government that, as we have before stated, there is no record of a case in this court in which it was contended that a marriage in this state, entered into without conformity. with the requirements of our statutes, is valid. If such a marriage in this state could be held valid, it would seem to have been an useless effort on the part of our legislature, by certain acts passed, to protect innocent offsprings of an illicit cohabitation, Secs. 2553-4 of the Code." confer the privilege, etc. None of these authorities, however, question the power of the legislature, by plain language or clear implication, to declare all marriages or pretended marriages not entered into in accordance with the requirements of the statute illegal and void. 'Certainly it is a legitimate subject for legislation, for the state has an interest in each act, contract and relation of its individual members that in any way affects the public welfare, or tends to injure the individual, and these will become regulated more and more in various ways, as the government of man approaches greater degrees of perfection, and the rights, relations and responsibilities of one person with regard to another, and to all others becomes better understood. Every thoughtful person would desire this should be so, even though in some cases it might seem to result in individual hardship. It is true the legislature may expressly provide that all marriages not entered into in the ways pointed out by the statute, and not within the exceptions provided for, should be held invalid, but this affords no reason for not giving effect to the clear intention otherwise expressed in the legislation existing, because the legislature has not declared all others void. statutes in relation hereto would, if upon any other subject, be held mandatory and prohibitive, and we see no reason why the same effect should not be given here, for the law could as well say that all attempted marriages should be valid, nothwithstanding the statutory requisites were not complied with. However this question is decided, it may result in hardship in some cases; but we think the lesser injury will come from an Court of Common Pleas No. 2, Our adherence to the statutory requisites than otherwise, to the end that these contracts should be made permanent and not revocable at the will and pleasure of the parties, that parents may be made responsible for the support, maintenance and care of their offspring, and the legitimacy of the offspring established beyond dispute.' Re Estate McLaughlin, supra. "And as we said in that case, 'our marital laws are plain and simple, not difficult to understand by the humblest citizen.' They have, in fact, been so fully understood and lived up to since the earliest history of our If it is to be claimed that the bringing of the petitioners when quite small from Culpepper, Virginia, to the home of the dece dent and supporting and rearing them therein under the joint care of himself and lawful wife, whom the respondent was, that they should share in his estate after his decease,. this could have been accomplished by will during the continued illness of the deceased. That he did not do so and relied upon their right to inherit because they were his children, dependent primarily upon their being the product of a lawful union of their father with their mother, and that not being found to be a lawful union, defeats their right to inherit from their father, as well as their mother to share in his estate as against his lawful wife. And now, April 20, 1904, this cause came on to be heard and was argued by counsel, and upon due consideration, the prayers of the petitioners are refused and the petition dismissed at the costs of the petitioners. For petitioners, Parker & McIlvaine [From Harry Russell Myers, Esq., Washington, Pa... ALLEGHENY COUNTY. COLEMAN v. BROWN, et al. Option-Notice of acceptance.. C, the owner of certain real estate executed with her husband, B, an option on the property to AS Before the expiration of the option A served notice of its acceptance upon B, but did not notify C. Held, on bill in equity filed to enforce the agreement, that the notice was not sufficient and the bill should be dismissed. No. 608 July T., 1903. In Equity. Opinion by RODGERS, J. 1904. Filed March 21, ants of his willingness to perform his part of the agreement. Defendants, however, re In so far as we deem the facts to be fused performance upon their part. On May material, we find as follows: 23, 1903, said Coleman tendered to defendants the purchase money and mortgage required of him under the agreement, which tender defendants refused to accept. