number of bonds than can be liquidated in ten years by an an nual tax of one-fourth of one per cent. upon the property in the county has been held a limitation upon the section which authorizes the issue of such bonds "in such amount as may be necessary." 1 " And bonds issued in excess of the amount authorized by the provision as to tax are void and cannot be enforced even by a bona fide purchaser. And the purchaser of such bonds are chargeable with notice of the official assessment rolls of taxable property which are public records, and cannot claim to be innocent purchasers. That part of the constitution of Texas which provides that no debt shall be created by a city unless at the same time provision be made for taxation for its payment applies to all cities alike, though other parts of the section are expressly limited to cities of more than ten thousand inhabitants.1

§ 820. Rulings in West Virginia.— Where there is a constitutional limit of indebtedness of a city, and it is indebted up to that limit, it cannot carry on its operations upon credit in any manner or for any purpose, but must pay during the current year with funds in hand or with funds already legally levied. And any tax-payer, resident and voter of a city may

1 Francis v. Howard County, 50 Fed. Rep. 44; following Russell v. Cage, 66 Tex. 432; s. c., 1 S. W. Rep. 270, and Nolan County v. State (Tex.), 17 S. W. Rep. 826.

279, holding further that a city could not increase its indebtedness beyond the constitutional limit by contracting for an electric apparatus and plant; and, such indebtedness being

2 Francis v. Howard County, 50 forbidden, the contract out of which Fed. Rep. 44.

it arose, although executory, was

Francis v. Howard County, 50 also forbidden. The end aimed at, Fed. Rep. 44.

4 City of Terrell v. Dissaint (Tex.), 9 S. W. Rep. 593. And it was also held that a note for $1,000, given by a city in payment for water-works material, and payable with interest two years after date, was a debt within the meaning of the constitution, forbidding cities to contract debts without at the same time providing for taxation for their payment. Spilman v. City of Parkersburg, 35 West Va. 605; s. c., 14 S. E. Rep.

being prohibited, carries with it the prohibition of the means directly and appropriately designed and adapted for its accomplishment. See, also, List v. City of Wheeling, 7 West Va. 501; Brannon v. County Court, 33 West Va. 789; s. c., 11 S. E. Rep. 34; County Court v. Boreman (West Va.), 12 S. E. Rep. 490; East St. Louis v. People, 124 Ill. 655; s. C., 23 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 408; Gould v. Paris, 68 Tex. 511; s. c., 17 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 340; Scott v. Davenport,

sue on behalf of himself and all other tax-payers to enjoin the creation of any indebtedness by such city in excess of the constitutional limit.1

§ 821. Special statutory provisions.- When the charter of a municipal corporation authorizes a contract to be made by the corporate body in a certain mode, its officers and agents cannot bind it in any other manner. Where a statute makes no contract binding on a city unless an appropriation sufficient to pay the same be previously made by the council, it has been held that when an appropriation was made sufficient at the time to pay the contract in full, a subsequent diversion of the same to other objects by the city left it liable as though such diversion had not been made. Nor does such a provision repeal the obligation imposed upon councils to annually raise the amount required by commissioners for the erection of public buildings, and councils are bound to levy the tax or otherwise raise the amount. If an appropriation has been made under such a provision in the charter of a city for a specific purpose, and the proper department incurs liabilities sufficient to exhaust it, it can make no further contracts binding on the city for that purpose. A municipal corporation may be bound upon implied contracts made by its agents and to be deduced from corporate acts without a vote of the governing body, provided the contract is within the scope of the corporate powers and is not one which the charter or law

34 Iowa, 208. The Supreme Court of West Virginia considered that the safe and sound construction of this constitutional inhibition which West Virginia modeled after that in the Illinois constitution of 1870 was the rule laid down in Prince v. City of Quincy (1889), 128 Ill. 443; s. c., 21 N. E. Rep. 768, as follows:-"The effect of this constitutional inhibition is to require cities indebted to the limit fixed by the constitution to carry on their corporate operations while so indebted upon the cash system, and not upon credit to any extent or for any purpose."

1 Spilman v. City of Parkersburg, 35 West Va. 605; s. c., 14 S. E. Rep. 279.

2 Keeney v. Jersey City, 47 N. J. Law, 449; s. c., 11 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 309.

3 McGlue v. Philadelphia, 10 Phil.

348.

4 Perkins v. Slack, 86 Pa. St. 270. See, also, Tatham's Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 465; Donovan v. Mayor &c. of New York, 44 Barb. 180.

5 Kingsland . Mayor &c., 5 Daly, 448. See, also, People v. Kelly, 5 Abb. N. C. 383, 468; s. c., 76 N. Y. 475.

governing the corporation requires to be made in a particular way or manner.1

§ 822. The same subject continued.-It has been held that the provisions of the charter of a city prohibiting it from entering into a contract for a work or improvement at a price exceeding $500 "until the assessment therefor has been confirmed" did not apply to the board of park commissioners, but only had reference to contracts made by the regular officers of the municipal government and not to those made by its separate independent departments. Where the power of the commissioners of public works to incur liability for materials used in the construction of sewers was limited to $100,000, it was held that a contract for sewer materials exceeding that amount was not binding on the city, at least for the excess. But a contractor who had in good faith furnished the materials which had been received by the city could recover therefor where the legislature had subsequently validated the contract. It has been held that a statute prohibiting municipal corporations from contracting any debt or pecuniary liability without adopting an ordinance and providing in it the means of paying principal and interest of the debt contracted was not applicable to a demand for gas supplied to a city. Under the Georgia act limiting the power of a city to levy taxes to taxes imposed for the purpose of defraying "ordinary cur

1 Kramrath v. City of Albany (1891), 127 N. Y. 575. And a corporation like an individual is liable upon quantum meruit, when it has enjoyed the benefit of the work performed or goods purchased when no statute forbids or limits its power to make a contract therefor. Peterson v. Mayor &c., 17 N. Y. 449; Harlem Gaslight Co. v. Mayor &c., 3 Robt. 100, affirmed in 33 N. Y. 309; Nelson v. Mayor &c., 63 N. Y. 535; McCloskey v. Mayor &c., 7 Hun, 472.

