value, and therefore there is a "discrimination against the owners of mortgages and in favor of the owners of other real estate, properly so called, especially agricultural lands." This argument not only assumes the existence of a state of facts not in this record, but also assumes that every assessor and county board of equalization in the state has violated the law they are sworn to obey, which requires all real property to be assessed at its true cash value, which shall be held and taken to mean the amount such property would sell for at a voluntary sale made in the ordinary course of business, and not what it would bring at public auction or forced sale. Code, $2752. Certainly, before a court can reach such a conclusion, and determine that real estate is not assessed at more than half its value, or at any sum less than its cash value, there should be some allegation and proof of the facts. It was contended by counsel for Marion County that the state board, consisting of the governor, secretary of state, and state treasurer, is to take the abstracts of the assessment rolls, certified by the county clerks of the several counties, and not the tabulated statement of the state board of equalization, as a basis upon which to levy the state tax and apportion the same among the several counties. There are no allegations in the complaint upon which this contention can arise, or nothing to indicate the basis upon which the state board proceeded in making the state levy, and therefore, although it is difficult to conceive that a county or taxpayer could refuse to pay the state tax for the reason suggested, it would be obiter for us to undertake to decide the question in this case. There are some other objections suggested in the brief, but they were not pressed at the argument, and after examination we do not deem them of sufficient importance to require any further notice. We conclude, therefore, that the action of the state board by which it increased the county valuation of the roadbed or track and lands of plaintiff, not included in the classification of city, village, or town property, is void and of no effect, but that the per centum added by the board to the assessed value of city, village, or town property must be added to plaintiff's property in Marion County, belonging to such class, and the taxes caused thereby paid, before the injunction can be made perpetual. The complaint not being clear upon this matter, the decree of the court below must be reversed, and the cause remanded to ascertain such amount. Tax on Bonds of Foreign Corporation-Presumption as to where Unregistered Bonds are Held.-In Commonwealth v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., (Pa., June 2, 1891,) 22 Atl. Rep. 236, it appeared that the Pennsylvania act of 1885 imposes a tax on "any scrip, bonds, or certificates issued by a foreign corporation to residents of this state, and held by them," and makes it the duty of the treasurer of such corporation to assess and retain the tax when payment of interest is made on such bonds, and to report the amount thereof 66 as nearly as the same can be ascertained;" failing which, the corporation is liable for the tax. The report of the treasurer of defendant company showed that it had issued bonds, etc., to the amount of $78,000,000, whose ownership could not be determined except as to some $28,000,000, which were registered for the purpose of voting, of which $338,000 were owned by residents of Pennsylvania. It was held that it is not to be presumed, for purposes of taxation, that the unregistered bonds were held by residents of Pennsylvania in the same proportion; and the company is only liable for the tax on those which are actually shown to be held in Pennsylvania. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA v. RIDGE-AVENUE PASSENGER R. Co. (142 Pa. St. 484.) Constitutional Law-Title of Statute.-A statute entitled "An act relating to the Ridge-Avenue Passenger Railway Company," which changes the rate of taxation payable by such company for city purposes, fills the constitutional provision that no statute shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. Taxation-Unconstitutional Statute-Estoppel of City to Claim Additional Taxes--Where a city treats a statute taxing a railway company as a valid enactment, and collects for several years the taxes it imposed, it is estopped from claiming additional taxes for those years after the supreme court has decided that the statute is unconstitutional. Same-Same-Res Judicata.-The fact that a city recovers judgment for taxes against a railway company under an unconstitutional enactment, in an action in which the question of the unconstitutionality of the statute was not raised, does not estop it, in a subsequent action to recover taxes for other years, from alleging that the act is unconstitutional. APPEAL from Philadelphia court of common pleas. Sumciency of title of act. CLARK, J.-It appears from the case stated that the RidgeAvenue Passenger Railway Company resulted from the merger and consolidation, under the statute, of the Girard College and the Ridge-Avenue & Manayunk Passenger Railway companies; the former incorporated under the act of April 15, 1858 (P. L. 301), and the latter under the act of March 28, 1859 (P. L. 264). By the terms of their respective charters, the original companies were required, annually, to "pay into the treasury of the city of Philadelphia, for the use of the said city, whenever the dividends shall exceed six per centum per annum on the capital stock, the sum of six per centum on the said dividend thus declared." After the consolidation, however, an act of assembly was approved 8th March, 1872 (P. L. 264), entitled "An act relating to the Ridge-Avenue Passenger Railway Company," which provided that the said company should pay annually into the treasury, of the city of Philadelphia, for the use of the said city, "a tax of six per centum upon so much of any dividend declared which may exceed six per centum upon their said capital stock," etc. It is now contended on the part of the city that this act of 1872 was in conflict with section 8, art. 11 (amendment of 1864), of the constitution of this state, in force at the time of its passage, and that the company, therefore, remains liable for the greater tax imposed in the original charters. The company having paid, and the city having received, the taxes, according to the provisions of the act of 1872, for the years 1880 to 1888, inclusive, this suit is brought to recover the balance which would remain unpaid for these years, according to the rate fixed in the original charters. The provision of the constitution was as follows: "No bill shall be passed by the legislature containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title, except appropriation bills." Article 3, $3, of the present constitution, is precisely to the same effect; it differs from the amendment of 