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be justified in finding, as he in fact did, that in fact had no interest in the business, but August 12th was within the terms of the merely executed the contract, and assumed contract, and that defendants broke it by the liability of joint agent with Finnegali, disposing of the property prior to that in order to give him credit, and enable him date. The court found on this issue in to secure the benefits of an agency to favor of plaintiff, and, in view of the con- handle plaintiff's machines. It does not flict of testimony, we cannot say that nis appear that plaintiff knew this fact, but, finding is not justified by the evidence. for reasons which will be suggested hereThis is decisive of the case; for if, within after, it is entirely immaterial whether it the life of the contract, defendants wrong. did or not. In the fall of 1887 plaintiff's fully disposed of the property, this ren- agent and Finnegan had a full accounting dered unnecessary a formal demand for it, and settlement for the season's business, at or tender of payment by plaintiff, which, which it was ascertained and agreed that under the circumstances, would have been there was a balance of $325 due the plaina useless ceremony. Order affirmed.

tiff. In the fall of 1888 they had a similar (43 Minn. 183)

settlement and accounting, at which it MILWAUKEE HARVESTER Co. v. FINNEGAN

was ascertained and mutually agreed that et al.

there was due the plaintiff, including the

amount found due the previous year, a (Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 24, 1890.)

balance of $703.40. Duffy personally took JOINT AGENTS-STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT-PART- no part in these settlements, and in fact NERSHIP.

knew nothing about them. In this action Where two or more persons contract to exe- against the two defendants to recover this cute a private agency together, they are jointly lia

balance as an account stated, Duffy, who ble each for the acts of the other, and are, as to the principal, quasi partners in the agency business,

alone answered, did not attempt to suralthough, as between themselves, the one has no

charge this accounting; his defense on the interest in the business which is wholly transacted trial being that he was not in fact a partby the other. An account, within the scope of such ner with Finnegan, and had no interest in business, rendered or stated by the one during the the business, and, not having personally continuance of the quasi partnership, is equivalent taken any part in the accounting, there to an account rendered by the firm, and is equally

was as to him no account stated. The binding on both.

court instructed the jury that the whole (Syllabus by the Court.)

case turned upon the question whether Appeal from district court, Sibley coun.

Finnegan and Duffy were partners; that ty; EDSON, Judge.

if Duffy was not a partner, but simply R. A. & F. C. Irwin, for appellant. W. surety for Finnegan, the plaintiff could not H. Leeman, for respondent Duffy.

recover, for the reason that the action was

upon an account stated; and that Duffy MITCHELL, J. We think the trial judge took no part in the settlement, and never in his charge to the jury failed to distin- | agreed to any account stated. In view of the guish between what will constitute a part- evidence, this was equivalent to instructing nership of parties inter se, and what con- the jury to find for the defendant, and was stitutes a partnership as to third persons, clearly error. It is familiar law that and also overlooked the rules governing where two or more persons undertake to the liability of joint agents or factors to execute a private agency together they are their principal; and that, as a probable jointly liable each for the acts of the other; consequence of these errors, the verdict is nor is it any defense that one of them against the evidence. In the spring of 1887 wholly transacted the business with the the plaintiff as one party, and the two de- knowledge of the principal. Each is liable fendants jointly as the other party, entered for the whole, if they jointly undertake the into a contract by which the former ap- agency, notwithstanding an agreement bepointed the latter its joint agents for that tween themselves to the contrary, or that season to handle and sell its farm machin- one shall have all the profits. As to all ery on commission in certain counties in matters within the scope of this agency, this state, the defendants agreeing to sell Duffy and Finnegan were, as to plaintiff, it for a stipulated compensation, and to quasi partners. The fact that Duffy had return the proceeds of sales (less their com- no interest in the business, but merely lent missions) to the plaintiff, the cash as soon his name for Finnegan's benefit, even if as received, and the notes whenever called known to plaintiff, would not affect his for, and to be ready to make a full and liability or alter his relation to plaintiff. complete settlement for the season's busi- | By express contract with plaintiff, he volness by October 1st. The contract was untarily assumed the obligations of joint renewed, or, rather, a similar contract was agent with Finnegan, and of a quasi partmade in the spring of 1888 for the follow- ner with him in the business which was ing season. Pursuant to these contracts, the subject of the contract. The fact that the plaintiff shipped to defendants, at he did so without having, as between himShakopee, in 1887 and 1888, a large number self and Finnegan, any interest in the busof machines; which, however, at Finne- iness, did not induce credit any the less. gan's request, were consigned to him indi- On the contrary, the very fact that he convidually, he giving as a reason that Duffy tracted to assume these relations and obdid not want it known that he was inter-ligations constituted the very basis of the ested in the business. The business was credit given to and the trust confided in managed exclusively by Finnegan; the de- him and Finnegan as plaintiff's joint fendant Duffy, who resided on a farm some agents. Whart. Ag. 142; Godfrey V. distance from town, taking no active part. Saunders, 3 Wils. 73; Brown y. Leonard, Indeed, it appears from the evidence that, 2 Chit. 120. Therefore, upon the undisas between Finnegan and Duffy, the latter | puted facts, Duffy and Finnegan were, as to plaintif, quasi partners in this agency amount of a promissory note, of $400, business. The statement of this account given by the defendant to Vogely, January by Finnegan was within the scope of this 1, 1881. The defendant admitted the makbusiness. - In fact was expressly required by Ing of the nute, but alleged in defense that

