STATE ex rel. GLENN v. MISSISSIPPI RIVER BRIDGE Co. et al. (Missouri Supreme Court, March 14, 1892.) Taxation-Bridge between Two States-Bridge Company.-Under the revenue law (Rev. St. Mo., 1889, sec. 7755), that portion of a railroad bridge across the Mississippi River at Louisiana, Mo., lying west of the Missouri state-line, is taxable as a bridge while owned by a bridge company. Ownership of Bridge-Lease to Railroad.-The fact that the bridge is under lease to a railway company "forever," at a fixed rent, subject to a defeasance in case of failure by the lessee to comply with its terms, does not destroy the ownership by the bridge company, within the meaning of the revenue law. Segregation of Bridge from Railroad for Taxation.-A railroad bridge may lawfully be segregated for the purposes of taxation from the railway line in connection with which it is used where its ownership is separate from the railway. APPEAL from Pike circuit court. BARCLAY, J.-This action was begun by the collector of the revenue for Pike County to enforce payment of certain taxes assessed and levied for state, and also for local purposes, against the property of the Mississippi River Case stated. Bridge Company, situated in that county. The assessment by the state board of equalization and the levy by the county court of Pike County are not challenged for any irregularity. The objection to them goes deeper, and is placed upon the contention that the property in view is not subject to the tax imposed. That property is the Missouri portion of a railroad bridge across the Mississippi River at Louisiana, Mo. To make the present issue entirely clear, a short history of that structure will be given. For many years the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company operated a line of railroad in Illinois to a point opposite the state of Louisiana, and it ran a line in Missouri, leased from the Louisiana & Missouri Railroad Company, westward from that city. The transfer of trains over the river was then made by ferry. In 1871 the Louisiana & Missouri Railroad Company was authorized by an act of Congress to construct a railroad bridge over the river there on certain conditions, some of which will be discussed later on. Afterward a corporation was organized in Illinois, called the "Mississippi River Bridge Company," to erect a bridge at the place indicated, and to exercise the power of eminent domain in reference thereto in that state; while a similar corporation, the Louisiana Bridge Company, was formed in Missouri for the exercise of like powers on this side of the river. In 1873, under legislative authority from both states, the two bridge companies were consolidated under the name of that first mentioned, the present defendant. The Louisiana & Missouri Railroad Company then entered into an agreement with the bridge company by which the latter was to build the bridge (under the grant of power by Congress to the former), and the bridge company was thereupon to become the owner of the completed work in consideration of its outlays upon it. This contract was carried out. None of the moves so far described of these companies is called in question by any party to the litigation. This appeal proceeds on the assumption that they are entirely valid, and we shall so treat them. After the bridge was finished, the bridge company leased it to the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company for use in connection with its lines in Illinois and Missouri. The terms of this lease will necessarily be referred to again, since upon them arises one of the most important questions in the case. The trial court held that the bridge property was improperly assessed as such by the state board of equalization, and that it should have been treated for taxation as a portion of the line of the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company in Missouri. It rendered judgment accordingly, and the plaintiff appealed in the interest of the county. * * able as a By section 7755 (Rev. St. 1889) of the revenue law, it is provided that "all bridges * * over streams dividing this state from other states, owned by joint-stock companies, and all such bridges where a toll is charged for crossing the same, * * shall be subject to taxation Structure taxfor state, county, municipal, and other local pur- bridge. poses, to the same extent as the property of private persons, and taxes levied thereon shall be levied and collected in the manner'as is now or may hereafter be provided by law for the taxation of railroad property in this state." Under other sections of the revenue law, bridges forming merely parts of a railway line, and not comprehended within the terms of the section above quoted, are taxed as general railroad property. Rev. St. 1889, §§ 7717, 7718, etc. But it is evident that such a structure as that here in consideration is included within the scope of the language, no less than of the spirit and intent of section 7755. to railroad company. By the federal authority under which it was erected, this condition is affixed to the ownership and use of the bridge, viz.: "That all railway companies desiring to use Effect of lease the said bridge shall have and be entitled to equal rights and privileges in the passage of the same, and in the use of the machinery and fixtures thereof, and of all approaches thereto, under and upon such terms and conditions as shall be prescribed by the district court of the United States for the district in which said bridge is situated, upon hearing the allegations and proofs of the parties, in case they shall not agree." 