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v. Starr, before referred to, it is sufficient mortgage. Under our statute, (section 4995, to say that defendant denies that either Comp. Laws,) one of the specific grounds of such conversations had any reference to justifying the issuing of an attachment is the mortgaged goods, or their proceeds, that the defendant has secreted, or is but says that he did tell them that he about to secrete, his property with intent could do as he liked with a part of the to defraud his creditors, and this was one proceeds of sales, for the reason that the of the facts in the attachment affidavit almortgage covered butlittle more than half leged to exist, and one of the grounds uphis stock. We think the affidavit of de- on which the warrant of attachment was fendant, thus explaining these conversa- issued. If the affidavit had shown this fact tions, was sufficient to impair the force of alone, it would have been sufficient ground the affidavits to which it was responsive, for the attachment, and, if the defendant and that they do not seriously antagonize had sought a discharge of the warrant by each other as to truthfulness. As this the court, he must have positively and defwas substantially all the evidence tending initely denied such allegation. In the proto support the grounds upon which the curing affidavit in this case it was charged warrant of attachment was issued, we that the defendant“had assigned, disposed think the court below was justified in con- of, and secreted his property, and was cluding that there was no such preponder- about to assign, dispose of, and secrete ance of proof with the plaintiffs - upon his property, with intent to defraud his whom rested the burden-asentitled them creditors,

creditors," and it was incumbent on him, to a continuance of the warrant of attach- on his motion to discharge, to meet each ment. The order of the court discharg- substantive ground

substantive ground alleged, and upon ing the attachment is affirmed. All the

All the which the warrant had been issued, with judges concurring.

a full and unqualified denial. We have ex

amined with great care all the affidavits (1 S. D. 129)

which were used in the court below on the HORNICK DRUG Co. v. LANE.

motion to discharge, and can find no de(Supreme Court of South Dakota. May 12, 1890.) nial, nor any attempt at a denial, of this ATTACHMENT-MOTION TO DISCHARGE.

charge of secretion. There was an effort,

at least, to traverse all the other statutory motion to discharge a warrant of attach. ment should be refused unless the defendant, or

grounds for attachment, as alleged in the other moving party, denies the existence of every

affidavit. The practical effect of denying statutory ground alleged in the affidavit upon

a part of the allegations only, is to leave which the warrant was issued.

those undenied as though confessed. With 2. Where the warrant is issued upon an affi- this specific and positive allegation of the davit alleging, among other statutory grounds, attachment affidavit uncontradicted, or that the defendant has secreted and is about to

even explained, it being alone sufficient to secrete his property with intent to defraud his creditors, and the defendant, on motion to dis

support the attachment, it was error in charge, controverts all the allegations of the affi

the court below to sustain the motion to davit except that of secretion, leaving that unno

discharge. The order of the district court ticed and undenied, the motion to discharge should discharging the warrant of attachment is be refused.

reversed. All the judges concurring. 3. The practical effect of denying a part of the allegations only, is to leave those undenied as

(1 S. D. 131) though confessed. (Syllabus by the Court.)

HAMLIN COUNTY V. CLARK COUNTY. Appeal from district court, Spink county.

(Supreme Court of South Dakota. May 12, 1890.) H.C. & T. J. Walsh, C. T. Howard, and

POOR-RELIEF IN SICKNESS-LIABILITY OF John B. & W. H. Sanborn, for appellant.

COUNTY, N. P. Bromley and A. B. Melville, for re

1. A person who had a lawful settlement in the spondent.

county of C.was severely injured while temporarily residing in the county of H., and the latter county

furnished him medical attendance, nurses, etc., for KELLAM, J. This case comes to this

several months. Held, on suit brought to recover court on appeal from an order of the dis

for such relief by the county of H. against the trict court discharging an attachment county of C., that the county of H. could not retherein. The warrant was issued upon an cover, in the absence of any provision of the stataffidavit charging that the defendant had ute authorizing such recovery. had “assigned, disposed of, and secreted