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. The answer being clearly responsive and admitting all of the allegations of the bill of complaint except that legal notice was given to Annie Brown, one of defendants, of the acceptance of the option set forth in the bill prior to its expiration we must be guided by the well established rule of evidence in First. That by agreement in writing, bearing date the 31st day of December, 1900, and of record in the recorder's office of Allegheny county in deed Book vol. 1274, page 93, the defendants granted to George N. Coleman, his heirs and assigns, the option or right to elect on or before July 1, 1901, to purchase all the coal in and under the tract of land situate in Harmer township, Allegheny county, Pennsylvania, containing 71,367 acres, as described in the bill, together with the usual mining rights, agree-equity, requiring two witnesses or the ing that upon compliance with the provisions thereof, if Coleman should elect to purchase, he should receive a fee simple title to said property, free of all liens and encumbrances, as specifically set forth in the agree ment. Second. That the title to said property was in Annie Brown, one of defendants. Third. That the purchase money provided by the agreement was $25 per acre, one third to be paid on or before July 1, 1901, or as soon thereafter as the title should be examined and accepted by said Coleman (the defendants to furnish complete abstract of title) and the remainder to be paid in two equal annual payments to be secured by mortgage. Fourth. That on the 26th day of June, 1901, a written notice was served upon James Brown, one of the defendants notifying him and Annie Brown that the said George N. Coleman elected to take and purchase the said coal and mining rights, and finding said Brown in a rather belligerent mood said Coleman deposited his written notice at defendant's gate post and left without inquiry Nor for Annie Brown or effort to serve her. equivalent thereof to overcome the positive Let a decree be drawn accordingly.. For defendants, C. C. Dickey and H. R. In Ex parte O'Neal, 11 Am. B. R. 196, it was held that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction summarily to try and determine whether or not an assault upon a trustee in bankruptcy in the performance of the duties of his office has been committed, and if so, whether, in the circumstances, it was a contempt of court, and its action upon the merits is not reviewable by the Circuit Court upon a writ of habeas corpus. The title to real estate of a bankrupt, exempt under the State law as a homestead, does not vest in the trustee in bankruptcy, and an order of the bandruptcy court directFifth. That on September 10, 1901, all ing a sale upon petition of a particular credthe interest of George N. Coleman of, in anditor who under the state law may have the to the above mentioned agreement was as- right to subject the homestead to the paysigned to A. B. Coleman, plaintiff hereto.ment of his debt, is erroneous; the creditor Sixth. That subsequently, on March 19, must seek his remedy in the state courts. 1902, A. B. Coleman notified both defend- Ingram v. Wilson, 11 Am. B. R. 192. Pittsburgh Legal Journal formed, was $5,552.50, and the plaintiffs' bill for extras amounted to $1,988.54. Third. The dealings of the plaintiffs with the defendants were principally conducted through Harry Alvan Hall, Esq., who was attorney for the defendant church, and on or before June 27, 1903, it was agreed between the plaintiffs and Mr. Hall that the matters in controversy between them should be sub Court of Common Pleas No. 2, mitted to arbitration and Mr. Bodine, one of ALLEGHENY COUNTY. BURT et al. v. GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH et al. Arbitration-Bill in equity to set aside award. Act of June 16, 1836, Section 4. the plaintiffs, and Mr. Hall chose arbitrators by each of them nominating one and procuring Mr. Lindsay, the clerk of the United States District Court to nominate a third, and on that day a submission, exhibit one of the answer, was drawn up and signed by the plaintiff firm by G. A. Bodine, and by the president and some of the trustees of the Where a matter in dispute is submitted to arbitra-church, and was on the following Monday tion and the arbitration is made a rule of court, under section 4 of the Act of June 16, 1836, exceptions to the award on the ground of mistake, corruption, misbehavior, etc., may be made under the act in the same proceedings and a bill in equity to set aside the award for such reasons will be dismissed. No. 271 October T., 1903. In Equity. Opinion by SHAFER, J. Filed February 4, 1904. The bill is to set aside an award of arbitrators, alleging fraud or mistake in the making of the submission, improper conduct on the part of the arbitrators, mistake of law on the part of the arbitrators in the interpretation of the submission, and want of finality in the award. FINDINGS OF FACT. First. The plaintiffs are builders and contractors, and on September 8, 1902, entered into a contract with the Greek Catholic Church of Allegheny for the building of a church and parochial, the contract being set out as exhibit "A" of the bill. Second. During the progress of the work disputes arose between the parties as to the manner of the execution of the contract by the plaintiffs, it being claimed by the defendant that the work was in many respects not done according to the contract. Certain extras were ordered by the defendants and furnished by the plaintiffs, and when the church was completed the balance due upon the contract, if it had been properly per immediately