2 Bork v. City of Buffalo (1891), 127 N. Y. 64; s. c., 37 N. Y. St. Rep. 232.

Nelson v. Mayor &c. of N. Y. (1875), 63 N. Y. 5?5; reversing s. C., 5 Hun, 190. Followed in People v.

Denison, 19 Hun, 137, 149; affirmed in 80 N. Y. 656; distinguished in Bigler v. Mayor, 5 Abb. N. C. 51, 70; limited in McDonald v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 23; s. C., 23 Am. Rep. 144; affirming 4 Sup. Ct. (T. & C.) 177; Smith v. City of Newburg, 77 N. Y. 130, 137.

4 Laycock v. Baton Rouge, 35 La. Ann. 475, for the reason that this demand was one of the current expenses of the city and payable out of the current revenues of the year in which the liability was contracted, As to different rulings and modifications, see Prince v. Quincy, 105 Ill. 138; s. c., 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 66; Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626; Sackett v. New Albany, 88 Ind. 473.

rent expenses," expenses incurred in erecting and fitting up necessary municipal offices, such as police headquarters, council chamber, court room, clerk's office, town hall and engine-house, have been held to be included therein.'

§ 823. Indebtedness for water and lights.-The establishment by the city of a water department for the supply of water to the city and its inhabitants is a "city purpose," within the meaning of a constitutional provision that "no county, city, town or village shall be allowed to incur any indebtedness except for county, city, town or village purposes."2 A section of the act "to establish and maintain a water department in and for the city of Syracuse" provided for the issue of bonds by the city of Syracuse in aid of the establishment and maintenance of a water department, and made the bonds payable more than twenty years from the date of their issue, but provided for no sinking fund for their retirement at maturity. It was held that such section was not in violation of the constitution of New York, which provides that "no county containing a city of over one hundred thousand inhabitants, or any such city, shall be allowed to become indebted . . to an amount which, including existing indebtedness, shall exceed ten per centum of the assessed valuation of the real estate subject to taxation," and that such section "shall not be construed to prevent the issue of bonds to provide for the supply of water, but the terms of " such bonds "shall not exceed twenty years, and a sinking fund shall be created on the issuing of such bonds for their redemption," it not affirmatively appearing that Syracuse contained more than one hundred thousand inhabitants and that its existing indebtedness exceeded ten per centum of the as

1 Rome v. McWilliams, 67 Ga. 106. But in Hudson v. Marietta, 64 Ga. 286, it was held that an election under the law was necessary to authorize a city to incur a debt under the provisions of the constitution of that State in exchanging an old fire-engine for a new one. And in Spann v. Webster Co. Comm'rs, 64 Ga. 498, it was held that a vote of citizens

was necessary to authorize the purchase of iron safes for the county. The levy of a tax for expenses of jails was, however, held to be valid, being equivalent to a levy to maintain and support prisoners, which was in the power of the commissioners.

2 Comstock v. City of Syracuse, 5 N. Y. Supl. 874.

sessed valuation of its real estate subject to taxation.' The construction and operation by a city of a plant for the supply of electric light to the city and its inhabitants is a city purpose, within the meaning of the constitution of New York, prohibiting cities from incurring indebtedness except for city purposes.2 The act of a town in authorizing its selectmen to make a contract with a water company for a supply of water, for fire and other purposes, for a term of years at a certain sum per year to be paid annually, the payments to be made out of moneys annually granted by the town and raised by taxation, is not the incurring of a debt within the meaning of the statute of Massachusetts relative to municipal indebtedness, as the statute does not apply to contracts for current expenses payable out of current revenues. Where the mayor and council of a town have the power to contract an annual indebtedness for lighting the town, they will not be enjoined, under the provision in the constitution of Georgia that a debt cannot be incurred by a town without the approval of twothirds of the voters, from carrying out a ten-years' contract for lighting, by the terms of which $2,000 is to be paid annually, so long as such payments are made as they become due.' A debt arising from a breach of contract to pay cash is not within the constitutional provisions of the State of Georgia limiting indebtedness."

§ 824. Effect of exceeding the limit. Where bonds are issued by a court at different times to pay for improvements, under an act limiting the total amount to be issued, the fact that bonds are issued beyond the limit does not invalidate such bonds as were issued and sold before the limit was reached. In an action on such bonds the petition need not allege that there was not an over-issue, it being a matter of defense if there was. And even if it were necessary to al

1 Comstock v. City of Syracuse, 5 N. Y. Supl. 874.

2 Hequembourg v. City of Dunkirk, 2 N. Y. Supl. 447.

Smith v. Dedham, 144 Mass. 177; S. C., 10 N. E. Rep. 782.

4 Lott v. City of Waycross, 84 Ga. 681; s. c., 11 S. E. Rep. 558.

City of Conyers v. Kirk, 78 Ga. 480; s. c., 3 S. E. Rep. 442.

6 Catron v. La Fayette County, 106 Mo. 659; s. C., 17 S. W. Rep. 577.

7 Catron v. La Fayette County, 106 Mo. 659.