2. Section 2143, Comp. Laws, provides that "evhis property, and was about to assign, dis

ery county shall relieve all poor and indigent perpose of, and secrete his property, with in

sons lawfully settled therein, whenever they shall

stand in need thereof.” Held, that under this sectent to defraud his creditors." The prin- tion no legal duty was imposed upon a county to cipal ground relied upon to justify the is- provide relief or support to one who had a lawful suing of the warrant was the giving of a settlement therein while without the county. certain chattel mortgage on a portion of 3. Section 2161 provides that it shall be the his stock, by defendant and respondent, to

duty of the overseers of the poor of a county to his brother, William A. Lane, which inort

furnish temporary relief to one who is sick an, in gage appellants claim as to them, cred

distress, and without friends or money, therein,

though not an inhabitant of the county. Held, itors of said respondent, was at least pre- that this duty is imposed upon a county, in addisumptively fraudulent on its face. This tion to the legal duty of supporting its own poor question was fully considered and deter- and indigent.. mined in Lane v. Starr, ante, 212, (decided at 4. Further held, that the obligation or duty of this term,) where it was held that there was a county to relieve and support the poor is purely nothing in the mortgage itself to impeach statutory, and to make a county liable the case :

must fall within the liability created pursuant to, its validity; and the attachment must be

and in the manner prescribed by, the statute. sustained, if at all, upon grounds other 5. Further held, there are none of the elements. than any appearing upon the face of the of a contract, express or implied, in a demand for the support or relief of the poor. The liahility, if | in giving judgment against the defendant any, originatos solely in the positive provisions of in this action, for that, even though all the statuto.

the findings of fact are true, the plaintiff (Syllabrus by the Court.)

is not entitled to judgment herein. The Appeal from district court, Codington question, therefore, presented for our decounty.

termination, is, is Clark county legally liaWiliam McGaan and S. B. Van Burkirk, ble, for the relief so furnished to the man for appellant. J. P. Cheever and w. S. Luther, to Hamlin county, in the absence Glass, for respondent.

of any express provision of the Compiled

Law's creating such liability? It is conCORRON, P. J. The defendant and ap- tended by the learned counsel for appelpellant appeals from a judgment rendered lant that no right of action existed at against it and in favor of plaintiff, revers- common law, by one municipality against ing a decision of the board of county com- another to recover for temporary or othmissioners of Clark county, disallowing er relief furnished a poor person while out plaintiff's claim for the expenses incurred of the county of his settlement, and that, by the plaintiff for relief furnished one as no remedy is given by our Compiled Luther, who had a legal settlement in de-Laws in such a case except that provided fendant county. The facts as found by the in section 2153, no right of recovery exists. referee, to whom the case was referred. It is urged on the part of the learned counare in substance as follows: That on the sel for the respondent that, though our 13th day of December, 1884, one Charles statute has not in terms provided for the Luther, a resident of Clark county, and repayment of expenses so incurred, it has then temporarily residing in Hamlin coun- made it the legal duty of the county " to ty, fell from the roof of a building upon relieve and support all poor and indigent which he was at work, breaking his leg, persons lawfully settled therein," and and rrreiving other injuries; that on the that, consequently, there is an implied dny followiig complaint was made to 0. promise on the part of a county to reimC. Swift, chairman of the board of county | burse another county for the expenses incommissioners of Hamlin county, that curred in furnishing temporary relief to a said Luther was lying in said county sick person who has a legal settlement in the and in distress, without friends or money, former county. The sections of the Comand that he was not a resident of said piled Laws bearing upon this question are county; that said Swift examined said as follows: Section 2143 provides: "Evcare, and found the complaint to be true, ery county shall relieve and support all and granted, as such chairman, such tem- poor and indigent persons lawfully settled porary relief as the nature of the case re- therein whenever they shall stand in need quired; that said Luther was a poor per- thereof." Section 2152 provides: “Whenson, virtually without money and abso- ever any person entitled to temporary relutely without friends; that said Hamlin lief as a pauper shall be in any county in county caused necessary surgical and med- which he or she has not a legal settlement, Ical aid and attendance, and also nurses, the overseers of the poor thereof may, if clothing, and board, to be furnished him the same is deemed advisable, grant such to the amount of $680.53, and that the re-relief by placing him or her temporarily lief so furnished him was reasonably worth in the poor-house of such county, if there that sum, and that the same was allowed be one; but if there be no poor-house, then and paid by said Hamlin cuunty ; that such they shall provide the same relief as is cusrelief was furnikbed said Luther until tomary in cases where a legal settlement March 31, 1885, when he was removed to has been obtained." Section 2153 prosald Clark county by said Hamlin county, vides: “Upon complaint of any orerseer and that said removal of said Luther was of the poor any justice of the peace may made as soon as it was safe to his health issue his warrant, directed to and to be and life to do so; that soon after the in- executed by any constable, or by any othjury to Luther notice was given by said er person therein designated, to cause any Hamlin county to said Clark county of poor person found in the county of such his condition, and that relief was being overseers, likely to become a public charge, furnished him by Raid Hamlin county, and and having no legal settlement therein, to that he had a legal settlement in said be sent and charged at the expense of the Clark county: that said Clark county made county to the place where such person beno provision for anid Luther while he was longs, if the same can be conveniently so being relieved by said Hamlin county, done; but, if he or she cannot be removed, and refused to remove him, and that no such person shall be relieved by said overorder for his removal, as provided by the seers' whenever such relief is neeued.” Compiled laws, was at any time applied Section 2161 provides: “It shall be the for or obtained by the overseers of the poor duty of the overheers of the poor, on comol sald Hamlin county. The findings of plaint made to them that any person not fact, reported by the referee, were adopt- an inhabitant of their county is lying sick ed by the court, and upon them the court therein, or in distress, without friends or stated as Its conclusions of law that the money, so that he or she is likely to suffer, defendant was liable to the plaintiff for to examine into the case of such person, the amount so expended in the temporary and grant such temporary relief as the natrellet of said Luther, and entered judg. ure of the same may require; and if any ment for plaintiff as before stated.