before the time fixed for the hearing signed by Mr. Burt the other plaintiff. This paper recites the articles of agreement, exhibit "A" of the bill, and that a controversy has arisen between the parties "in regard to the balance due to the said Burt and Bodine under the terms of the said contract," and thereupon proceeds to submit to the arbitration of the arbitrators named "all matters in controversy between them arising out of the construction of the said church and parochial under the terms. of said written contract," and further provides that this submission shall be made a rule of court agreeably to the provisions of the Act of Assembly of June 16, 1836, and that the arbitrators should meet at the office of Mr. Hall, and that the award of any two of them should be final and conclusive without exception or appeal. Fourth. Upon the trial the two plaintiffs testified that their understanding was at the time the contract was signed, and that it was expressly stated by Mr. Hall, that the only matter for the arbitrators to pass upon would be the plaintiffs' bill of extras against the church and not the balance due upon the general contract, and this for the purpose of showing that the submission was not properly drawn according to the contract and intention of the parties and should be reformed. The bill nowhere alleges directly that the submission was written as it is by mistake, or that they were induced to sign by fraud, and the only allegation which might bear any such meaning is contained in the fourth paragraph of the bill, where it is alleged that the plaintiffs "were informed and induced to believe that the only matters in controversy which could be and would be arbitrated would be the item of extras," and that the remainder of the contract price could not be disputed as the architect had certified to the same. This the defendants responsively deny, and we are of opinion that the proof offered by the plaintiffs is not sufficient to establish fraud or mistake in the making of the submission, especially in view of the fact that the uncontradicted evidence on both sides showed that there had been a serious dispute between the parties for a long time as to the execution of the contract, and no dispute except as to one or two trifling matters appeared to have existed as to the extras. Fifth. The arbitrators met several times at the office of Mr. Hall and at the church, and heard evidence in regard to the bill of extras, and in regard to the construction of the church in general, evidence being offered by both sides on that subject, and not until the last meeting of the arbitrators was any claim made that the architect had given a certificate in regard to the fulfillment of the contract by the plaintiffs, and we find that this certificate was not in fact given by the architect until after the submission had been signed by the parties. Sixth. It appears from the evidence that when the arbitrators went to the church to look it over, they were furnished by the priest with one or more glasses of beer in default of city water, which, it appears had not yet been introduced into the building, and on this occasion Mr. Bodine, one of the plaintiffs, was present and also partook of some of the priest's beer without protesting against any being given to the arbitrators. It also appears that upon the way back to the city from the church the arbitrators and Mr. Bodine and perhaps some of the trustees of the church repaired to a saloon by the way and drank one or more glasses of beer, which were furnished and paid for by Mr. Bodine. And lastly, it appears that on the evening before the award was made the arbitrators, having sat during the day in Mr. Hall's office or an office adjoining, two of the arbitrators went with Mr. Hall to a resstaurant in the same building and had dinner, for which Mr. Hall paid. Seventh. Shortly after the making of the submission the same was upon the filing of an affidavit entered of record in the Court of Common Pleas No. 1, and a rule thereupon made by the court that the parties should submit to and be concluded by the arbitration to be made pursuant to the submission as provided by the act referred to in the submission itself. That this rule had been entered did not appear until almost the last moment of the hearing and was not known to the plaintiffs in this case until it was then produced. