rule of the nation with the largest armament factories. Such a policy the United States of America could not accept.

But our principal controversy with the German Government, and the one which rendered the situation at once acute, rose out of their announcement of a sea zone where their submarines would operate in violation of all accepted principles of international law. Our indignation at such a threat was soon rendered passionate by the sinking of the Lusitania. This attack upon our rights was not only grossly illegal; it defied the fundamental concepts of humanity. Aggravating restraints on our trade were grievances which could be settled by litigation after the war, but the wanton murder of peaceable men and of innocent women and children, citizens of a nation with which Germany was at peace, was a crime against the civilized world which could never be settled in any court.

Our Government, however, inspired still by a desire to preserve peace if possible, used every resource of diplomacy to force the German Government to abandon such attacks. This diplomatic correspondence, which has already been published, proves beyond doubt that our Government sought by every honorable means to preserve faith in that mutual sincerity between nations which is the only basis of sound diplomatic interchange. But evidence of the bad faith of the Imperial German Government soon piled up on every hand. Honest efforts on our part to establish a firm basis of good neighborliness with the German people were met by their Government with quibbles, misrepresentations, and counter accusations against their enemies abroad. And meanwhile in this country official agents of the Central Powers-protected from criminal prosecution by diplomatic immunity-conspired against our internal peace, placed spies and agents provocateurs throughout the length and breadth of our land, and even in high positions of trust in departments of our Government. While expressing a cordial friendship for the people of the United States, the Government of Germany had its agents at work both in Latin America and Japan. They bought or subsidized papers and supported speakers there to rouse feelings of bitterness and distrust. against us in those friendly nations, in order to embroil us in war. They were inciting to insurrection in Cuba, in Haiti, and in Santo Domingo; their hostile hand was stretched out to

take the Danish Islands; and everywhere in South America they were abroad sowing the seeds of dissension, trying to stir up one nation against another and all against the United States. In their sum these various operations amounted to direct assault upon the Monroe doctrine. And even if we had given up our right to travel on the sea, even if we had surrendered to German threats and abandoned our legitimate trade in munitions, the German offensive in the New World, in our own land and among our neighbors, was becoming too serious to be ignored.

So long as it was possible, the Government of the United States tried to believe that such activities, the evidence of which was already in a large measure at hand, were the work of irresponsible and misguided individuals. It was only reluctantly, in the face of overwhelming proof, that the recall of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador and of the German military and naval attachés was demanded. Proof of their criminal violations of our hospitality was presented to their Governments. But these Governments in reply offered no apologies nor did they issue reprimands. It became clear that such intrigue was their settled policy.

In the meantime the attacks of the German submarines upon the lives and property of American citizens had gone on; the protests of our Government were now sharp and ominous; and this Nation was rapidly being drawn into a state of war. As the President said in Topeka, on February 2, 1916:

"We are not going to invade any nation's right. But suppose, my fellow countrymen, some nation should invade our rights. What then? * * * I have come here to tell you that the difficulties of our foreign policy * * * daily increase in number and intricacy and in danger, and I would be derelict to my duty to you if I did not deal with you in these matters with the utmost candor, and tell you what it may be necessary to use the force of the United States to do." The next day at St. Louis, he repeated his warning: "The danger is not from within, gentlemen, it is from without; and I am bound to tell you that that danger is constant and immediate, not because anything new has happened, not because there has been any change in our international relationships within recent weeks or months, but because the danger comes with every turn of events."

The break would have come sooner if our Government had not been restrained by the hope that saner counsels might still prevail in Germany. For it was well known to us that the German people had to a very large extent been kept in ignorance of many of the secret crimes of their Government against us. And the pressure of a faction of German public opinion less hostile to this country was shown when their Government acquiesced to some degree in our demands, at the time of the Sussex outrage, and for nearly a year maintained at least a pretense of observing the pledge they had made to us. The tension was abated.