person shall die within any county, who The appellant has assigned numerous shall not have money or means necessary errors, but the view we take of the case to defray his or her funeral expenses, it only renders it necessary to consider one. shall be the duty of the overseers of the anil that is as follows: "The court erred poor of such county to employ some person to provide for and superintend the burial bursing municipalities for the expenses inof such deceased person; and the neces- curred for relief furnished in cases like the sary and reasonable expenses thereof shall one at bar, in preference to the system in be paid by the county treasurer upon the force in many of the states, where provisorder of such overseers.

ions are made for such reimbursement, and It will be observed froin an examination the method of proceedings to enforce the of these sections that it is made the duty remedy are fully and specifically pointed of the county-First, to relieve and sup- out. If we are correct in our construction port all poor and indigent persons lawful- of the statute, Hamlin county has fursy settled therein; second, to relieve, tem- 'nished no relief to the man Luther which porarily, poor and indigent persons, not it was the legal duty of Clark county to lawfully settled therein, but who stand in have furnished. It has only furnished the need of aid therein; third, to grant tem- relief legally imposed upon it, to furnish to porary relief to persons not inhabitants of one lying sick and in distress, without the county, lying sick or in distress there friends or money, therein, though not an in, without friends or money; and, fourth, inhabitant of that county. The obligathat authority is given the county to re- tion or duty of a county to relieve and move, on proper proceedings taken, poor support the poor and indigent is purely and indigent persons, liable to become a statutory, and to make a county liable public charge, to the county in which such the case must fall within the liability crepersons have a legal settlement. It will ated pursuant to and in the manner prebe further observed that in the sections scribed by thestatute. Cooledge v. Mahascited, except section 2161, "poor” or ka Co., 24 Iowa, 211; Mitchell v. Cornville, "poor and indigent” persons are referred 12 Mass. 333; Miller v. Somerset, 14 Mass. to, while in the latter section the words 396; Kellogg v. St. George, 28 Me. 255; Ives “any person” are used as designating the v. Wallingford, 8 Vt. 224. There are none persons entitled to temporary relief under of the elements of a contract, express or that section. This latter section, therefore, implied, in a demand for the support or seems to contemplate that persons who relief of the poor. The liability, if any, are not in the class designated as “poor originates solely in the positive provisions and indigent” persons may, from accident, of the statute. City of Augusta v. Chelsickness, or other misfortune, require tem- sea, 47 Me. 367. The duty of supporting porary relief in a county of which such per- the poor, aiding poor people, or those temsons may not be inhabitants. It is quite porarily requiring assistance, may be im- . clear from the findings of the referee in this posed by the legislature upon counties or case that the man Luther was within this towns in such manner as it may deem exclass, and that the temporary relief fur- pedient. There is no question of moral nished him was uuder the provisions of obligation involved, nor any question of the latter section. The legal duty imposed absolute right as between the counties. upon a county to grant temporary relief It is simply a question of public policy, to such persons, as are designated in sec- and, being such, is entirely within the contion 2161, is quite as obligatory upon the trol of the legislature. We are therefore county as the duty imposed of relieving all of the opinion that the judgment in this poor and indigent persons lawfully settled case should be reversed. Judgment retherein. The duty, in either case, is im- , versed, with instruction to the court below

| posed in positive terms. The legal duty of to conform its conclusions of law to the a county to relieve and support the poor views expressed in this opinion, and to and indigent lawfully settled therein seems render judgment on the findings in favor to be limited to the poor and indigent of the defendant. All the judges concurwithin the county, there being no provis- ring, except BENNETT, J., who did not sit ions in the law requiring a county to pro- in this case, nor take any part in the devide for its poor outside of the county; cision. and a county, neither upon notice or otherwise, is required to remove a person having