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 1. The fourth section of the Act of June 16, 1836, above referred to, provides that the party against whom an award shall be made may except thereto for either of the following causes and no other, namely, misbehavior of the arbitrators, plain mistake in matter of fact or law, or that the award was procured by corruption or other undue means. While the award made in this case was in favor of the plaintiffs for some three thousand dollars, it was, of course, in the sense of the act an award against the plaintiffs in that it determined that they were not entitled to about three thousand dollars which they claimed. They have, therefore, a remedy under this section of the act for all the matters complained of in the bill except the supposed fraud or mistake in the making of the submission itself, and, having thus a statutory remedy, they can have no other. The plaintiffs' allegations of improper conduct on the part of the arbitrators of entertainment of them by the parties, or mistake of law in improperly interpreting the submission itself, and the alleged want of finality in the award are all, therefore, matters which are cognizable by the court of which the submission has been made a rule, and there only. 2. As to any fraud or mistake in the making of the submission itself, the matter is not properly pleaded so as to make it a ground of relief, and we have, besides, found that there was in fact no such fraud or mistake. The bill must, therefore, be when it is sold or put to its intended use. dismissed at the cost of the plaintiffs. Court of Quarter Sessions, ERIE COUNTY. COMMONWEALTH V. DENSMORE. Constitutional law-Uniformity-Police power. Automobiles-Act of April 23, 1903, P. L. 268-Registration-License. The act of April 23, 1903, P. L. 268, is constitutional. It does not lack uniformity and is a proper exercise of the police power of the state. The provision of the act requiring the owners of automobiles to take out a license is obscure, as the title provides for licensing operators. A charge in an indictment charging a person with operating an automobile without the same being registered cannot be sustained. No. 62 Sept. T., 1903. Rule in arrest of judgment. Opinion by WALLING, P. J. Filed February 8, 1904. The defendant was tried on an indictment containing two counts, drawn under the Act of April 23, 1903, P. L. 268, relating to automobiles. The first count charges defendant with operating an automobile without a license, and the second count charges him with operating an automobile without the same being registered. He was convicted on both counts. It is urged for defendant that said act is unconstitutional, because it is provided in section 13 that the act shall not apply "to any of the motorvehicles which any manufacturer or vendor of automobiles may have in stock for sale and not for his private use or for hire." In my opinion that position is not sound. The main object of the act would seem to be to fix a means by which automobiles used upon the public highways can be identified and the owners thereof known. I can see no necessity for registering or licensing such a machine while kept in stock for sale. True such machine might be exhibited on the street to a prospective buyer, but, if so, there would be little trouble in identifying it or its Who would contend that an act or ordinance for the licensing of hacks was void because it did not apply to hacks kept in stock for sale and not for private use or for hire? The time to license such vehicle is The act is uniform. It operates alike upon all persons and all automobiles, under like circumstances. It applies to all vehicles when used upon the public highways, either for private use or for hire, and does not apply to any while kept in stock for sale and not so used. It does not exempt from its operation the inhabitants of certain districts, as did the ordinance in case of Sayre Borough v. Phillips, 148 Pa. 482; nor does it exempt Com. v. Zacharias, 181 Pa. 126. This case certain persons, as did the act in question in would seem to be governed by Com. v. Finn, 11 Super. Ct. 620, where it said that "under the authorities it is clear that the states have the right to classify their citizens of the property within their limits so that the law may apply to the different classes only. The test is whether the law, as applied to any particluar class, operates alike upon all persons or property under like circumstances, and in the same situations. As was said by Mr. Justice Bradley, in Missiouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 31, 'this clause means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and. under like circumstances.' The rule was also stated by Mr. Justice Field, in Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, where he said that this amendment 'does not prohibit legislation which is limited, either in the objects to which it is directed or by the territory within which it. is to operate.' It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions, both in the priviledges conferred and in the liabilities imposed."" See also Com. v. Wilson, 6 D. R. 628. But As to the sections providing for the registration of automobiles the act is a wise exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public safety, and I can see no valid objection to that branch of the statute; and no reason for arresting the judgment on the second count of the indictment. the validity of that branch of the act requiring the owners of automobiles to take out licenses is not clear. The title of the act provides for the licensing of the "operators" of automobiles; while there is no provision in the act for licensing "operators," but a provision for the licensing of the "owner." As to that the title is misleading, for the act provides neither for licensing the operator or the machine. The owner may be one |