November 2, 1903, by handing a true and attested copy of this writ to W. C. Dowl, superintendent, J. E. & A. L. Pennock, making known to him the contents thereof. So answers W. C. McKinley, sheriff.” the County Court Reports for February 27, 1904, page 125. In addition to this, the proposed amended return of the sheriff, as we have intimated, does not state whether the service on W. C. Dowl was at the defendants' place of business in Allegheny county or in Philadelphia county, and so far as this return shows may have been served on Mr. Dowl at the defendants' place of business in Philadelphia county. For the above reasons the original return of the sheriff is set aside, and the petition of the sheriff to amend his return is refused. For plaintiff, W. W. Wishart and A. W. Imrie. For defendants, Wm. Yost. Surety. This return might be set aside, without further consideration, as not being a proper service under any act of assembly, or at common law, were it not for the petition of the sheriff to amend his return, stating in effect that the above return is not in accordance with the facts, and asking that he be allowed to make return as follows: "Served November 2, 1903, by giving a true and attested copy of this writ to W. C. Dowl, defendants' superintendent, at defendants' place of business, after inquiry thereat that defendants' residence in the county could not be ascertained." The defendants, in their petition to set aside the service of the Subrogation in Behalf of a Surety's writ, allege that the above defendants are associated together as co-partners, under the firm name of J. E. & A. L. Pennock, and that said firm has an office at No. 305 Walnut street, in the city of Philadelphia, where the business of said firm is regularly transacted. That the said defendants took a contract for the erection and construction of certain work in connection with the Allegheny General Hospital, in the city of Allegheny, county of Allegheny, and W. C. Dowl is the superintendent of said firm, having special charge of said work, and supervising and carrying on the same on the ground. This rule has not been answered by the plantiff, and we assume that the facts alleged in that petition are true. Assuming -which is not specially set forth in the proposed amended return of the sheriff-bursement; Succession of Dinkgrave, 31 La. that the service on W. C. Dowl was made in Allegheny county, the question arises as to whether a firm, having a regular place of business in another county of this state, taking a contract for a single undertaking within this county, may be said to have established a place of business in this county, within the meaning of the act of July 9, 1901. We are of the opinion that that is not doing business in this county, or having a place of business in this county, as contemplated by that act. We are sustained in this opinion by a decision of the Court of Common Pleas No. 3 of Philadelphia county, reported in The right of a surety, when compelled to pay the debt, to be subrogated as against the principal debtor to the position of the creditor is, as a general proposition, unquestioned. While this right is often co-ordinate in its usefulness with the surety's other remedies of indemnity and exoneration, still its use frequently has obvious advantages. This is true when the principal is insolvent and the creditor holds securities, Goddard v. Whyte, 2 Gif. 449, or has a claim of especial dignity against the principal; Lidderdale v. Robinson, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 594. Like the surety's remedies of indemnity and exoneration, subrogation is equitable in its nature, and is accorded the surety to secure reim An. 703. It finds its justification in the fact that, as between principal and surety, the former is the only real obligor. The surety, while bound to the creditor, is not intended to bear the burden of the obligation, When, therefore, at the whim of the creditor, he is forced to liquidate his legal obligation, equity will prevent his suffering, and will throw the burden where it belongs. The extent of this remedy of subrogation has been subject to some misapprehension in its application to a surety's surety. Thus in an early New York case, New York State Bank v. Fletcher, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 85, it was held that a plaintiff who had become a surety to another, at the latter's instance, could not, on account of a defense in favor of the principal against the latter, claim subrogation against the principal. The court apparently proceeded on the ground that, as the plaintiff had become a surety at the request of a first surety only, and not at the request of the principal, he could stand in the position only of the first surety. The argument, however, fails to comprehend the situation. The primary feature to be noticed is that the principal, the first surety, and the surety to the surety are equally bound as obligors to the creditor. He can throw the burden of the obligation, in the first instance, on any one of them. The next and the important feature is that, in their relation to the principal debtor, the first surety and the surety to the surety stand as co-sureties. This is