THE RELATION OF HISTORY TO POLITICS. By JESSE MACY. Dr. Freeman's oft-quoted declaration that history is past politics and politics is present history calls our attention to an assumed identity of history and politics. Taken in a certain sense all will agree that a large part of the history of the past is a description of what we call the politics of the past; and a large part of to-day's history is included in to-day's politics. Over against these accepted truisms we observe that there is a widespread impression of a conflict between history and politics; that politics is a perverter of history; that he who would know true history must rid himself of the trammels of politics; that it is impossible to have a true history of the present on account of the prejudices engendered by politics. It is commonly assumed that in order to attain the true historic spirit the writer must be removed in time and space from the field of active politics. Politics has to do chiefly with conflicting rights and interests. It is customary for the parties to a political contention to appeal to the experiences of the past in support of their contention. Each party appeals to history, but he does it not in what would usually be accepted as the true historic spirit. He garbles the facts of the past in the interest of his special contention. That contention about the nature of the United States Constitution which involved the question of the right of a State to peacefully withdraw from the Union was debated chiefly as an historical question. Many facts, incidents, and statements were adduced to make good the claim that the makers of the Constitution intended to leave the States in the full possession of this right. Other facts, incidents and say. ings were adduced to prove that the makers of the Constitution intended to create a National Government having full powers to maintain its integrity. As a mere debate, the balance of the arguments from history was remarkably even. A careful garbling of all the history bearing upon the question left the dispute unsettled; as much proof could be found for one side as for the other. Alongside of the historical argu ment for and against the right of a State to peaceably with. draw from the Union there were always in the minds of the disputants arguments drawn from the sense of what ought to be. It was not simply a question of what sort of constitution the statesmen of the Revolution did make. This question came to be merged into the more pressing question, What sort of constitution, in this regard, ought we to have? This last question came to be the dominant one. And it may now be considered as settled that the American Constitution does not permit a State to withdraw from the Union except by an act of successful revolution. Now the mere fact that this question is settled in this way will give added force to the one-sided historical arguments which were always adduced in support of this particular theory. That which was for the time being merely garbled history in support of a partisan view is likely now to be accepted as the true history. This principle is illustrated in all history. Statesmen and citizens are divided into parties. They have, or think they have, conflicting interests. They have conflicting ideas as to what is right or just. Each party appeals to the experiences of the past in support of its partisan view. In this appeal to the past the facts of the past are always distorted. It is not a calm and scientific survey of the experiences of the past, but certain facts only from the past are selected and taken out of their true setting and marshaled in such a manner as to give support to a particular partisan view. Finally, in the course of political development one of the partisan views is adopted by the state. Immediately there ensues a strong tendency on the part of all classes to accept the partisan view of history which had been presented in argument as correct history. Those who are beaten in the historical argument, when once the question at issue is settled, are disposed to accept as true the partisan view of history which is most in harmony with the action of the state. There is now in England a controversy between the Established Church and the Nonconformists on the question of the disestablishment and the disendowment of the church. Each party rests its case largely upon certain facts in past history. Yet no historian would claim that in the arguments for and against disestablishment a fair statement of these facts is pre sented. In the present state of morality it is too much to expect that men will maintain a scientific or a Christian attitude of mind in dealing with rather obscure facts of history when a possible conclusion of the investigation is likely to deprive them of a living. Under such circumstances history is much distorted. But the time will come when this question will be settled. It is likely also to be settled in a thoroughly partisan way. The bodies of some of the partisans who at the time were most blamed for the measure will be entombed in Westminster Abbey. Those who have been beaten in the contest will then join with those who have triumphed in doing honor to the successful statesmen. After having incurred the injury which ensues upon a political action, and having forgiven the perpetrators, it is a slight thing to accept as true historical arguments which seem most in harmony with the policy adopted. There would thus seem to be a natural and a perpetual conflict between politics and history. That is, politics seems to tend constantly to pervert the truth of history. But whether this conflict is real or apparent depends in part upon the definition of history and the definition of the historic spirit. History is usually conceived as a true presentation of the past experiences of mankind. The true historic spirit is that disposition of mind which keeps the faculties at their best in seeing all that is true in the past and in fully and accurately reporting all that is seen. When the expert naturalist describes a species of animals his testimony is accepted by the scientific world. The modern scientific spirit has freed the scientist from prejudice. In the observing and reporting of material phenomena almost no motive exists for deception or lying. The animal does not testify of himself. Biology is wholly a science of observation. But when we come to deal with a human being the case is altogether different. The thing of chief interest about man is what he thinks and says of himself. If man is studied after the analogy of natural history his distinctive characteristics are. omitted. Some of our historians who have tried to present to our view the early Germanic institutions find, or think they find, groups of families and kinsfolk united into a sort of free township. It is believed that these freemen in the township were accustomed to meet and attend to matters of common interest. The first |