious error that the court may imply bad faith. It is true that there was a small section of the channel encountered by the plaintiff which had not been dredged previously to a 21-foot depth. All of the rest of this vast area, some 15 miles, had been dredged but had been filled in by material deposited by the Maumee River and shoals which had accumulated subsequent to the previous dredging. In the specifications, section 14, it is specifically stated that the material which was to be encountered was believed to be silt, clay, and sand, and that the contractor was to remove and dispose of all material encountered except ledge rock. The material encountered by plaintiff was silt, clay, and sand, and under the contract the channel was to be dredged to a 21-foot depth and a 400-foot width. In addition, plaintiff was warned to make his own examination as the defendant was not guaranteeing the accuracy of the description. Irrespective of this, plaintiff did not make an examination but made its bid, undertook the work, and ran into a situation which could easily have been discovered if a proper inspection of the channel had been made. The real trouble was that plaintiff's dredges were not of the kind to handle the virgin material of sticky clay. They were clamshell dredges. We have mentioned this situation. although there is no claim made by plaintiff for dredging 421221-42-CC-vol. 94- -3 Opinion of the Court 94 C. Cls. this part of the channel. It received payment for the amount of material removed under the terms of the contract. The loss, if any, which plaintiff incurred, was due primarily to the poor equipment at the site of the work and the constant repairs which had to be made. When the subcontractor went to work with an hydraulic dredge, it had no difficulty in completing the work. The claim of the subcontractor's loss for which the contractor is suing is without merit because the ground on which it is alleged was presented to the contracting officer before the subcontractor entered into its contract with the contractor and it was well known to the contractor that the contracting officer and the Chief of Engineers both believed that the hard material which plaintiff had encountered in Section 1 was strictly within the terms of the contract. If there was fault, or misrepresentation, it cannot be assigned to the United States. There can be no recovery either on the part of the contractor or the subcontractor on this contention. Plaintiff's claim for certain over-depth dredging is likewise not tenable. The contract provided for over-depth dredging where the predredging level was above 21 feet. Where the predredging level was already 21 feet or deeper there was no occasion for dredging at all, and as we understand it the claim covers instances where over-depth dredging was done in areas already down to 21 feet, although due to unavoidable inaccuracies of the dredging process. The "inaccuracies" referred to related to variations from levels required to be dredged to and not to variations from levels that were not to be disturbed. The contracting officer's action was correct. There can be no recovery on this item. The petition is dismissed. It is so ordered. MADDEN, Judge; JONES, Judge; and LITTLETON. Judge, concur. WHITAKER, Judge, took no part in the decision of this case. Syllabus ALASKA JUNEAU GOLD MINING COMPANY (A CORPORATION) v. THE UNITED STATES [No. 43194. Decided June 2, 1941] On the Proofs Gold bullion; newly mined gold; Act of March 9, 1933.—It is held that gold bars, newly mined in crude and natural alloy form, produced by plaintiff, which were 83 percent or more pure gold, constituted "gold bullion" within the meaning of the act of March 9, 1933, and the Executive Order of April 5, 1933, and that plaintiff is not entitled to recover as just compensation, as for a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, any amount in excess of the total amount paid by the defendant for the bars at the rate of $20.76 plus per fine ounce of gold under the rules applied in Nortz v. United States, 80 C. Cls. 859; 294 U. S. 317; 82 C. Cls. 692; Perry v. United States, 80 C. Cls. 861, 294 U. S. 330; 87 C. Cls. 182, 305 U. S. 624, and similar cases. Same.-Plaintiff was in no better position than any other holder of gold or gold bullion within the meaning of the Act of March 9, 1933, and the Executive Order of April 5, 1933, and the Treasury regulations merely because its gold bullion was obtained as the result of its mining operations rather than by purchase or by some other mode of acquisition. Same. The term "gold bullion" as it has been consistently understood, interpreted and applied over many years includes gold bars of the same character and of the same gold content as the bars involved in the instant case. Same.-There is nothing in the record to justify the conclusion that in the Act of March 9, 1933, and in the Executive Order of April 5, 1933, it was not intended to include in the term "gold bullion" newly mined gold melted and cast into gold bars containing as much as 83 percent pure gold. Same; power of Congress to regulate monetary system.