, the terms of the contract,--and it was stat its execution was procured by false repreed during the existence of the quasi partner sentations, and that there was no considship. An account rendered or stated by eration for it. It appears from evidence in one partner, under such circumstances, is the case that long prior to the making of equivalent to an account rendered by the this note the defendant had executed to othfirm. 1 Lindi. Partn. 128. Hence, unless er parties two notes, for $400 and $300, resurcharged, the acountstated by Finnegan spectively, which Vogely had executed with is binding on Dutty, although as between him as his surety. The defendant claimed, themselves they might not have been part- and produced evidence tending to show, ners. Order reversed.

that the note pued upon was given in re

newal of an earlier note to reimburse Vogely (3 Minn. 150)

for payments which he claimed to have KENYON et al. v. SEMON.

made upon those obligations of the defend(Supreme Court of Minesota. April 24, 1890.)

ant. The case also showed that long before PLEADING-COMPLAINT-DESIONATION OF PARTIES.

the giving of the note in suit the plaintiff,

Vogely, executed with the deiendant and The frct that the parties to an action are

the brother of the latter a note for $700 to designated by the initials of their Christian names is no ground for the dismissal of the complaint, or

one Elmer; the plaintiff being a surety for reversal of the judgment. The proper remedy is

the other makers. The claim of the plainby motion to require the complaint to be corrected

tiff is that the note in suit was made to reor amendod.

imburse Vogely on account of the pay(Syllabus by the Court.)

ment by hm of the note to Elmer. The deAppeal from municipal court of Minneap

fendant (appellant) concedes that the evi

dence was suffieient to justify the conclu. olis; MAHONEY, Judge.

sion of the jury that the note in suit had Action by A. H. Kenyon and others

its origin in the note to Elmer. against J. $. Semon and others. From a

It having been shown that Elmer had judgment for plaintiffs, defendant W. H.

died, certain entries in private books, which Semon appeals.

he had kept, were introduced in evidence N. H. Miner, for appellant. C. E. Co- by the plaintiff; it being further shown that pant, for respondents.

these entries were in the handwriting of MITCHELL, J. The practice of designat- Elmer. The defendant's assignments of ing the parties, elther plaintiff or defend

error in respeet to this evidence should not ant, by the initials of their Christian

be sustained. Exhibit J embraces the folnames, is irregular, and has been more lowing statement or memorandum by Elthan once disapproved by this court; but mer in his book, under date of April 1, 1869: It is no ground for the dismissal of the According to note, I have loaned to the complaint, or for a reversal of the judg- / brothers. Fridolin [this defendant] and ment. The proper remedy, in such a case, Jacob B! Bom, and Jost Vogely, money to is by motion to require the complaint to the amount of 700.00, which they are to be amended or corrected in that respect. pay after two years with 9 per cent. inter

Then follow, under variThe other question sought to be raised is est until paid. not involved in this appeal, at least on

ous dates down to the year 1874, statements the present record. Order and judgment of the receipt of interest. Then comes affirmed.

the following statement: “For the above

amount, Jost Vogely has given me a new (3 Minn. 163)

note, and therefore the above-liamed $700 VOGELY v. Bi.com.

are to be considered paid, with the excep(Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 17, 1890.) | tion of the fourth half year's interest which

is due to me from Fridolin Bloom.” The EVIDENCE—DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST—De- | defendant excepted only to the reception CEDENTS.

