Herwick and the special agent visited the property together, and sent for the plaintiff, who made an estimate of the cost of repairing the building, and Herwick directed him to proceed to make the repairs. Shortly thereafter, and before any repairs were actually made, Herwick wrote to Weinmann telling him of the fire and of the fact that the repairs were ordered and that the insurance company at first promised to pay for them, but now refused to do so, because they had discovered that the premises had been used as a cigar factory contrary to the provisions of the policy. The letter further urged Weinmann to take steps to compel the insurance company to pay. Weinmann thereupon went to the building, saw some lumber which had been brought there for the purpose of making the repairs, knew that the repairs were about to be made, but said nothing to plaintiff about that, nor did he direct Herwick to countermand the direction to make them until the matter should be settled. The repairs were then made, and so far as appears without any attempt on the part of Weinmann to collect from the insurance company. He refused to pay for them on the ground that either the insurance company ought to pay for them, or that Herwick had no authority to direct them to be made and should pay for them himself. Under these circumstances we think it would have been error to direct the jury to find for the defendant as requested; but it would seem that if either party were entitled to peremptory instructions it was the plaintiff and not the defendant. A new trial is therefore refused. (Common Pleas No. 2, Allegheny Co.) HAMILL v. ANDRESAK. Municipal taxes-Special Acts of May 1, 1861, and April 8, 1862-Repeal by implication Act of May 4, 1889. The Act of May 4, 1889, providing that certain taxes shall not remain a lien upon the property against which they are assessed for a longer period than five years, repeals by implication the special Acts of May 1, 1861, and April 8, 1862, relating to taxes in Allegheny county. The above cause came on for argument upon a case stated, substantially as follows: On September 24, 1903, defendant made conveyance to plaintiff of two certain lots of ground, being numbers 68 and 19 in John. Dalzell's Ravine plan situate in the borough of North Braddock, this county, covenanting to convey said lots free of liens and encumbrances. Certain tax liens are entered against his property. However, the period of more than five years has elapsed since the entry thereof and none of them has been revived by scire facias. The question for determination, therefore, is whether the failure to revive said liens within the period of five years has rendered them null and void and of no effect-in other words, does the general act of May 4, 1889, P. L. 79, relating to tax liens repeal the special act of May 1, 1861, and its supplementary act of April 8, 1862, both being special acts relating to the county of Allegheny, in this respect. It seems to us hardly necessary to discuss this question at length, for although we find many decisions holding that special acts of this character are repealed by subsequent general acts, and this especially since the adoption of the constitution as tending to produce uniformity, we are of opinion that this cause comes within the rule laid down in the cases of Philadelphia v. Bakər, 142 P. S. 39, holding that by the passage of the act of May 4, 1889, "it was clearly the intention then, as before, to put an end to perpetual liens." This surely does not contemplate the abolishing of such perpetual liens in Philadelphia alone, but to use the concise and certain language of the act "that hereafter no county . . tax levied shall remain a lien. . . for a longer period than five years," etc. How, then can it be contended that the county of Allegheny alone shall have its separate system in this regard or that its special acts similar in character to that passed upon in the above cited case shall remain in force. We are of opinion that the act of May 4, 1889, repeals the act of May 1, 1861, and its supplement, the act of April 8, 1862, at least in so far as the perpetuity of liens is concerned, and therefore enter judgment herein in favor of defendant. For plaintiff, S. R. McClure. choses in action, is governed as to its situs by the maxim mobilia personam sequntur, and hence such property is not subject to collateral inheritance taxation under our laws be For defendant, Daniel Harrison and R. E. cause it is not situated within this state." Stewart. Orphans' Court, ALLEGHENY COUNTY. In re Estate of W. S. DAVISON, Collateral inheritance tax. There are, however, exceptions to this rule, as where as in Small's Estate, supra, the personal property of a non-resident consisted of an interest in a limited partnership organized under the laws of this state, where it carried on its business, and its property was located; and in Lewis' Estate, 203 Pa. 211, where a person domiciled in another state died leaving stocks, bonds and mortgages which had always been held by an agent in this state for investment and reinvestment, and the executor, legatees and creditors agree that there shall be a complete administration and distribution of the whole estate by the Orphans' Court of the county in which the securities are held, and where the agent resides. In both of which cases the situs of the personalty