-The power of Congress to regulate the monetary system and to regulate gold coin includes the power to regulate gold bullion. Same. In the Nortz case it was specifically held that the Congress has the power to appropriate unto the Government outstanding gold bullion, gold coins, and gold certificates and that this power could not be successfully challenged. Same; refusal to receive gold bars on consignment.-Where plaintiff presented certain of its gold bars to the San Francisco mint on September 18, 1933, and requested that said bars be accepted on consignment under the Executive Order of August 29, 1933, and where the proper Mint officials found that said bars 94 C. Cls. had been melted before August 28, 1933, and had thereafter been held by plaintiff an unreasonable length of time, although plaintiff had no need for said bars in its business; it is held that the said Mint officials properly refused to receive said bars on consignment under said Executive Order, and plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Reporter's Statement of the Case Same; regulations and actions confirmed.-Even if it could be said that the pertinent Treasury regulations and the action of the Mint officials were doubtful, said regulations and actions were approved, ratified, and confirmed by section 13 of the Act of January 30, 1934. United States v. Heinzen & Co., 206 U. S. 370, 386, cited. The Reporter's statement of the case: Mr. Moses Lasky for the plaintiff. Messrs. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, and Messrs. Vogelsang, Brown, Cram, Feeley & Finney were on the brief. Mr. Harry LeRoy Jones, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea, for the defendant. Mr. Edward H. Foley, Jr., Mr. Bernard Bernstein, and Mr. Joseph B. Friedman were on the brief. Plaintiff seeks to recover $319,745.28, with interest at 7 percent per annum until paid, in excess of the amount of $894,497.43 paid, as just compensation for the alleged taking by the defendant during 1933 of 136 certain gold bars which plaintiff alleges were private property in the form of a simple commodity and were not gold bullion within the meaning of the act of March 9, 1933, the Executive order of April 5, 1933, and subsequent Executive orders, and the orders and regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury. Plaintiff further contends that certain of its gold bars actually delivered to the United States Mint after the Executive order of August 29, 1933, and the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury thereunder, should have been accepted by the defendant on consignment for sale for plaintiff's benefit at the best market price obtainable therefor. The court, having made the foregoing introductory statement, entered special findings of fact as follows: 1. Plaintiff is, and was at all times herein mentioned, a West Virginia corporation having its general offices in 15 Reporter's Statement of the Case San Francisco, California. It owns and at all times herein mentioned and for many years prior thereto has owned gold mining properties in the Territory of Alaska in the vicinity of Juneau under patents from the United States, and during such times it has been engaged in the business of mining gold on such properties. The gold in said properties is, and was, contained in the form of natural deposits of ore. As part of its business plaintiff has been accustomed to extract the gold ore, mill it, and obtain and cast therefrom gold bars and sell them, or dispose of them in accordance with the provisions of Title 31, U. S. Code, sections 327, 358, 359, and 360, and to accept payment therefor by check or dollar credit. These gold bars of plaintiff, including bars numbered 1176 to 1212, inclusive, involved in this proceeding, cast as aforesaid, assayed approximately as follows: For many years and at all times mentioned herein plaintiff followed the practice of milling the ore extracted in periods of 10 days as a unit, and, within a few days after the close of each 10-day period, of obtaining, melting and casting therefrom bars of gold as above stated. It was the regular and uniform business practice of plaintiff for many years not to keep on hand any reserves of gold produced by it but to ship all the bars of gold produced by it, as above stated, on the first available vessel out-bound from Juneau after the date on which the bar was melted and cast. Beginning with 1928 it was the regular and uniform business practice of plaintiff, with the exception of the period from February 1932 to March 1933, to consign all its gold production to a United States Mint or Assay Office. 2. Pursuant to plaintiff's regular and uniform business practice, plaintiff obtained, melted, and cast certain bars of gold from gold ore mined and extracted from the natural deposits of ore in Alaska from April 1 to May 20, 1933, each bar being consecutively numbered from 1176 to 1189, inclusive. The bars, as so melted and cast, assayed approxi |