(1 S. D. 138) a legal settlement therein from a county

HEGELER v. COMSTOCK. where he is, or is liable to become, a pub- (Supreme Court of South Dakota. May 12, 1890.) lic charge, but such duty of removal is im

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. posed upon the county in which such person may be. In our opinion the legal duty

1. The term “negotiable instrument" has a def. to furnish temporary relief to a person sick

inite signification in the law merchant, and the or in distress, and without friends or

meaning of the term has not been changed by the

Code. A negotiable instrument is one that is simmoney, is imposed upon the county, in ad

ple, certain, and unconditional. dition to the duty of providing relief and 2. Certainty as to the payer and payee, the support for its own poor and indigent, and amount to be paid, and the terms of payment, is an is placed as an additional burden upon essential quality of a negotiable promissory note, such county. This is quite apparent from

and that certainty must continue until the obliga

tion is discharged. the fact that no provision is made for reimbursing a county for the relief so fur

3. The following is a copy of a note held to be

non-negotiable: “On or before the 1st day of Denished, and that no provision is made for cember, 1884, for value received, I or we, the unany notice to be given to the county in dersigned, living 5 miles of Howard P. O., county which such person has a legal settlement. of Miner,' territory of Dakota, promise to pay That this is the proper construction of our

Marsh Binder Manufacturing Company or order statute is confirmed by the further fact

one hundred dollars, at the Miner County Bank, that in adopting a system of poor-laws

in Howard, with interest from date until paid at

the rate of ten per cent. per annum, eight per cent. our legislature has followed substantially

if paid when due. The indorsers, signers, and the system in force in the state of Indiana, guarantors severally waive presentment for payin which no provisions are made for reim- ment, protest and notice of protest, and notice of

non-payment of this note, and diligence in bring. was still unpaid. (7) That at the comlag suit against any party to this note, and secur- mencement of this action the said notes Illes agree that time of payment may be extended

were the property of the plaintiff, due and without notice or other consent. Edwin W.COM

unpaid. (8) "That at the commencement STOCK.” (Syllabus by the Court.)

of this action, to-wit, February 11, 1888,

there was due on both of the above-deAppeal from district court, Miner coun- scribed notes the sum of $290.80." The fol. ty; BARTLETT TRIPP, Judge.

lowing were the stipulations en tered into D. D. Holdridge, for appellant. Gott- by the parties as to the legal questions

inleib Engel, for respondent.

volved in said action, to-wit: *(1) Wheth

er the plaintiff, under the abovestatement, BENNETT, J. This is an action brought was a bona fide holder. (2) Whether said by the plaintiff and appellant against the notes are negotiable instruments so as to defendant and respondent upon two prom- cut off in the hands of said plaintiff, proissory notes. The following is a copy of cured by him as above stated, all defenses said notes: "On or before the 1st day of that might have been set up and proven December, 1884, for value received, I or we, between the original parties to the notes." the undersigned, living 5 miles of Howard Upon the bearing the court found the folP. O., county of Miner, territory of Da- lowing conclusions of law: "(1) That kota, promise to pay to Marsh Binder said potes are not pegotiable instruments, Manufacturing Company or order one and that said defendant is entitled to hundred dollars, at the Miner County prove any defense to said notes that he Bank, in Howard, with interest from date could have proven in an action between until paid at the rate of ten per cent. per the original parties to said instruments; annum, eight per cent. 11 paid when due. (2) that the defendant has a good and The Indorsers, signers, and guarantors valid defense against said notes, and to severully waive presentment for payment, the whole thereof, and is entitled to a judgprotest and notice of protest, and notice ment of dismissal of plaintiff's action, and of non-payment of this note, and diligence for costs,-and rendered a judgment disin bringing suit against any party to this missing the plaintiff's complaint, and that note, and suretles agree that time of pay- the defendant recover of said plaintiff the ment may be extended without notice or costs and disbursements of this action.” other content. EDWIN W. ComeTOCK." Up- Whereupon the plaintiff perfects his apon tbe trial the cause was submitted to peal, and makes the following assignment the court, sitting as a Jury, upon the fol- of errors: “(1) The court erred in finding lowing agreed statement of facts: "(1) that said notes were not negotiable. (2) That on the 18th day of August, 1883, the The court erred in finding that the defenddefendant, Edwin W. Comstock, made, ex- ant is entitled to prove any defense to said ecuted, and delivered to the Marsh Binder notes that he could have proven in an acManufacturing Company or order his two tion between the original parties to said certain promissory notes of $100 each. instruments. () The court erred in findcopy of said notes are set out in the com- ing that the plaintiff, under the statement plaint hereto attached. (2) That said notes and stipulation of the parties, was not a were given in part payment for a machine. bona fide holder. (4) The court erred in That said machine was warranted by said finding that the defendant has a good and company, and that said Comstock pur- valid defense against said notes, and that chased said machine on the faith of said defendant is entitled to a dismissal of warranty, and the consideration for said plaintiff's action. (5) The judgment is