was held to be in this state Opinion by OVER, J. Filed February 3, and liable for the collateral tax. The con1904. Decedent, who left collateral heirs only, was a resident of another state. Prior to his death he sold land in this county, taking purchase money mortgages. One being unpaid, at his death an ancillary administrator was appointed to collect and satisfy it. Held, that the fund was not liable to the collateral inheritance tax. No. 51 Jan. T., 1904. trolling facts in the latter case seem to be that the personalty had a permanent location in this state for the purpose of investment and reinvestment, this being treated by the decedent as its situs, and that the parties interested recognized its situs as being here by demanding and accepting final distribution in our courts. The case was distinguished (p. 217) from the class of cases in which the administration in this state was purely for the purpose of collecting the assets and transmitting them to the domiciliary forum for distribution, in which it is held there is no liability for the tax. The decedent, W. S. Davison, was a resident of and died in the State of New York, leaving collateral heirs only. Some time prior to his death he sold land located in this county, taking bonds secured by mortgages for a portion of the purchase money. He appointed A. V. D. Watterson, his attorney in fact to collect these mortgages, who made collections and transmitted the proceeds to his principal. One of these mortgages on which there was due $6,100 was unpaid when he died, and for the purpose of collecting and satisfying it ancillary letters were taken out in this county by Mr. Watterson. The proceeds of this mortgage is the only item charged in this account, and the balance for distribution after deducting any legal claims presented at the audit must be distributed to the domiciliary administrators in pursuance of the request of the interested parties. The only claim presented is that of the commonwealth for collateral inheritance tax, which cannot be al-istration here is merely for the purpose of lowed unless the situs of the mortgage was in this state. In Small's Estate, 151 Pa. 14, Mr. Justice STERRETT said, "As a general rule intangible personal property of a non resident, such as bonds, mortgages and other The facts of this case distinguish it from both of these cases. Here the decedent converted his real estate prior to his death, collected the balance of the purchase money as it fell due through his attorney in fact, who transmitted it to him. It was not invested, nor reinvested; the decedent did not intend that it should be permanently located here, nor make this its situs; and the admin collecting and transmitting the assets. The facts in Coleman's Estate, 159 Pa. 231, are much stronger for the commonwealth than here. There the testator without lineal heirs and domiciled in another state, directed that land situated in this state should be viz., the advancement of one's own position sold, and that his executor should convert in the "struggle for life," is completely a the same into money and apply the proceeds proper object. By far the greatest of recent arising therefrom towards the payment of services to this subject was rendered by legacies to collaterals, and it was held that Judge HOLMES when he made that point neither the land, nor its proceeds were liable clear. See dissenting opinions, supra. Where for the tax. Here there was an actual conver- the object is improper, e. g., the gratification sion prior to the decedent's death, whilst of one's malice, there is an action; Walker there, there was but an equitable conversion v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Delz v. Winfree, at his death. 80 Tex. 400. We think this case rules the question. against the commonwealth, and the fund for distribution is therefore not liable for the tax. The great controversy, however, comes with regard to the means. A, in order to advance his position in life, can carry his purpose with B by the use of any means not For accountant, B. H. Pettes and Watter- tortious per se. He can cut prices, refuse to son & Reid. For Commonweath, Samuel J. Graham. Combination by Coercion. The doctrine of Mr. Justice HOLMES (advanced in 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1, and in dissenting opinions in Vergelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92, 104; and Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 504) that intentionally to injure another is a prima facie tort for which justification must be shown, has received such general acceptance in contemporary discussion that the chief question in the law of competition may, perhaps, now be said to be, what is a justification? It seems only a truism to say that whatever is a benefit to the public is a justification, and a statement in a recent Massachusetts case to that effect is therefore interesting only for its clearness; Martell v. White et al., 69 N. E. Rep, 1085. But when that decision went further and held that the members of a manufacturer's association in bringing pressure to bear upon a fellow member, by means of heavy fines, for the purpose of forcing him not to deal with the plaintiff, were using business methods not beneficial to the public, it became of the greatest interest. The advantages of competition are so well known that it seems but another truism