of the last sentence above recited. The 1. Declarations made by a person since de coased may be received in evidence in an action be

fact of the giving of the $700 note as stated tween other parties, If it appear that the person

in the book entry was virtually admitted making the declaration had knowledge of the fact by the defendant. The evidence to which declared, and that the declaration was against his the defendant's exception related was adinterest

missible, not as a matter of book-account, 2. Evidence held sufficient to justify the ver- under the statute, but as a declaration of dict.

a fact, relevant to the issue, made by a per(Syllabus by the Court.)

son since deceased, he obviously having Appeal from district court, Nobles coun- knowledge of the matter set forth in the ty; PERKINS, Judge.

statement, and the same being against his Action by Jost Vogely against Fred | interest, pecuniary or proprietary. 1 Bloom. Plaintiff having died pending the Greenl. Ev. 147 et seq.; 2 Best, Ev. Š 500 action, his administrator, J. C. Zimmer- et seq.; Steph. Dig. Ev. arts. 25, 28, c. 4; 1 man, was substituted plaintiff.

Phil. Ev. (Cow. & H. Notes) 252 et seq.; Daniel Rohrer, for appellant. Geo. w. Higham v. Ridgway, 3 Smith, Lead. Cas. Wilson, for respondent.

(9th Ed.) 1607, and notes. Not only were the

acknowledgments of the receipt of nterest DICKINSON, J. This action was com

com- declarations against interest, but so was menced by the above-named Jost Vogely, the acknowledgment by Elmer that hu and was tried in the district court before had accepted the note of Vogely alone in his death. The action was to recover the payment of the joint note of Vogely and two other persons. From another page | judgment, Barwise was not the owner of of the book, entries were also received, un- the other. An assignee of a judgment der the defendant's objection, relating to takes it, of course, subject to the equities Jost Vogely's note of $700, and acknowl-between the parties to it. But such eqedging the receipt of interest on it, and, uities, to affect him, must exist at the under date of April 2, 1877, that Vogely had time of the assignment.

time of the assignment. He cannot be afpaid the same, excepting a specified sum fected by those that may subsequently which had been thrown off. These entries arise. At the time of this assignment as to Vogely's note were admissible in con- there were no counter-judgments to be set nection with those before introduced, and off, and no equity of set-off could exist. for the same reason. The reasons upon Order affirmed. which the admissibility of secondary evidence of this character rests are such that MITCHELL, J., took no part in the decisit is not essential that the entries or dec

ion. laration be shown to have been made at

(43 Minn. 172) the time of the transactions referred to.

BUCHANAN V. REID. The entries from the same book embodied in the case as Exhibit L were not objection- (Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 24, 1890.) able as being an attempt to impeach the

MORTGAGES-REDEMPTION-TACKING-PURCHASER defendant's testimony as to collateral facts.

UNDER JUNIOR MORTGAGE. This evidence tended to rebut the defend

1. Rule in Pamperin v. Scanlan, 28 Minn, 345, ant's claim that he had paid the $700 note

9 N. W. Rep. 868, and Parke v. Hush, 29 Minn. 434,

13 N. W. Rep. 668, that the holder of the purto Elmer.

chaser's interest upon a foreclosure or execution The refusal of the court to instruct the sale, in order to tack a subsequent lien to it for the jury as requested in respect to the asserted purposes of redemption, must place himself in the counter-claim growing out of the Stauf- fine of redemptioners, with respect to such subsefacher note was justified for the reason quent lien, by complying with the statute, followed. that the court had already instructed the 2. The purchaser at the foreclosure of a junior jury, in effect, that, by the concession of mortgage may, within the year from the foreclos

ure sale, redeem from the foreclosure of a prior the plaintiff, thatitem was to be allowed in

mortgage as "a creditor having a lien." favor of the defendant.

(Syllabus by the Court.) We are of the opinion that the verdict, which was a little less than the amount of Appeal from district court, Polk county; the note sued on, was not greater than was MILLS, Judge. justified by the evidence. The case justi- White & Hewit, for appellant. Pierce & fied the jury in concluding that after allow- Cromb and P. C. Schmidt, for respondent. ing an account of the indebtedness existing at the time of the giving of this note, all GILFILLAN, C. J. At the times of exethe matters of counter-claim which were cuting the several mortgages hereinafter established in favor of the defendant, the mentioned, one Peter Borden was the

, indebtedness was at least as large as the owner of the real estate in this action innote given therefor. A review in this opin- volved.

volved. July 19, 1882, he executed a mortion of the evidence upon these matters gage on the property, with a power of would serve no useful purpose. Order af sale, to the trustees of Beloit College, firmed.