clear from the fact that the second surety became equally liable with the first surety. This legal obligation he was willing to assume because of the private agreement of suretyship between himself and the first surety. That the plaintiff did not become a surety at the request of the principal is unimportant. A party who becomes a surety even in the face of an express refusal by the principal to receive him as such, is nevertheless entitled to subrogation; Mathews v. Aiken, 1 N. Y. 595. The equity of subrogation is not the result of contract, but of the burden of being compelled to pay another's debt. Upon analysis, therefore, since the plaintiff is a surety to the principal debtor, it follows that he is entitled to the ordinary surety's right of subrogation. This right is recognized in the Virginia case of Leake v. Ferguson, 2 Gratt. (Va.) and it is gratifying to note that the opinion expressed in a recent New York case is contrary in effect to the earlier decision; Kolb v. National Surety Co., 176 N. Y. 233. This latest conclusion is sound in theory, and it avoids the unfortunate result of allowing the çreditor, at his caprice, to throw the burden of the obligation on an innocent party. Harvard Law Review. "Value" in the Law of Negotiable Instruments. holder the same in the law of negotiable instruments Value sufficient to cut of equities is much as it is in the law governing any other property. One who pays the purchase price, even though it is less than the face value, is a purchaser for value and entitled to recover the full face value of the instrument, Lay v. Wissman, 36 Ia. 305, though some courts indeed hold that the purchaser can recover only as much as he has paid; Holcomb v. Wyckoff, 35 N. J. 35. If, however, a partial payment only is made before notice, the may recover only so much as he has paid before such notice; Dresser v. Railway Construction Co., 93 U. S. 92. This is codified in the Negotiable Instruments Law; Art. IV. § 54. A recent New York decision under this provision holds correctly that a bank, discounting a note and crediting the purchase price to the account of the transferrer, but receiving notice of an equity before it is drawn upon, is not a purchaser for value. Albany Co. Bank v. People's', etc., Co., 30 N. Y. L. S. 2023 (N. Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div.) If the consideration given by the purchaser consists in a negotiable instrument which has already been negotiated, such purchaser would be a purchaser for value; Adams v. Soule, 33 Vt. J38. The same should be true even though the instrument given as consideration is not yet negotiated, unless its surrender is procured by the defendant, the maker of the first instrument, to prevent future negotiation. If it is already matured in the hands of the transferrer, since any subsequent holder of it would then take subject to all equities, the purchaser should not be deemed a purchaser for value. A very material difference between negotiable paper and other property exists, however, in case of a transfer in payment of, or as security for, an antecedent debt. By the decided weight of authority a transfer of negotiable paper in payment of an antecedent debt is a transfer for value; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1. A common law consideration, by means of which to predicate value to the transferrer, was at first found, where the paper was payable at a future date, in the forbearance to sue on the old obligation until that date. This is, however, obviously lacking where the paper is payable on demand. The English case of Currie v. Misa, L. R. 10 Ex. 152, settled the matter by holding that the consideration consists, not in the forbearance to sue, but rather in the extinction of the old debt, which revives upon default of the instrument taken. In the case of a transfer as security, however, the New York case of Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 93, held there was no transfer for value, and such is the weight of authority at common law. The United States Supreme Court, Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14, and several other courts have, however, reached the contrary result. Their attempt to find a consideration constituting value in the duty to present and give notice of dishonor seems illusory, and is obviously without foundation in the case of bearer paper. Commercial usage alone can be its justification. Several cases decided under the Negotiable Instruments Law to the effect that a transfer to secure an antecedent debt is a transfer for value, Payne v. Zell, 98 Va. 294, had encouraged the hope that the codification had effectually changed the rule so that all jurisdictions adopting this statute would be uniform on this point, as they are in the case of a transfer in payment of an antecedent debt. A New York case of last year, however, reaching the contrary result, has dispelled that hope; Sutherland v. Mead, 80 N. Y. App. Div. 103. This is probably contrary to the intention of the draughtsmen, but the blame must attach rather to the Act than to the court.