to say that competition, by proper means, is a benefit to the public. That is to say, A can inflict intentional damage on B if it is done, (1) for a proper object, and (2) by proper means. It seems now to be clear that the object of competition in the broadest sense, work for B, or refuse to employ B, either in order to make B exchange his commodity on better terms, or in order to make B do some other non-tortious act for the benefit of A. And what A can thus do singly, he can persuade others to do with him in combination. In either case B has no action; Bohn M'f'g Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310. But it is believed that when by these acts A forces B against his will to join him in a conspiracy to use like methods towards C, C has an action against A, for the latter is using the methods of the boycott. There are three common classes of cases: (1) Where a trade-union forces a citizen of the community to combine with it in its action towards the plaintiff; (2) where a trade-union forces a master to conspire with it and discharge the plaintiff; (3) where a member of the same association or union is forced by heavy fines or other undoubted coercion to join the other members in boycotting the plaintiff. The principle in the three classes is identical. The first, which is the well-known boycott, has been declared to give the boycotted person an action; Casey v. Cincinnati Typo. Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135; Barr v. Essex Trade Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101; Quinn v. Leathem, (1901) A. C. 495; the plaintiff has likewise, though with some hesitation, been allowed to recover in the seeond; Plant v. Woods, supra; Lucke v. Clothing Assembly, 77 Md. 396; contra, Martell v. Victorian Miners Ass'n, 25 Austr. L. T. 40; and the third class is now assimilated to the others by Martell v. White; Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592; Boutwell v. Marr, 71 Vt. 1, accord. These decisions seem to war- his children for life as tenants-in-common, rant the suggestion that the view is coming to be that, while a competitor may use all means not tortious per se, forcing others to join a boycotting combination against the plaintiff is a means which, if not tortious per se, is at least in the same category. Nor is much argument needed to support so happy a result. That any individual or set of individuals should be able, by threats of damage, to construct of unwilling others a combination powerful enough to destroy whoever stands in the way of their private gain, is in the highest degree detrimental to society. If this analysis is correct, there is still a troublesome question. As has been seen, A can persuade others to join him in his action towards his competitor. He can even offer special benefits as inducements to join him in turning against the other; Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor (1892) A. C. 25. Thus in many cases will arise the difficult question whether B has been coerced or merely induced. See Brown v. Jacobs Co., 115 Ga. 429, 449. distinguishing McCauley v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255. This, however, is a question of fact, and one which, it is arguable, might be left to the jury.-Harvard Law Review. Cy-Pres. so be continued in a descending line per stirpes for life with cross-remainders, the unborn person has been given an estate tail; Parfitt v. Hember, L. R. 4 Eq. 443. In a recent case the limitations were substantially these with the exception that no crossremainders were limited, and none could be implied, since there was no devise over; 2 Jarman Wills, 6th ed., 1339. In re Richardson [1904] 1 Ch. 332. The reasoning of the court in holding that the Cy-pres doctrine does not apply, and that the estates subsequent to those of the unborn person are bad because of the rule against remoteness, suggests an inquiry into the principles underlying this rule of construction. The application of the Cy-pres doctrine to these cases is said to be justifiable, for thereby provided no holder bars his tail, the estate will go as it would have gone under the testator's limitations. This, however, does not account for the application of the doctrine to limitations of life estates. In such cases, under the testator's limitations, all children of the unborn person would have taken life estates at the same time, while after the application of the cy-pres construction, the younger children have merely a possibility on failure of issue of the older children. The courts say that there should be a sacrifice of the testator's special intent, as regards the order of taking, to his general In general the rule against remoteness, intent in regard to the persons who shall commonly termed the rule against perpetui- take; Jessel, M. R., in Hampton v. Holman, ties, has no effect on the construction of 5 Ch. D. 183, 190. No greater sacrifice is limitations of estates expressed in unam-made, for, as a recent case shows, the rule is bigous language. An application of the Cy-pres doctrine, however, gives rise to one striking exception; see Gray, Rule against Perpetuities 386. Where lands are devised to an unborn person for life, remainder to his children in tail, either successively, or as tenants-in-common with cross-remainders, the remainders to the children are clearly bad by the rule against