While the war spirit was growing in some sections of our Nation, there was still no widespread desire to take part in the conflict abroad; for the tradition of noninterference in Europe's political affairs was too deeply rooted our national life to be easily overthrown. Moreover, two other considerations strengthened our Government in its efforts to remain neutral in this war. The first was our traditional sense of responsibility toward all the republics of the New World. Throughout the crisis our Government was in constant communication with the countries of Central and South America. They, too, preferred the ways of peace. And there was a very obvious obligation upon us to safeguard their interests with our own. The second consideration, which had been so often developed in the President's speeches, was the hope that by keeping aloof from the bitter passions abroad, by preserving untroubled here the holy ideals of civilized intercourse between nations, we might be free at the end of this war to bind up the wounds of the conflict, to be the restorers and rebuilders of the wrecked structure of the world.

All these motives held us back, but it was not long until we were beset by further complications. We soon had reason to believe that the recent compliance of the German Government had not been made to us in good faith, and was only temporary; and by the end of 1916 it was plain that our neutral status had again been made unsafe through the ever-increasing aggressiveness of the German autocracy. There was general agreement here with the statement of our President, on October 26, 1916, that this conflict was the last great war involving the world in which we could remain neutral.

It was in this frame of mind, fearing we might be drawn into the war if it did not soon come to an end, that the President began the preparation of his note, asking the belligerent powers to define their war aims. But before he had completed it, the world was surprised by the peace move of the German Government-an identical note on behalf of the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, sent through neutral powers on December 12, 1916, to the governments of the Allies, proposing negotiations for peace. While expressing the wish to end this war—“a catastrophe which thousands of years of common civilization was unable to prevent and which injures the most precious achievements of humanity"-the greater portion of the note was couched in terms that gave small hope of a lasting peace. Boasting of German conquests, "the glorious deeds of our armies," the note implanted in neutral minds the belief that it was the purpose of the Imperial German Government to insist upon such conditions as would leave all Central Europe under German dominance and so build up an Empire which would menace the whole liberal world.

Moreover, the German proposal was accompanied by a thinly veiled threat to all neutral nations; and from a thousand sources, official and unofficial, the word came to Washington that unless the neutrals used their influence to bring the war to an end on terms dictated from Berlin, Germany and her allies would consider themselves henceforth free from any obligations to respect the rights of neutrals. The Kaiser ordered the neutrals to exert pressure on the Entente to bring the war to an abrupt end, or to beware of the consequences. Clear warnings were brought to our Government that if the German peace move should not be successful, the submarines would be unleashed for a more intense and ruthless war upon all commerce.

On the 18th of December, the President dispatched his note to all the belligerent powers, asking them to define their war aims. There was still hope in our minds that the mutual suspicions between the warring powers might be decreased, and the menace of future German aggression and dominance be removed, by finding a guaranty of good faith in a League of Nations. There was a chance that by the creation of such a league as part of the peace negotiations, the war could now be

brought to an end before our Nation was involved. Two statements issued to the press by our Secretary of State, upon the day the note was dispatched, threw a clear light on the seriousness with which our Government viewed the crisis.

From this point, events moved rapidly. The powers of the Entente replied to the German peace note. Neutral nations took action on the note of the President, and from both belligerents replies to this note were soon in our hands.

The German reply was evasive--in accord with their traditional preference for diplomacy behind closed doors. Refusing to state to the world their terms, Germany and her allies merely proposed a conference. They adjourned all discussion of any plan for a league of peace until after hostilities should end.

The response of the Entente Powers was frank and in harmony with our principal purpose. Many questions raised in the statement of their aims were so purely European in character as to have small interest for us; but our great concern in Europe was the lasting restoration of peace, and it was clear that this was also the chief interest of the Entente Nations. As to the wisdom of some of the measures they proposed toward this end, we might differ in opinion, but the trend of their proposals was the establishment of just frontiers based on the rights of all nations, the small as well as the great, to decide their own destinies.

The aims of the belligerents were now becoming clear. From the outbreak of hostilities the German Government had claimed that it was fighting a war of defense. But the tone of its recent proposals had been that of a conqueror. It sought a peace based on victory. The central empires aspired to extend their domination over other races. They were willing to make liberal terms to any one of their enemies, in a separate peace which would free their hands to crush other opponents. But they were not

willing to accept any peace which did not, all fronts considered, leave them victors and the dominating imperial power of Europe. The war aims of the Entente showed a determination to thwart this ambition of the Imperial German Government. Against the German Peace to further German growth and aggression the Entente Powers offered a plan for a European Peace that should make the whole continent secure.

At this juncture the President read his address to the Senate, on January 22, 1917, in which he outlined the kind of peace the