1864 in phraseology only. Although it is not necessary that the title to an act of assembly should be a complete index to its provisions, all the cases agree that the subject of the proposed legislation must be so expressed therein as to give notice of its purpose to the members of the legislature and to others specially interested. Com. v. Green, 58 Pa. St. 233; Dorsey's Appeal, 72 Pa. St. 192; Beckert v. City of Allegheny, 85 Pa. St. 191; In re Road of Phoenixville, 109 Pa. St. 44; Sewickley Borough v. Sholes, 118 Pa. St. 165. A distinction exists, however, between the title to an original act and that of a supplement. When an act of assembly is a supplement to a former act, if the subject of the original act is sufficiently expressed in its title, and the provisions of the supplement are germane to the subject of the original, the general rule is that the subject of the supplement is covered by a title which contains a specific reference to the original by its title, giving the date of its approval and declaring it to be a supplement thereto. State Line R. Co.'s Appeal, 77 Pa. St. 429; Craig v. First Pr. Church, 88 Pa. St. 42; In re Borough of Pottstown, 117 Pa. St. 538; Millvale Borough v. Evergreen R. Co., 131 Pa. St. 19, 46 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 219. Although the cases at the outset, after the adoption of this amendment, were a little loose in its construction, yet, if the distinction just referred to is kept in view, they will be found to have established a reasonably consistent rule, which may now be recognized as the settled law of the state. The question of the constitutionality of the act of 8th March, 1872, upon the ground of its defective title, was on a previous occasion argued in this court before a full bench; and in a per curiam opinion it was held that the subject of the bill, as it was passed by the general assembly, was not clearly expressed in the title (Railway Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 124 Pa. St. 219), and upon that ground the act was held to be in conflict with the constitutional provision referred to. In the case cited the company sought to have the advantage of a provision of the act of 1872, relieving it from the burden of repairing the street, a burden imposed by the original charters, and releasing the company from control by the city councils; while in this case the company seeks to have advantage of a provision of the same act, which would in part relieve it from the payment of city taxes. If the title of the bill was not so expressed as to warn the city as to the former feature or effect of the bill, it was clearly defective as to the latter, for there is no reference in the title to either; indeed, there was nothing expressed in the title to call the attention of the city that her rights were in any way affected by it. We are not inclined to change the conclusions to which we came in the case referred to, nor to recede from the rule so well settled in our cases. It follows that the act of 1872 must be treated as unconstitutional, and therefore void, in so far, at least, as it affects the rights of the city and changes the rate of taxation for city purposes. Estoppel of city to claim additional taxes. But assuming that upon this ground the act of 1872 is unconstitutional and void, in so far as it affects the rights of the city of Philadelphia, and that the company was and is liable according to the provisions of the original charters of 1858 and 1859, is the city now in condition to insist upon that measure of liability for the years 1880 to 1888, inclusive? It appears that some time after the year 1879 the city brought suit against the company for the taxes of 1872 to 1879, inclusive; the claim was for taxes according to the provisions of the act of 1872. The company, admitting its liability under that act, contended that, upon a proper construction of the act, it was not liable for tax, excepting when any single or separate dividend declared exceeded 6 per cent of the authorized capital of the company. The city's contention was, however, that as, upon 54 A. & E. R. Cas.-21 this construction of the statute, the company could declare dividends as often as he directors desired, they might so manipulate their dividends as to defeat the manifest design of the legislature to provide revenue for the city. Suit having been brought, as we have said, defence was taken, and such proceedings were afterward had that the cause came into this court upon a writ of error, where it was held that the extent of the company's liability under that act was to be ascertained by applying the aggregate annual dividends to the capital actually paid in, and judgment was entered against the company accordingly. The constitutionality of the act of 1872 was not drawn in question, and the company was compelled to pay according to the demands of the city, under the provisions of that act. Philadelphia v. Railway Co., 102 Pa. St. 190. The argument of the company's counsel now is that, although in the case referred to the point does not appear to have been made or decided, yet the constitutionality of the act of 1872 must be taken to have passed in rem judicatam; that the judgment in that case necessarily involved a decision; that the statute imposing the tax was to that extent valid, and, although the cause of action is not the same, the city is estopped of record from relitigating that question. In support of this doctrine they cite Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 619; Aurora City v. West, Id. 85; Durant v. Essex Co., Id. 107; Corcoran v. Canal Co., 94 U. S. 741; Wilson's Ex'r v. Deen, 121 U. S. 525; and Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. (8th ed.) 941. While the general rule declared in these authorities is undoubtedly correct, it does not extend to estop a person from setting up the constitutionality of a statute when the cause of action is not the same. The former judgment is absolutely conclusive upon the parties as to the cause of action involved in it, although the statute upon which the proceedings were taken was not constitutional; that judgment can only be impeached collaterally for fraud or want of jurisdiction. It is a matter of no consequence now that the act of 1872, upon which judgment was entered for the amount of the tax, was unconstitutional and void; judgment having been entered and no appeal taken, the subject-matter at the issue in that suit is res adjudicata. The former judgment, therefore, operates as a bar to any subsequent action founded on the same demands. Bigelow, Estop. 80-88. In the case at bar, however, while the point in issue may perhaps be the same, the cause of action is different, and, although the verdict, with the judgment thereon, would furnish conclusive evidence of the matters in controversy upon which the verdict was rendered, and operate as a bar to the further litigation thereof, it would |