remoteness. To avoid the effect of this rule the limitations are construed as an estate tail in the unborn person; Vanderplank v. King, Hare 1. This doctrine has not been confined to a succession of estates tail, however, but has been extended to successive life estates. Under a devise to an unborn person, remainder to applied only where the exact persons are included who would have been included in the testator's limitations; Monypenny v. Deering, 2 DeG. M. & G. 143; Seaward v. Willcock, 5 East 198; In re Rising [1904] Ch. 533. In addition the rule has been applied only where there were cross-remainders, express or implied, under the testator's limitations. In such cases each person had the possibility, if the other lines failed, of getting in the whole estate, and of passing it to his children. This was practically equivalent to the estate tail which he will get under the new construction. Though the order of taking is entirely departed from, yet the general scheme of the testator is preserved. The court in the Richardson case, however, name applied to mesilf, it come straight from clearly indicates that it regards the doctrine as applicable only when the life tenants would have taken in the same order under the testator's limitations, in which they will take under the estate tail. It would be altogether reasonable to thus confine the doctrine to cases in which the intention of the testator will be almost exactly accomplished. Its application to cases where the order of taking will be entirely changed seems, however, well established by the cases noted. The principal case, nevertheless, though distinguishable, since there were no cross-remainders, indicates a commendable tenacity to confine the doctrine within its present limits.-Harvard Law Revien. The Crime of "Hogamy." A certain "daughter of Erin," of many summers, and twice wedded-once in Ireland where she left "her ould man to shift fur hisself and become silf-supparting," and once at a certain mining camp in the far West-came into my office recently in a state of considerable excitement, and while extracting a ten dollar bill from a tobacco sack, recited her trouble as follows: "Sure and wud ye belive it, sor, but thim vinimous neighbors o' mine is all puttin' their dirty hids togither and sayin' that Mrs. Pat Mulligan (and that's mesilf) has broke the law and committed 'hogamy' and that they'll soon be about gitting the shiriff after me, sure, and Mr. O'Hooligan, the only dacent man in the town, says I must see a lawyer to onct, and git all advice I kin for ten dollars. He says I must buy a divarce, and thin shake the coort papers in the shiriff's face, if he ivir presoom to put his unsoightly mug inside my door. And that's jist what I'll be after dooin'! How soon kin I buy a divarce from one or the ither of them onery curs that I tied mesilf up to in a moment of silfforgitfulness?" I told her that there was no such crime known to the law as "hogamy," -was she sure that was the name? "Well, sur," she explained, "ye see it's jist this way, thim same dirty neighbors o' mine call it pigamy, but I calls it hogamy, sure I do, because the fust time I ever heard the beastly one o'thim; and till me now what difference. can that make whin it comes to buying a divarce?" So it gradually dawned on me that her dear neighbors had been whispering around that she had committed the crime of bigamy, and had made threats that they would have her "arristed" for it. Then I ascertained that her first husband, so far as she knew to the contrary, was still living at the same place in the "ould countrie" where she had left him "to shift for hisself and become self-supparting"-no letters having ever passed between them. Supposing," I said, "that a divorce is what you need, and that I can get it for you, which of your two husbands do you prefer to be separated from?" "I lave that entoirely to you, sor-entoirely," she promptly replied, the only provisio being that she "could git thim papers from the coort to shake in the sheriff's face if he ivir presoomed," etc. Then I told her not to worry about it, and to say nothing (a rather useless suggestion doubtless under the circumstances) until I could. write a letter to a certain magistrate "in the ould countrie" and find out if her first husband was still in the land of the livingassuring her, as a matter of course, that she had nothing to fear in the meantime, as I would defend her "in coort" if the "shiriff should arrist her." She gave me the last known address of husband No. 1 and went away well satisfied with my advice. In due time I received a reply from "the ould countrie" to the effect that "the gentleman enquired about had for over two years past reposed peacefully" in a certain graveyard where "he had been buried at public expense." The magistrate added a note to the effect that he personally knew the man in question, and that as soon as he was thrown upon his own resources by the emigration of his wife, he commenced to waste away, "and being disinclined to work for a living, in due time had laid himself down and died." I then found that his exit from this mundane sphere antedated, by several months, my client's alliance with husband No. 2. I sent for her and told her she needed no "divarce," and had committed no erime. "Ye've done well, sor, but ye must put it in writing, and I'll nail it on me front |