which mortgage was duly recorded July

20, 1882. February 25, 1887, this mort(43 Minn. 171) WYVELL V. BARWISE et al.

gage was duly foreclosed under the pow

er, and the trustees became the purchasers (Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 24, 1890.) at the sale. The certificate of sale was SET-OFF-JUDGMENTS- PRIOR ASSIGNMENT. recorded the same day. February 18, 1888,

June 22, 1888, B. recovered judgment against the trustees assigned the certificate to W., and on the same day assigned it to K., who plaintiff, and the assignment was recordstiú owns it. June 24, 1889, W. recovered judg.ed February 29, 1888. May 23, 1885, Borment against B. Held, that the court cannot set

den executed a mortgage on the same the judgments off against each other.

property to one Sweet, which was record(Syllabus by the Court.)

ed June 2, 1885. Afterwards Sweet asAppeal from district court, Wadena / signed this mortgage to plaintiff, and the county; HOLLAND, Judge.

assignment was recorded January 28, 1886. Lyman B. Everdell, for appellant. A.

December 28, 1885, Borden executed to the G. Broker, for respondents.

plaintiff a mortgage, with a power of sale,

on the same property, which was record GILFILLAN, C. J. Appeal from an order ed December 31, 1885. Afterwards plainefusing a motion to set off judgments tiff duly assigned this mortgage to defendagainst each other. June 22, 1888, respond- ant, and the assignment was recorded ent Barwise recovered judgment against June 27, 1887. August 16, 1887, defendant the appellant, and on the same day as- foreclosed this mortgage under the power, signed it to the respondent Katzky, who and at the sale became the purchaser, bidnow owns it. June 24, 1889, appellant re- ding in the property at the full amount of covered judgment against Barwise. These the debt secured by the mortgage. The are the judgments sought to be set off. certificate of sale was recorded August 23, There are other reasons upon which the 1887. Plaintiff did not attempt to redeem court might have refused the motion, but from the foreclosure of the first mortgage, the above statement of the facts presents nor file any notice of intention so to do. one that renders the consideration of any February 24, 1888, defendant filed notice of other unnecessary. There could be no intention to redeem from said foreclosure, right of set-off of the judgments till both and within the proper time made redempexisted. When

When appellant recovered bis | tion, paying to the sheriff the amount required for redemption from that foreclos | who have interests or claims which may ure, 11 he was not required to pay the sec- be ent off by a foreclosure or execution sale ond mortgage then held by plaintiff, but to save their interests or claims so far on account of which he did not pay any. they may without impairing the rights of thing. The sherifi executed to defendant those in whose behalf such sale was made the usual certificate of redemption, which or who purchased at such sale, it must be was recorded February 28, 1888. The ac- held that the foreclosure of a subsequent tion is brought to have the redemption lien does not take from it the right of redeclared null, and the certificate canceled. demption. In the case of a junior mortThe court below rendered judgment for gage, the purchaser at the foreclosure of the defendant.

It is, in some sense, until the mortgagor's The appellant's propositions in regard title passes to him by expiration of the to the redemption may be reduced to these time for redemption, the successor of the two: first.'ll the defendant's right of mortgagee. It is true his right and interredemption was that of a creditor ha ring est is different in some respects from that a llen, he could not make redemption with of the mortgagee. But is the difference out paying the amount of the second such as to transfer the right, as concerns mortgage then held by plaintiff, who also the purpose of redemption, from the class then owned the right of the purchaser on in which the mortgage belonged before the foreclosure of the first mortgage. Sec- foreclosure to another class, that of 'asond. But, as defendant's debt was extin. signs.' The title of the mortgagor does guished by the foreclosure of the mort. not pass by the foreclosure till his right of gage held by him, at which the property redemption expires. Section 12, c. 81, Gen. WAN bid in for the whole amount of the St. 1878; Daniels v. Smith, 4 Minn. 172, (Gil. debt, he was not a creditor having a lien, | 117:) Donnelly 1. Simonton, 7 Minn. 167,

a and could not redeem as such; and, if re- (Gil. 110;) Horton v. Maffitt, 14 Minn. 290, garded as an "assign" of the mortgagor, (Gil. 216;) Standish v. Vosberg, 27 Minn. for the purpose of redemption, he could re- 175, 6 N. W. Rep. 489. The foreclosuro sale deem only within the year, and redemp- attaches this condition to his title; that tion by him would merely annul the sale it will pass at the end of a year from the from which he redeemed.

