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philosophical investigation? The fact of Mr. Morell's silence on these points excites painful surmises.

After running an analogy between his definition of revelation, and the action of the intuitional consciousness, and showing their identity, he then endeavours "to demonstrate that the whole of the logical processes of the human mind are such, that the idea of a revelation is altogether incompatible with them,—that they are in no sense open to its influence, and that they can neither be improved nor assisted by it."

This is strong ground. What, then, is the demonstration? Simply that the logical processes take place according to the laws of thought: but these laws are immovable; therefore they cannot be made the subject of a revelation. "Correct reasoning could never be subverted by revelation itself; bad reasoning could never be improved by it." This is most marvellous. Grant that the laws of the logical understanding are immovable, are they infallible? Could not correct reasoning be certified by revelation? Could it not inform us whether we had used these laws of thought legitimately? Could not bad reasoning be corrected by it? Is it possible that the God who made these powers could not furnish them with logical processes and results, which they could rely upon as infallible and correct? This must of course be denied by Mr. Morell; a denial which, to most minds, will be a reductio ad absurdum of the theory.

But he gets a glimpse of the difficulties of his position as he proceeds, for he adds, page 135,

"There is, however, one more process coming within the province of the logical faculty, which might appear at first sight to be far more nearly compatible with the idea of a revelation, and through the medium of which, indeed, many suppose that the actual revelations of God to man have been made. The process to which I refer is that of verbal exposition. Could not a revelation from God, it might be naturally urged, consist in an exposition of truth, made to us by the lips or from the pen of an inspired messenger, that exposition coming distinctly under the idea of a logical explication of doctrines, which it is for mankind to receive as sent to us on Divine authority? Now this is a case of considerable complexity, and one which we must essay as clearly as possible to unravel."

This is undoubtedly rather an ugly case for his theory, but he floats over it as glibly as a cork. The amount of what he says is simply this, that if such a messenger kept within the bounds of our present experience, there would be no revelation to us; if he transcended these bounds, we could only understand his message by the elevation of our religious consciousness. In his own words, such an exposition of truth "would give us no immediate manifestation of

truth from God, it would offer no conceptions lying beyond the range of our present data," therefore it would be no revelation. In other words, it would conflict with our theory of revelation, therefore it is no revelation. This is really all we can logically infer from the reasoning.

He asserts that revelation is always the presentation of some truth immediately to the intuitional consciousness, and must therefore be confined to those truths which come within the range of this power of the soul. Was this the case with the history contained in the first chapters of Genesis? Was it the case with the moral and ceremonial law, the form and arrangements of the Tabernacle, and the structure of the Hebrew commonwealth, revealed to Moses? Was it so with the visions, dreams, voices, and symbols revealed to the prophets? When it was revealed to Simeon by the Holy Ghost that he should not see death until he had seen the Lord's Christ, was this a truth of the intuitional consciousness? When Paul went up to Jerusalem "by revelation," was that a truth of the intuitional consciousness? When he received an account of the last supper from our Lord, was that narration a truth of the intuitional consciousness? Were the resurrection, the second coming of Christ, the scenes of the judgment, the rise of Antichrist, and similar futurities, conceptions of the intuitional consciousness? Were all the minute predictions of prophecy truths of the intuitional consciousness? Is it not obvious at a glance that many things were matters of revelation to inspired men that must fall within the scope of the logical consciousness, even as narrowed down by the psychological theory of our author?

But he also asserts, page 143,

"That the Bible cannot, in strict accuracy of language, be termed a revelation. The actual revelation was not made primarily in the book, but in the mind of the writers: and the power which that book possesses of conveying a revelation to us, consists in its aiding in the awakenment and elevation of our religious consciousness.”

This bold assertion is not a little startling. We ask, if there is no revelation there, how can it ever become a revelation to us? We grant that a blind man cannot read a book until his eyes are opened; but neither can he then, if the book is not there. We must be spiritually enlightened before we can fully perceive the revelation conveyed in the Bible; but it is hard to see how we can perceive it then, if there is no revelation there to be seen.

But what is the judgment of the writers themselves? Do they call the words they were inspired to speak and write a revelation? "Secret things belong unto the Lord, but the things revealed, to us

and our children." Are these things "modes of intelligence?" "The Revelation of Jesus Christ," sent and signified by his angel to his servant John, who bare record of what he saw, and blessed those who read and hear the words of this prophecy,-was this a "mode of intelligence?" Was the "revelation of the mystery" in which Paul's gospel consisted, "made manifest, and by the Scriptures of the prophets made known to all nations," a "mode of intelligence?" When Paul asserted, "the things that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord," did he mean to teach that only the mode of intelligence of those who read them was the command of the Lord? What is the meaning of such phrases as, "the Word of God;" "the oracles of God;" "the Scriptures of inspiration;" "the words which the Holy Ghost teacheth;" "the form of sound words;"" the gospel of God;" and similar expressions? do they only mean a mode of intelligence? Are not all these things in direct contradiction of this starveling theory of revelation?

