thrown unbounded treasures into the lap of the commercial capital of our country; but the regions connected with the Valley of the Mississippi, are more extensive, more fertile, more populous now, and increasing more rapidly in their population. Yet, if it were proposed in Congress to establish a rail-road from Florence to Augusta, how would it be received, how has it been received? For a proposition to this effect was made during the last session of Congress. Why, sent to the tomb of the Capulets, to be deposited among that rubbish which it is expected will never rise again on earth to disturb the business or the harmony of the friends of internal improvement, and so it will ever be until the funds intended to be appropriated or lavished on internal improvements, shall, from necessity, be distributed equally throughout the country, so that neither local interests nor the preponderance of great States, nor that influence which arises from vicinity to the seat of government, shall avail to divert the funds of the nation into the narrow channel in which sectional interests would guide them.

Let us view the operation and effects of this irregular and unregulated system in another section of the United States. When at the close of the late war, it appeared to be important not only to raise our navy to power, but also to defend the exposed portions of the country from any future assaults of an enemy, by fortifying the most important positions along our coast-it was obvious, that however unequally this system might be carried into effect, when the northern and southern portions of our sea-coast were compared, it must be apparently still more unequal, when the east and west were contrasted. The fortresses to be erected, excepting a few on the confines of Canada, were necessarily all on the sea-coast. The west was exposed to no enemy but the wandering Indian, against whom no expensive works were wanting. The frontier of the west has, in fact, been changing so wonderfully, that if an extensive work had been commenced some years ago, if one were to be undertaken now, the presumption is, that before either could be finished, it would be found in the midst of a populous country, where it would be altogether useless. The west, however, seems now disposed to avail itself of this apparent disproportion in the expenditures of the country, and to claim, as a means of restoring an equilibrium, much, which if viewed strictly, cannot be constitutionally granted. It is not to the magnitude, but to the nature of the claims that we object. To the construction of roads and bridges, that are parochial rather than national; to the support of colleges, that are private in their foundation, and sectarian in their government. It is in support of

these and similar claims, that many have been induced to enlist themselves as advocates for an unlicensed construction of the Constitution, even from that portion of the United States where Mr. Jefferson so fondly hoped, and so confidently predicted, would be found its purest disciples, its firmest, its latest, its most incorruptible advocates. How melancholy to reflect that personal and local interests can exercise such sway over nations as well as over individuals, in popular as well as oligarchic governments. Even able and distinguished men are now heard to boast of the advantages they had secured, and the appropriations they had gained for their own districts, esteeming these as triumphs. This is surely wrong, and the system that leads to such results, must be defective. It should rather be the boast of a great statesman, not that he had obtained many favours and benefits for one section of the country, for the west, or the north, or the south, or for any particular spot or district; but that he had caused the treasures of the government to be distributed fairly over every portion of the country; that the people had been all made to partake and rejoice in the common prosperity.

A new doctrine, however, to which at present we shall merely advert, has lately been advanced, and may well merit our future consideration. It has been said that if the minority is dissatisfied with the construction given to the Constitution, it is their duty to appeal to the people, and obtain, by amendments to that instrument, the limitations they may desire. This is virtually saying that the Constitution is in the hands of the majority, and if the people can be made to acquiesce in any exercise of power which they may assume, the minority have no hope of redress. What then is the use of a Constitution, or has it any use? Was it intended to control a minority? Surely not. They are the flies whom physical force and the webs of the law have already entrammelled. If a Constitution cannot restrain a majority, it then has no virtue, for it is only a majority that requires restraint. We have already shewn that all the powers under which the system of internal improvement has been exercised, have been derived from construction, and from such doubtful phrases, that no two of its distinguished leaders have assumed it on the same ground. But the interests of a majority have upborne this construction, and against that interest it seems almost hopeless to appeal.

We have said and we believe, that a majority of the citizens of the United States are, at present, in favour of this construction. We believe, however, that many have become converts under party excitement, and temporary views; that many have been dazzled by prospects of apparent and immediate advan