sale unless he, his heirs, executors, adminThe first of these propositions in dis- istrators, or assigns redeem. The court, ponad of by the decision in Pamperin v. in Whitney v. Huntington, 34 Minn. 458, Scanlan, 24 Minn. 345, 9 N. W. Rep. 868, 26 N. W. Rep. 631, in speaking of the right followed in Parke v. Hush, 29 Minn. 434, of a purchaser at an execution sale pend13 N. W. Rep. 668, in which It was held ing the time of redemption, purposely and that the holder of the purchaser's interest carefully refrained from giving it a desigat a foreclosure on execution sale, in or- nation or description. In Lindley v. Cromder to tack a subsequent lien to it for bie, 31 Minn. 232, 17 N. W. Rep. 372, it is

. the purposes of redemption, must place spoken of as a right to have the title vest himself in the line of redemptioners, with by lapse of time, if not prevented by rerespect to such subsequent lien, by comply. | demption. The lien of the mortgage is not Ing with the statute. Those decisions extinguished until it merges in the legal eshave stood so long without question that tate, when that passes by lapse of time. they must now be regarded as establishing It has passed, indeed, to the purchaser,a "rule of property"

and they ought to be that is, to the amount of the purchase adhered to.

price,-60 that, if he go into possession The other proposition prerents a quer- under the foreclosure, even though it be tion not free from doubt, to-wit, to which invalid, he is regarded as a mortgagee in class of persons entitled to redeem, “as- possession. Martin v. Fridley, 23 Minn.

. signs" or ".reditors having liens," docs 13; Johnson v. Sandhoff, 30 Minn. 197, 14 the purchaser at the foreclosure of a junior N. W. Rep. 889. That the purchaser has mortgage belong? In ('uilerier v. Bru- a lien for the purchase price does not repelle, 37 Minn. 71, 33.X. W. Rep. 123, It was move the difficulty the court found, in held that within the meaning of those sec- Tinkcom y. Lewis, in holding him a credittions of the statute giving the right to re or having a lien. In that opinion it is Jeem, and prescribing how and when re- said: "For the mortgage debt was satisdemption may be made, the mortgagee in fied by the sale, and the purchaser at a a Junior mortgage, not foreclosed, is not mortgage sale does not become a creditor an" Daniga," but is a creditor having a of the mortgagor, in the usual sense of the lien. The status in respect to this, of the term." We think, however, on reflection, purchaser under a foreclosed Junior mort. that the term "creditor," as used in the gage, before the title under the foreclosure statute, ought not to be construed as havhas passed to himn, has never been ciecided. ing the limited sense of a “personal creditThe matter was before the court, but not or." There may be a creditor, so far as decided, in Tinkcom v. Lewis, 21 Minn. 132. concerns the land alone, without the perIn the opinion in that case, Mr. Justice sonal relation of debtor and creditor, in Young recognizes the difficulty of consid- the ordinary sense, existing. Thus, a ering the purchaser as a creditor, but says: | mortgage might be given without any "On the other hand, there are equal, if not personal liability, any liability beyond greater, dithculties in the way of holding the land, any right in the creditor of re

, that during the year following the sale course except to the land; or a mortgage such purchaser is an 'assign' of the mort- might secure the debt of a third person. gagor, within the meaning of section 13." In such case the mortgagee would not be When we have in view the general purpose a "creditor" of the mortgagor, in the usof the statute giving and regulating the ual sense of the word. Yet there could right of redemption, to-wit, to enable all | be no doubt that he would have the right

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of redemption as a creditor having a lien, DICKINSON, J. July 10, 1889, these parties within the meaning of the statute. Con- entered into an oral agreement, the plainstruing the term “creditor," as used in the tiff leasing to the defendant certain real statute, as including one having a right property for the term of one year from the of recourse to the land for satisfaction of 1st day of August at a yearly rental of his claim or demand, though he may have $780, payable in monthly installments, in no personal claim against the mortgagor, advance. The defendant entered into the we think the purchaser at a mortgage occupancy of the premises on the 1st day foreclosure sale comes within the class of of August, and remained in possession unredemptioners, “creditors having liens.” til the 28th of September, when he went Those words may not accurately describe out. This action is for the recovery of his relation to the land, but they come the stipulated monthly rental for the more nearly doing so than the word “as- month of October, payable, according to signs.”