-Harvard Law Review. tisements as were published are reprehensible, mischievous and detrimental to good morals, and libelous upon the courts of justice throughout the state. The court refers particularly to the case of People v. Maccabe, 32 Pac. 280, 18 Colo. 186, and states that the reasons which are fully set forth in that case govern the present one. In the case referred to, the attorney advertised to obtain divorces quietly which would be good everywhere. It is held that the ethics of the legal profession forbid that an attorney shall advertise his talent or his skill as a shopkeeper advertises his wares. An attorney may properly accept a retainer for the prosecution or defense of an action for divorce when convinced that his client has a good cause, but for anyone to invite or encourage such litigation is reprehensible. An advertisement stating that divorce could be obtained quietly which would be good everywhere is against good morals, public and private It is a false representation and a libel upon the courts of justice. Divorces cannot be legally obtained very quietly which shall be good anywhere. To say that divorces can be obtained quietly is equivalent to saying that they can be obtained without publicity. The statutes require certain public proceedings, such as the filing of the complaint, the summons, service of process, either personal or by publication in a newspaper; and to indicate that such public proceedings can or will be dispensed with by the courts having jurisdiction of such cases is a libel upon the integrity of the judiciary which cannot be overlooked.-The Green Bag. FIRE PROTECTION. (CITY PROPERTYCONTRACT WITH WATERWORKS COMPANY.) CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT. In town of Ukiah City v. Ukiah Water & Improvement Co., 75 Pacific Reporter 773, it is held that a city which, under its power to conserve the general public good, contracts with a waterworks company for general fire protection, has no cause of action against the company for municipal property destroyed by fire, through the company's failure to supply a sufficiency of water. The case turns on the distinction between contracts made by municipal corporations in what may, with perhaps questionable pro- years. With his yellow goat-beard and wisp preity, be termed its private capacity, and of golden hair, the squire flaunted defiance those which it makes as a governmental in the face of the old man of the snows. agency of the state, for the benefit of the public at large. The contract in suit was held to belong to this latter class. The opinion of the court below is set out in full and adopted by the Supreme Court, which distinguishes the cases of Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340, 12 Southwestern Reporter 554, 13 Southwestern Reporter 249, 7 L. R. A. 77, 25 Am. St. Rep. 536; Gorrell v. Water Supply Co., 124 N. C. 328, 32 Southeastern Reporter 720, 46 L. R. A. 513, 70 Am. St. Rep. 598; Planters' Oil Mill v. Monroe Water Works & Light Co., 52 La. Ann. 1243, 27 Southern Reporter 684; Watson v. Inhabitants of Needham, 161 Mass. 404, 37 Northeastern Reporter 204, 24 L. R. A. 287. In the opinion of the trial court it is said, "It may be assumed here that it is within the power of a municipality, as a property owner, to enter into such a contract with a water company for the protection of the property which it owns as a legal individual; but it certainly needs something more than evidence showing an accepted service for general fire purposes to establish such a contract, and the evidence here shows nothing more. The distinction between the powers conferred on municipal corporations for public purposes and for the general public good, and those clearly marked by the decisions."The Green Bay. The Mishap of Squire Berry Todd. Squire Berry Todd, Magistrate and Notary Public, long, lank and loosejointed, was apparently a typical American citizen, bearing, as many declared, a close physical resemblance to the pictures of "Uncle Sam." But mentally and morally Squire Berry was an enigma-a rara avis. He invariably took the "off" side of every controversy in Pikeville-that is to say, when his official functions decreed not otherwise. The squire's favorite pastime was fishing on the Sabbath, claiming that, according to the most ancient and honorable lexicographers, it was a holiday rather than a holy day, the "y" having been substituted to put a burdensome restriction on youth. A certain warm, sunshiny day in June, when the members of the Pikeville Bar were industriously and conscientiously singing or snoring off their sins, found the squire seated on his favorite log over "Crocodile Creek." He had landed (or logged) two terrapins and an eel, and lost, by entanglement with a raft of brush, a hefty cat-fish. A swarm of mosquitoes sang about the squire, and it became necessary for him to give them an occasional peremptory flap with his broadbrimmed palmetto hat. He was just in the agony of one of these frantic flourishes when his cork bobbed and sank, as if a five-pounder had seized the hook. The squire instantly made a sudden downward sweep, and, in the distraction of two things being done at almost one and the same time, lost his equilibrium, and went backward into the creek like a monstrous, long-legged bull-frog. For a moment only a few big bubbles marked