5 notes wholly failed. That the said defend- erroneons, and against law. ant had a good and sufficient defense to By stipulation of the parties, and the assald notes in the original parties' hands. signment of errors, the only legal ques(3) That on the 9th day of November, 1883, tions involved in tbis action are these: the Marsh Binder Manufacturing Com- First. Are the written instruments sued pany borrowed of the plaintiff, E. Č. Hege- upon negotiable notes? Second. Is the ler, the sum of $20,500. That to secure the plaintiff a bona fide holder of the same? payment of said sum of money so bor- It is claimed that the following clause renrowed the suid company, on the 9th day ders thene notes non-negotiable: “ With of November, 1883, the same day the said interest from date until paid, at the rate sum was so borrowed, transferred to the of ten per cent., eight per cent. if paid when plaintiff, E. C. Hegeler, a large number of notes, amounting to about $30,000, and 1. Aresaid instruments negotiable? The among the notes so transferred were the statutes of Dakota, independent of the above-described notes. (4) That said notes common law and decisions of state courts, were so transferred as abovestated before define negotiable instruments and setthey were due, and that the plaintiff had tle their ingredients. We quote from the no notice of any defense to the same, but compiled Laws: "Sec. 4456. A negotiable received them in perfect good faith. (5) instrument is a written promise or request That at the time of the transfer above for the payment of a certain sum of money mentioned, the Marsh Binder Manufact- to order, or bearer, in conformity to the uring Company properly indorsed said provisions of this article. Sec. 4457. A nenotes to the plaintiit. (6) That at the gotiable instrument must be made paycommencement of this action several able in money only, and without any conthousand dollars of the $22,500 borrowed dition not certain of fulfillment. Sec. by the Marsh Binder Manufacturing Com. 4462. A negotiable instrument must not pany of the plaintiff, E. C. Hegeler, as contain any other contract than such before stated, and for which the above- as is specified in this article." The term described nutes were taken as security, negotiable instrument" has a definite




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signification in the law merchant, and the what may not be? It is the first step in meaning of the term has not been changed the wrong direction which costs. These by the Code. The principal importance instruments may come to be lumbered up which is to be attached to the question of with all sorts of stipulations, and all sorts negotiability arises from the rule of law of difficulties, contentions, and litigation which subjects all non-negotiable bills and

In Bank v. Purdy, 56 Mich. 6, 22 notes to any equities which may exist be- N. W. Rep. 93, the supreme court decided tween prior parties, even when they are that the following was not a negotiable transferred before due to a bona fide pur-promissory note: a