16 U. S. St. at Large 1871, p. 474, § 5. Under that stipulation the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company enjoys the use of the tracks and other bridge privileges for a consideration of $150 monthly, and 25 cents additional for each paying passenger carried over the river on its line at that point. This arrangement was made between that company and the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, as lessee of the bridge, and it is yet in force. Any railway company desiring like accommodations may secure them upon reasonable terms, in the mode indicated in the section just quoted from the act of Congress. The Chicago & Alton Railroad Company is in present possession of the bridge by virtue of the lease already mentioned. It is contended that the nature of its tenure thereof is such as renders that property, in substance, one with the entire road of that company in Missouri for purposes of taxation. The general features of the lease in question are these: The bridge company leases the property to the railway company "forever," upon conditions stated. The railway company is to use and operate the leased premises as part of its line; to keep them in good repair; to pay all taxes thereon; to pay the salaries of the officers of the bridge company, the interest and principal of its bonded indebtedness, and an annual (7 per cent) dividend upon its stock. The bridge company is to incur no new indebtedness nor increase its capital stock. In. case of default on the part of the railway company in performance of the agreements mentioned, the lessor may re-enter and dispossess the lessee of the property. It is clear from this statement of the substance of the instrument that, notwithstanding the long term the tenancy may normally endure, the paramount title remains in the bridge company. The lease is subject to a defeasance, in event of any failure on the part of the lessee to meet all its requirements, and its entire scope and effect exclude the notion of any attempt at a transfer of the title outright. This view of it results in the ruling that the property is yet "owned" by the bridge company, within the meaning of the section for the taxing of bridges; for it cannot require a moment's consideration to determine that such corporations were intended to be embraced within the term "joint-stock companies." Its retention of ownership imposes the burdens incident thereto, under the plain words of the law. Indeed, there is much therein to indicate that such bridges as this were directly in contemplation in its enact ment. The decision in State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 97 Mo. 348, 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 406, has been pressed upon our notice as pointing to a conclusion different from that we have reached on this point. There is this difference between the facts in judgment there and here: In this case we find the bridge company the owner of the property, subject to the lease described, whereas in that no such fact existed. This distinction is important under the language of the statute section 7755). It was noted in the first opinion in that case (which the later one in the ninety-seventh Report does not purport to overrule), when it was said that "it matters not whether a bridge owned by a joint-stock company is a tollbridge or not, it is taxable as a bridge." State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 89 Mo. 103. Nothing that was written in either opinion in the cause was intended, nor, we think, can fairly be construed, as inconsistent with the judgment we announce in the case at bar. bridge for tax ation. That such a structure as this may, for the purpose of taxation, be lawfully segregated (by reason of its separate ownership) from the railway line in connection with which it is used, is a proposition too clear to re- Segregation of quire discussion. Railway v. Williams (1890), 53 Ārk. 58, 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 20; Cass Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. (1889), 25 Neb. 348; Quincy R. Bridge Co. v. Adams Co. (1878), 88 Ill. 615; St. Joseph, etc., R. Co. v. Devereux (1889), 41 Fed. Rep. 14; State v. Metz (1860), 29 N. J. Law, 122. Our statute evidently intends such severance of bridges held as is this one, for reasons of public concern, which it is not our province to question. Our duty is merely to give effect to such intention, lawfully expressed. We conclude that that portion of this bridge indicated by section 7757 is subject to be taxed as the property of the Mississippi River Bridge Company, under section 7755 of the revenue law of 1889 (the same as section 6901 of 1879). It follows that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded. It is so ordered, with the concurrence of all the judges. Taxation of Railroad Bridges and Bridge Companies.-See extended note on this subject, 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 25. OREGON & CALIFORNIA R. Co. et al. V. CROISAN et al. (22 Oregon, 393.) Taxation Classification of Property-State Board of Equalization.— Under the laws of Oregon there are for the purpose of assessment and taxation but three kinds of real property; by this classification the state board of equalization is bound, and cannot either on the basis of present ownership, source of title, or otherwise change the same so as to add new kinds, or increase the assessments of individuals or classes of people holding lands of the kinds thus invented. The board has no authority to classify railroad lands and tracks and change their valuation separately, but can only change the aggregate valuation of the class to which they belong. APPEAL from Marion circuit court. Bronaugh, McArthur, Fenton & Bronaugh, for appellants. Raleigh Stott and Geo. H. Williams, for respondent Marion County. Geo. E. Chamberlain, Atty.-Gen., G. G. Bingham, Dist.-Atty., and D'Arcy & Bingham, for respondent Croisan. BEAN, J.-This is a suit against Marion County and its sheriff to perpetually enjoin the collection of a cerCase stated. tain delinquent tax, claimed by plaintiff to be illegal, and comes here on appeal from a decree sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. For the purposes of this appeal it is only necessary to state that the complaint avers that the value of plaintiff's property in Marion County for the year 1891, including congressional grant, road-bed, or track depot grounds, town and city property, and rolling-stock, as listed, described, and assessed by the county assessor, and approved by the county board of equalization, amounted in the aggregate to $348,927. This property was classified, entered, and described on the county assessment roll, under appropriate heads, as town and city property, other real estate, which included congressional grant and road-bed, and rolling-stock. The state board of equalization created by and acting under the provisions of the act of February 21, 1891 (Laws 1891, p. 182), at its session in December of that year, divided and classified the real property of the state, appearing on the assessment rolls of the several counties, into railroad lands, wagon-road lands, swamp lands, agricultural and other lands |