an increasing number, are senators because they are rich; a few are rich because they are senators; while in the remaining cases the same talents which have won success in law or commerce have brought their possessor to the top in politics also. The great majority are or have been lawyers; some regularly. practise before the Supreme Court. Complaints are occasionally levelled against the aristocratic tendencies which wealth is supposed to have bred, and sarcastic references are made to the sumptuous residences which senators have built on the new avenues of Washington. While admitting that there is more sympathy for the capitalist class among these rich men than there would be in a Senate of poor men, I must add that the Senate is far from being a class body like the Upper Houses of England or Prussia or Spain or Denmark. It is substantially representative, by its composition as well as by legal delegation, of all parts of American society; it is far too dependent, and far too sensible that it is dependent, upon public opinion, to dream of legislating in the interest of the rich.

The senators, however, indulge some social pretensions. They are the nearest approach to an official aristocracy that has yet been seen in America. They and their wives are allowed precedence at private entertainments, as well as on public occasions, over members of the House, and of course over private citizens. Jefferson might turn in his grave if he knew of such an attempt to introduce European distinctions of rank into his democracy; yet as the office is temporary, and the rank vanishes with the office, these pretensions are harmless; it is only the universal social equality of the country that makes them noteworthy. Apart from such petty advantages, the position of a senator, who can count on re-election, is the most desirable in the political world of America. It gives as much power and influence as a man need desire. It secures for him the ear of the public. It is more permanent than the presidency or a Cabinet office, requires less labour, involves less vexation, though still great vexation, by importunate office-seekers.

European writers on America have been too much inclined to idealize the Senate. Admiring its structure and function, they have assumed that the actors must be worthy of their

parts. They have been encouraged in this tendency by the language of many Americans. As the Romans were never tired of repeating that the ambassador of Pyrrhus had called the Roman senate an assembly of kings, so Americans of refinement, who are ashamed of the turbulent House of Representatives, have been wont to talk of the Senate as a sort of Olympian dwelling-place of statesmen and sages. It is nothing of the kind. It is a company of shrewd and vigorous men who have fought their way to the front by the ordinary methods of American politics, and on many of whom the battle has left its stains. There are abundant opportunities for intrigue in the Senate, because its most important business is done in the secrecy of committee rooms or of executive session; and many senators are intriguers. There are opportunities for misusing senatorial powers. Scandals have sometimes arisen from the practice of employing, as counsel before the Supreme Court, senators whose influence has contributed to the appointment or confirmation of the judges. There are opportunities for corruption and blackmailing, of which unscrupulous men are well known to take advantage. Such men are fortunately few; but considering how demoralized are the legislatures of a few States, their presence must be looked for; and the rest of the Senate, however it may blush for them, is obliged to work with them and to treat them as equals. The contagion of political vice is nowhere so swiftly potent as in legislative bodies, because you cannot taboo a man who has got a vote. You may loathe him personally, but he is the people's choice, and he has a right to share in the government of the country.

As respects ability, the Senate cannot be profitably compared with the English House of Lords, because that assembly consists of some fifteen eminent and as many ordinary men attending regularly, with a multitude of undistinguished persons who rarely appear, and take no share in the deliberations. Setting the Senate beside the House of Commons, the average natural capacity of its ninety members is not above that of the ninety best men in the English House. There is

1 In 1886, a bill was brought in forbidding members of either House of Congress to appear in the Federal courts as counsel for any railroad company or other corporation which might, in respect of its having received land grants, be affected by Federal legislation.

more variety of talent in the latter, and a greater breadth of culture. On the other hand, the Senate excels in legal knowledge as well as in practical shrewdness. The House of Commons contains more men who could give a good address on a literary or historical subject; the Senate, together with some eminent lawyers, has more who could either deliver a rousing popular harangue or manage the business of a great trading company, these being the forms of capacity commonest among congressional politicians.

The place which the Senate holds in the constitutional system of America cannot be fully appreciated till the remaining parts of that system have been described. This much, however, may be claimed for it, that it has been and is still, though less than formerly, a steadying and moderating power. One cannot say in the language of European politics that it has represented aristocratic principles, or anti-popular principles, or even conservative principles. Each of the great historic parties has in turn commanded a majority in it, and the difference between their strength has during the last decade been but slight. On none of the great issues that have divided the nation has the Senate been, for any long period, decidedly opposed to the other House of Congress. It showed no more capacity than the House for grappling with the problems of slavery extension. It was scarcely less ready than the House to strain the Constitution by supporting Lincoln in the exercise of the so-called war powers, or subsequently by cutting down presidential authority in the struggle between Congress and Andrew Johnson, though it refused to convict him when impeached by the House. All the fluctuations of public opinion tell upon it, nor does it venture, any more than the House, to confront a popular impulse, because it is, equally with the House, subject to the control of the great parties, which seek to use while they obey the dominant sentiment of the hour.

But the fluctuations of opinion tell on it less energetically than on the House of Representatives. They reach it more slowly and gradually, owing to the system which renews it by one-third every second year, so that it sometimes happens that before the tide has risen to the top of the flood in the Senate it has already begun to ebb in the country. The Senate has generally been a stouter bulwark against agitation, not merely

beranse a maymity of the senators have LVES DE VOLS (Č Heilbership before then, wiii viri period pubuk fee)ing may change, but is because the senators have 1691 17 vidually stronger men that the representatives. They ma′′E been less democratic. 1 IL CEL DU 21 1111%, bust they were more sedentidem, because they had more 1. jost because experience has taught then how feeting & thing p qua lar sentiment 16. and how used & ting LLT PUT is. The Senate has thered re usually keja me beat better thal the House of Representat res It has expresse 1 àitquately the fulgment, as contrasted with the emotion of the zation In this sense it has constituted & trek 200 balage in the Federal government.

Of the three great funt me viri the Futhers of the Cane stitution meant a to perform the first, that of serruring the rights of the smaller STTEN is 1.

the second that of advising or en troling the exentre in appointments as well as in treaties, has given rise to erüs almost commensurate with me benetta But the third LUT has been pretty fairly decharge de *the pengesety of a single and numerous assen by to viel to the implise of sudden and violent passin is frequently, though but T riably, restrained

CHAPTER XII

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THE House of Representatives, usually called for shortness the House, represents the nation on the basis of population, as the Senate represents the States.

1

But even in the composition of the House the States play an important part. The Constitution provides that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers," and under this provision Congress allots so many members of the House to each State in proportion to its population at the last preceding decennial census, leaving the State to determine the districts within its own area for and by which the members shall be chosen. These districts are now equal or nearly equal in size; but in laying them out there is ample scope for the process called "gerrymandering," which the dominating party in a State rarely fails to apply for its own advantage. Where a State legislature has failed to redistribute the State into congressional districts, after the State has received an increase of representatives, the additional member or members are elected by the voters of the whole State on a general ticket, and are called "representatives at large." Recently one State (Maine) elected all its representatives on this plan, while another (Kansas) elected three by districts and four by general ticket. Each district, of course, lies wholly within the limits of one State. When a seat becomes vacant the governor of the State issues a writ for a new election, and when a member desires to resign his seat he does so by letter to the governor.

The original House which met in 1789 contained only sixty-. five members, the idea being that there should be one member for every 30,000 persons. As population grew and new States 1 Constitution, Art. i. § 2, par. 3; cf. Amendment xiv. § 2.