But suppose we grant the theory for a moment. We ask, what is the precise authority of revelation? Has it any, independent of the mind that receives it? If it has no existence but in the mind perceiving it, how can it challenge any authority over a mind that does not perceive it? How can it demand universal submission on the penalty of eternal perdition? And what guarantee of certainty have we as to any revelation at all? If our intuitional conceptions contradict Mr. Morell's, and his contradict Neander's, and his again contradict Dr. Strauss's, who shall decide between them? How shall we know who or what is right? We have no infallible standard, no absolute rule, to which we may refer these conflicting revelations, and know whether they speak according to the law and the testimony. We are left at sea without chart or compass, and the trackless waters covered with a German mist. "Jesus I know, and Paul I know, but who are you?"

But, waiving these difficulties, let us examine whether his theory follows from the premises he has assumed. He alleges that because spiritual perceptions cannot be attained by a mind whose power of intuition is not elevated to their reception, therefore, a revelation can be made only to the intuitive consciousness, and not to the logical. But as the intuitive consciousness perceives by direct perception, this revelation cannot be in the form of a book, but in an immediate presentation of truth to the mind; and a revealed theology is impossible.

The sophism in this argument is not difficult of detection. Grant that spiritual intuitions are impossible to a blind soul; does it follow that a revelation must consist in nothing else but these spiritual

intuitions? Is not this assuming the very point in discussion? A revealed theology cannot of itself awaken these intuitions: but does it follow that it can do nothing, much more that it is impossible? Grant that it may be of little use to an unenlightened soul: does it follow that it will be of none to one enlightened? A system of optics is useless to a blind man, and powerless to produce his sight; but let vision be granted him, and is it then useless?

Mr. Morell admits the importance of a theology, and confesses that it is impossible for a man to avoid constructing one for himself, after attaining spiritual conceptions. But what is there in this work that confines it to man? Because God must give the intuitions, does he thereby lose the power of delineating them? Is He who alone understands these emotions fully, alone incapable of describing them? If man can do this work for himself, why may not God do it for him? What is there in it that limits it to the fallible, purblind creature? We cannot, then, for the life of us, see how the conclusion of Mr. Morell will follow from his premises.

But Mr. Morell has saved us some trouble, by virtually giving up his own theory, or at least by allowing it to break down at the very point where he attempts to apply it. He tells us, page 140,

"The aim of revelation has not been formally to expound a system of doctrine to the understanding, but to educate the mind of man gradually to an inward appreciation of the truth concerning his own relation to God. Judaism was a propædentic to Christianity; but there was no formal definition of any one spiritual truth in the whole of that economy. (!) The purpose of it was to school the mind to spiritual contemplation; to awaken the religious consciousness by types and symbols, and other perceptive means, to the realization of certain great spiritual ideas," &c., &c. "The Apostles went forth to awaken man's power of spiritual intuition; to impress upon the world the great conceptions of sin, of righteousness, of judgment to come, of salvation, of purity, and of heavenly love. This they did by their lives, their teaching, their spiritual intensity in action and suffering, their whole testimony to the word, the person, the death, and the resurrection of the Saviour."

Concede for a moment that the sole object of these great agencies was to awaken spiritual intuitions, how, by Mr. Morell's own account of it, was this done? They could not bring the naked idea before the blinded world, and thus cause spiritual perception. How, then, did they proceed? By "teaching!" by the use of "types and symbols;" and "giving testimony to the word, &c., of the Saviour!" And, pray, what was this but addressing themselves to the logical understanding? If they embodied these great conceptions in teaching, must not this, as far as it was embodied, be "an exposition of Christian doctrine?" How otherwise could they have proceeded? A spiritual conception can only be presented by one man to another through some verbal sign or exposition of the facts that give rise to it.

But this, by the author's own definition of the logical consciousness, is a purely logical process. "Their lives, and their intensity in action and suffering," had no significance in themselves, except as related to their teachings. Madmen and impostors had exhibited the same things; and it was only by verbal exposition that the world could understand the difference between the two cases; in other words, the whole process by which they acted was an appeal to the logical understanding. Here, then, the theory fails at the very point of its application; for it leads us irresistibly to the conclusion, that the revelation made by the inspired teachers of religion was made in the forms of the logical understanding.

The fatal error of Mr. Morell's theory lies in confounding the work of the Spirit of God with the action of human agents in the spiritual enlightenment of man. It is man's work to present the great conceptions of religion in those logical forms in which they have been placed in the revealed word; it is the Spirit's work to awaken the power of spiritual intuition, by which these embodied conceptions can be grasped by the higher consciousness of the soul. By confounding the work of God with that of man, and both with the agency of the revealed truth, he has involved himself in a maze of the most fatal error.

Our limits compel us to pause here, and postpone the conclusion of our remarks until the next number.

ART. II.-REMARKS ON I. CORINTHIANS XIII, 9-13.

"For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away."

ALTHOUGH there exists very general uniformity of interpretation on the contents of the impressive and important chapter from which the above words are selected, yet it may not be deemed presumptuous to offer a few remarks, with a view to present a different, and, we trust, a more consistent exegesis. The faith of the Christian need not be shaken by the prevailing differences of opinion among commentators. The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." The pillar and ground of the truth" is a rock that never can be moved.

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The general views of commentators on the above passage may be given in brief extracts from a few, with whose works most of our readers are familiar.

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