the spot where he had made his forcible entry, then the shiny bald spot on his head appeared, closely followed by bony arms and legs and a furious splatter. Blowing like a porpoise, the squire struck out for the nearest stretch of shore, and had almost gained that coveted terra firma when a rusty, evil-eyed alligator suddenly intervened. Though, from the vantage ground of the shore, the log-like creature had seemed perfectly harmless and inoffensive; the squire was not anxious to cultivate his acquaintance in the water; so for once he did just what other men would have done-turned and made for the opposite shore, as if an instanter capias had been issued for him. Imagine, therefore, his surprise and consternation when another, and larger alligator rose directly in his liquid path. "A pretty kettle o' fish!" gasped the squire. "I know now how to appreciate the feelings of a witness when the lawyers get him betwixt the Living alone in his dingy, cob-webbed office, holding daily converse and nightly orgies with the venerable shades of legal lore, the eccentric squire spent his declining -or rather we should say his reclining-devil and the deep blue. Shades of Blackstone!" he cried when he suddenly became entangled in the raft which had previously occasioned the loss of his cat-fish. "Help! help!" Now it happened that the Reverend Jonas Biddle had candidates to baptize that day, and hearing the squire's cries of distress, he hurried to the recue. "One more brief question," said the preacher, securely tying a rope, which he carried for use in baptismal emergencies, to the log. "Do you, here and now, henceforth and forever renounce, denounce, decry, deny, and despise the world flesh and the devil-and fishing on the Sabbath?" "I d-d-d-do shiveringly admitted the squire, with an egg-blue look about his lips. "Then, brother Berry Todd, I cast you the rope of salvation." The rope fell within easy reach. The squire seized it eagerly, and pulled with such force that the log suddenly went asunder with the Reverend Jonas Biddle on the broken end. But it served to scare off the saurians and to set the squire adrift. A few moments later he and the parson were pulled ashore by the candidates, but the main participants in this serio-comic (or religio-comic) event have never troubled each other about religion since.-The Green Bag. "The wicked stand in slippery places," observed the parson, carefully perching himself on the log, and opening his bible at the forty-first chapter of Job. "Listen, oh son of Belial, to the patience of Job: 'Canst thou draw out leviathan with a hook? . . . Wilt thou play with him as with a bird? ("No, sah,” cried the squire, with an uneasy glance at the alligators) . . . Behold, the hope of adrift. Behold, the hope of him is in vain, shall not one be cast down even at the sight of him? ("Heaven forbid it!" ejaculated the squire). . Who can open the doors of his face? His teeth are terrible round about. ("For humanity's sake, stop preaching and get me out of here!" shouted the squire.) . . . He esteemeth iron as straw, and bass as rotten wood . . . He beholdeth all high things.' The squire crouched lower in the water, which at that point was something over waist-deep. "Rejoice not when thine enemy falleth; let him that standeth take heed lest he fall," he cried desperately. "I nevǝr-." "Do you believe in immersion?" interrupted the preacher. "It seems so.” "Do you believe in the final preservation of the saints, and the final persecution of the wicked?'' "I believe in the final persecution of the saints and the final perseverance of the wicked," averred the squire. "Then work out your own salvation with fear and trembling," said the preacher with a decisive ring in his voice. "My candidates are waiting yonder. I must be going." "Stay!" cried the squire. "I subscribe to that." "Do you promise, if admitted to the church, to love the brethren and sisters?" continued the preacher. The squire demurred at this (he had never been an admirer of the sister), but glancing at the alligators, which seemed to be mancevering to foreclose their mortgage, he gave vent to a weak affirmative. Recent Bankruptcy Decisions. An order of adjudication determining whether a corporation was principally engaged in such a business that it could be adjudged bankrupt is appealable to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Columbia Iron Works v. National Lead Co., 11 Am. B. R. 340. A case of interest to referees is In re Sanford Furniture Co., 11 Am. B. R. 414, holding that when property subject to liens is sold by the consent of the lien holders the referee and trustee are entitled to commissions on the purchase price in full, even when the lien holder is the purchaser. Accommodation paper of a corporation a holder in good faith, for value, who took may be proved against it in bankruptcy by it before maturity in the usual course of business without knowledge of facts which impeach its validity between antecedent parties. Matter of Akron Twine, etc., Co., 11 Am. B. R. 321, Where the bankrupt, after petition filed, collected money from his debtors and disbursed the whole amount collected to various creditors about the same time the collections |