We hold, therefore, that defend- the terms of the agreement, on the 1st of ant's redemption was valid, and that by that month. By the terms of our statute it he acquired the title passing under the of frauds (title 2, c. 41, Gen. St. 1878) no foreclosure of the first mortgage. Judg

action is mantainable upon a mere parol ment affirmed.

agreement that by its terms is not to be

performed within one year from the makMITCHELL, J. While I adhere to the ing thereof, (section 6;) no estate or interest views expressed by me in Parke v. Hush,

in lands, other than leases for a term not supra, I concur in the result upon the

exceeding one year, nor any trust, etc., ground that when defendant made re

shall be created, unless by act or operation demption, the assignment from the trus

of law, or by deed or conveyance in writtees of Beloit College to plaintiff was not ing, etc., (section 10;) and every contract

; on record.

for the leasing for a longer period than one

year, or for the sale of any lands, or any (43 Minn. 166)

interest in lands, shall be void unless the JELLETT V. RHODE.

contract, or some note or memorandum

thereof, expressing the consideration, is in (Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 17, 1890.) writing, and subscribed by the party by STATUTE OF FRAUDS–PAROL LEASE.

whom the lease or sale is to be made, or

by his authorized agert, (section 12.) A parol lease of real estate for the term of one year, to commence in futuro, is invalid, being prosecuted is clearly within the language

The agreement upon which this action is an agreement which by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof.

of section 6. By its terms the agreement

was not to be performed within one year (Syllabus by the Court.)

from its making. There is no reason why Appeal from municipal court, city of St.

that section should not be deemed applicaPaul; BURR, Judge.

ble to such a case as this, unless it is to be Thompson & Taylor, for appellant. S.C.

considered that the exception in section Olmstead, for respondent.

10, and the implied exception in section 12,

of leases “for a term not exceeding one 1 In McCroy v. Toney, (Miss.) 5 South. Rep. year, are effectual to exclude from the oper

year,” or for a period not longer than one 392, it was held that a parol lease to commence in futuro was not rendered invalid by that fact.

ation of section 6 leases for a term of one A parol demise for more than a year vests no

year, to commence in futuro. The reasons term in the lessee, but he becomes a tenant at which led to the enactment of that part of will merely, subject to pay rent at the stipu- section 6, above referred to, are as applicalated rate, Talamo v. Spitsmiller, (N. Y.) 23 N. E.

ble to parol agreements leasing land, not Rep. 980; but the tenancy may be changed into a

to be performed within one year, as in retenancy from year to year, by annual payment and acceptance of rent, Dumn v. Rothermel, (Pa.) 3

spect to any other kind of a contract. Atl. Rep. 800. A subsequent ratification of a paroi The evil result likely to follow from allowlease must be in writing. Id. An oral agreement ing such a contract, the performance of to renew a lease for three years is extinguished which is to be long postponed, to rest in by a subsequent written lease to the same lessee parol, without any written evidence showfor one year. Stuebben v. Granger, (Mich.) 29 N. ing the terms of the agreement, are of the W. Rep. 716. See, also, Kramer v. Amberg, 3 N.

same nature, and just as likely to occur, as Y. Supp. 240. A verbal agreement to rent for one

in the case of any other contract. If a year at a certain price per month, and for a second year at a different price per month, creates a ten

merely oral lease may be effectually made ancy from year to year, and not at will. Schnei- for a year to commence in futuro, it matder v. Lord, (Mich.) 28 N. W. Rep. 773. A lease ters not how long the commencement of which has been reduced to writing, acted on, and the term may be postponed. If such a partly performed is binding, though not signed. case is not within the provision of section Loan & Trust Co. v. Railway Co., 2 Fed. Rep. 117.

6, then a lease may be thus made for a A lease which is void, because resting in parol, may be rendered valid for the full term by part

term to commence many years subsequent performance. Bard v. Elston, (Kan.) 1 Pac. Rep.

to the agreement. Such a case is so clearly 565; Wallace v. Scoggin, (Or.) 21 Pac. Rep. 558.

within the plain, explicit language of secA note for rent given by å lessee under a parol tion 6, and would so obviously involve the lease is, with letters referring to it, a sufficient very evils to avoid which has been the memorandum to take the lease out of the statute well-undertood purpose of this clause of of frauds, as against the lessee. Insurance Co. v.

the statute of frauds, that it should be Oliver, (Ála.) 2 South. Rep. 445. A tenancy from

construed as applicable, unless the cther year to year cannot be created by an oral agreement to work land on shares for a term of five

sections of the law very clearly manifest years, followed by occupancy of the land for two

the intention to withdraw or exclude such years under the agreement. Unglish v. Marvin, cases from its operation. Such an inten8 N. Y. Supp. 283.

tion is not manifest. Full effect may be

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