tages, who have not considered the remote consequences or the enormous waste of money which will take place when this system is farther extended, and its weak points better understood. It would surely have been more just to have appealed at once to the people for authority to execute these schemes of national welfare, and by this step to have given the minority some security against endless, and unlimited, and unqualified construction. We believe that if it had been constitutionally proposed to the people of the United States to amend the Constitution, and to give Congress "power to construct roads, and canals and similar works, calculated to promote the general welfare, but that all sums expended on such roads, or canals, or other works, including all sums expended for preliminary surveys and inquiries, shall be apportioned among the several States, according to the number of members each State may have in the House of Representatives," or in words to that effect, there have been many periods when such an amendment would have been adopted by a sufficient number of States to have engrafted it among the provisions of the Constitution-and if these schemes are to be pursued, this system is to be established, it is only under such an amendment, or in accordance with such principles that they ought to be conducted. The union is formed by the confederation of States, equal in their right of sovereignty, if not in their extent and actual power, and each has an indisputable and equal right to a certain portion, according to the federal principle of apportionment to which each has assented, of the direct benefits accruing from the government, and of the distribution of its income in all cases in which such a distribution can be equitably made. The scheme of internal improvement forms precisely one of those cases. There is no portion of the country, there never will be one, so far improved as to render operations of this nature altogether useless. Why should not Maine or Vermont, or Illinois, or Missouri, or Alabama, or Georgia, gain some of the advantages of public roads or canals, or other national improvements as well as the States that are near the seat of government? Why should measures of this magnitude be left to accident, to the varying influence and exertions of particular members of Congress, to the spirit of party, to sectional feeling, to the secret and dangerous operation of those who surround the halls of Congress, perhaps more than all to the wishes or local knowledge of the President of the United States, or of particular members of his cabinet. For, although these measures must all be sanctioned by Congress, no one can doubt the great influence which the executive departments exercise on 62

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this subject, an influence, by the bye, much more decisive, because less seen in causing the rejection or indefinite postponement of a project than in securing its adoption. We make no personal allusion, we reason from the general nature of man, and from our observations on human conduct. Our Constitution has, itself, determined what shall be the federal ratio in representation and direct taxation, let us adhere to the same principle in these expenditures for general welfare. Then Congress will only have, at each session, after ascertaining the condition of its treasury, to determine what portion of its revenue can be appropriated to works of internal improvement, and this sum can readily be apportioned among the several States.

It has been to us a matter of surprise that in these “evil days” in which we live, days in which much that is correct is misconstrued, and much that is wise misunderstood, our Presidents, themselves, should not have been peculiarly solicitous to have the responsibility of selection and decision taken off their shoulders, and placed where no sinister views could be imputed to them. At present, no survey can be made but under suspicion that it covers some sectional and party purpose, no brigade of engineers can go forth but upon some imputed political errand; and if the whole corps should be employed in one or two States, they are intended no doubt to produce a revolution in public opinion. From accusations of this nature, every upright and independent man ought to wish himself relieved; from suspicions even, every man of scrupulous integrity would instinctively recoil. Yet how, under our present practice, can this be avoided? The corps of Engineers is under the direction of the President. The movements of these officers are anxiously watched, and all their operations are naturally referred to executive favour-add to all this, promises are held out not only in the gazettes, but by members and candidates for Congress, that particular works or particular districts shall receive the pointed and partial attention of government; heralds go forth proclaiming the wonders that in particular States, internal improvements are to produce; many a mountain is, in imagination, lowered; many a valley smoothed and levelled; many a visionary hope excited, and many a voice consequently raised, not merely in support of this or that party throughout the country, but unfortunately against the restrictions and barriers imposed by the Constitution on the government. That instrument itself, is to be sacrificed to exaggerated hopes, to undefined expectations, to the wild calculations of excited cupidity.

If on the principle we advocate, it could at once be understood, that of every million appropriated, each State would receive

its fair proportion and could receive no more, much of this excitement and sanguine hope would be at once extinguished. If the great States, in their power and strength, should receive a large share, yet the small States would certainly receive their modicum, whatever it might be. Every State would then participate in the benefits arising from the fiscal prosperity of the nation, and no one would feel a peculiar interest in urging unreasonable appropriations in the hope of securing to itself, almost exclusively, the national bounty. Do we speak without proof or cause, when we say that the expenditures of the government, for internal improvement, have been partial, and without any fixed system or principle? In Carolina and Georgia, we are now surrounded by a million of people to whom no one grant has yet been made, for whose benefit no one project, we believe, has yet been even reported. IfCharleston had asked for two and half millions of dollars to make a breakwater, or improve her bar, could it have been obtained? If Georgia had asked for a million of dollars to construct a railroad from Augusta to Florence, would it have been granted? We need not pause for a reply.

What then is it that upon this subject the country has a right to require? In the first place, that the Constitution should not be so construed as to sanction the abuses that will necessarily take place under this system while vaguely applied; or, in the second, that if the important interests, the general welfare of the country require that this power should be vested in the Federal Government, that it be obtained by an amendment to the Constitution, in which, while the power itself shall be granted, the principles under which this power shall be exercised shall be duly regulated and left no more to personal or sectional influ

ence.

ART. VIII.-History of Roman Literature, from its earliest period to the Augustan Age, in two Vols. By JOHN DUNLOP, Author of the History of Fiction. From the last London edition. Vol. II. E. Littell. Philadelphia. 1827.

In a previous article on the subject of Roman literature, we reserved, for some future remarks, the historians and orators of