* $366.66. Coldwater, chaser for value. A negotiable instrument Mich., Feb. 27, 1883. On the 1st day of Nois one that is simple, certain, and uncon- vember, 1883, we, the undersigned, whose ditional. Lord ELLENBOROUGH, in Smith post-office address is Algansee, county of v. Nightingale, 2 Starkie, 375, held that Branch, and state of Michigan, jointly an instrument wherein the promise“ to pay and severally, for value received, promise J. S. the sum of sixty-five pounds, with to pay E. M. Birdsall & Company or orlawful interest for the same, and all oth- der three hundred and sixty-six 66-100 doler sums which should be due him,"was not lars, with interest at seven per cent. per ana promissory note. Byles, Bills, 147. Lord pum if paid when due; if not so paid, then KENYON, in Carlos v. Fancourt, 5 Term R. the interest shall be ten per cent. per an. 485, observed: “It would perplex the com- num from date. We also agree to pay exmercial transactions of mankind, if paper change and all expenses, including attorsecurities of this kind were issued out into ney's fee incurred in collecting, payable at the world incumbered with conditions and the First National Bank in Coldwater, contingencies, and if the persons to whom Mich. We do hereby relinquish and waive they were offered in negotiation were the benefit of all laws exempting real and obliged to inquire when these uncertain personal property from levy and sale, and events would probably be reduced to a cer- all benefit or relief from valuation and aptainty.” In Ayrey v. Fearnsides, 4 Mees. praisement laws. GEORGE R. PURDY. EL& W. 168, PARKE, B., held that the words NATHAN GEORGE.” Mr. Justice CHAMPLIN, “and all'fines according to rule” destroy in this case, says: “The modern tendency the negotiability. In Thompson v. Sloan, to interpolate into such instruments en23 Wend. 71, the court held that a promisé gagements and stipulations not recogto pay a certain sum in Canada money is nized by the law merchant, affecting the not negotiable. In the case of Jones v. certainty as to the amount due and payRadatz, 6 N. W. Rep. 800, the supreme able thereon, or the time of maturity, court of Minnesota held the following not

# should be discountenanced and a negotiable promissory note: “$135. P. held to destroy their negotiability and de0. St. Paul, County of Ramsey, State of prive them of the character of promissory Minnesota, September 7, 1878. Three notes, and they should be relegated to the inonths after date we, or either of us, domain of ordinary contracts.” In the promise to pay to H. K. White & Co. or case of Altman v. Rittershofer, 36 N. W. bearer $135, payable at the Second Nation- Rep. 74, 68 Mich. 287, the note before the al Bank of St. Paul, Minnesota, for value court was as follows: "130. Bay City, received, with 12 per cent. interest per an- Michigan, October 17, 1885. Six months num from date, and reasonable attorney's after date I promise to pay to the order fees, if suit be instituted for the collection of M. Cohn one hundred and thirty dollars, of this note.

Chief Justice at the Bay National Bank of Bay City, GILFILLAN, in this case, said: “The instru- Michigan, for value received, without any ment before us has this certainty as to relief whatever from valuation or appraisethe $135 and the interest. But the whole ment laws, with eight per cent. interest instrument must be taken together. The from date until paid, and attorney fees. promise to pay the $135, and interest, is FREDERICK RITTERSHOFER. Indorsed: M. not the whole of the promise, not the en- Cohn.” Mr. Justice LONG, in delivering tire obligation created. The entire prom- the opinion, says: "A promissory note is an ise and obligation is to pay absolutely unconditional written promise, signed by that sum, and interest, and in a particu- the maker, to pay absolutely and at all

, lar contingency, to-wit, the bringing suit events a sum certain in money, either to by the payee after default, to pay a fur- the bearer, or to a person therein desigther amount not fixed, and not capable of nated, or his order. The only question upbeing ascertained from the instrument it- on the negotiability of this instrument is self.” The supreme court of Pennsylvania, whether the words 'and attorney fees,' in the case of Woods v. North, 84 Pa. St. added thereto, renders the sum to be paid 407, held the following instrument to be a uncertain.

The better reasoning, non-negotiable promissory note: “$377. in my judgment, holds such instruments Huntington, Pa., May 5th, 1875. Sixty non-negotiable." In Bank v. Taylor, 25 N. days after date I promise to pay to the W. Rep. 810, the instrument sued on was order of W. H. Woods, at the Union Bank as follows: "$40.00. Coon Rapids, Iowa, of Huntington, three hundred and seventy- 5-4-1881. On the twenty-fifth day of De

seven dollars, and five per cent. collection cember, 1881, for value received, I promfee, if not paid when due, without defal- ise to pay J. W. Stoddard or bearer forty cation, value received. SAMUEL STEFFEY. dollars, with interest at ten per cent., payIndorsed: W. H. WOODS." In this case able annually from date until paid, and Justice SHARSWOOD said: “In the paper ten per cent. is to be added to the amount now in question there en ters, as to the if this note remains unpaid after matuamount, an undoubted element of uncer- rity, and is collected by suit. For the containty. * If this collateral agree- sideration mentioned above, the underment may be introduced with impunity, i signed hereby sells and conveys to J. W.

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