the International Council, its Commissions or its Courts shall be regarded as a declaration of war upon the League.

B. The economic and military resources of the constituent states of the League shall be at the disposal of the International Council for the enforcement of its decrees or those of the International Commissions and Court.

C. Decrees may be enforced or their violation punished by any action within the competency of the International Council, Commission or Court.

It might as well be declared at the outset and clearly recognized that the sanction of international government, far more than the sanction of government of any other order, must lie in the consent of the governed. Although, in view of the manifold tyrannies political, economic, social, religious, cultural - which oppress mankind, this notion may seem a paradox, it is a truism nevertheless. The endurance of oppression is due usually either to ignorance of its causes and character, to its benevolence, to habit, or to fear or to force. Once a people actually wills not to endure a government, the government goes. Every revolution is an instance of this fact. What conspires to postpone revolution is the series of factors just enumerated. Now thus far, states have made treaties with one another out of only two motives — considerations of advantage and considerations of fear. The same motives have led them also to break treaties — as Germany broke the war conventions of the Hague, to which she was a signatory and the convention of the neutrality of Belgium to which she was a signatory, and as Italy broke the treaty which established the triple alliance. So far as the morality of nations goes, no more need be expected after the war than before. All the nations

of the world might bind themselves to the mildest or the most stringent of international agreements. The moment it became in the judgment of its rulers to the advantage of any one of them to break it, broken it would be, brutally as by Germany or Italy, or by hook or crook as by older and better-mannered states. One check on this kind of international behavior that might be all-sufficient would be the complete democratization, economic as well as political, of each sovereign state, the expropriation of the power that makes invisible government and the conversion of all public policy to popular control. How this may be accomplished without either revolution or a long process of time is not, however, clear. What is clear is this, that the elimination or mitigation of the more positive causes of war, even without any change in the internal conditions of states, cannot help being, on the whole, to the advantage of the masses of men. They pay the piper, no matter who calls the tune in foreign affairs, and the uses of war and of the fear of war to divert discontent and to keep an oppressive government in power are historic.

Hence, any device for keeping the peace is better than none at all. But any device, to prove effective, must rest, in its beginnings at least, on considerations of advantage and fear. Later, as education and habit make a decent international practice normal and reverend, international organization may go purely on conceptions of justice and right, but justice and right are themselves nothing more than equality of opportunity for advantage. States must be bound to the League, their consent to it must be made inevitable by the advantage even the greatest and richest

of them derive from it. What this advantage is, the organization and functions of the agencies of the League themselves show clearly. The relief that must come from the mere remission of the burdens of competitive armament itself makes the League worth while. But the organization of equitable trade relations, with the automatic assurance to each member of the League of an equitable supply of raw materials, of shipping, and of markets, will constitute the positive maintaining force of the League. Nothing has shown so clearly as the conduct of war itself that this is so. In the matter of raw materials, food, and shipping the interdependence of the world has been vindicated by its very challenge. Hence, the bulk of the police activities of the League, its handling of the recalcitrant or criminal nation, will be economic. It will be a limitation of intercourse between the offending state and the League, in any degree from an embargo on a special material to complete nonintercourse. The procedure will take the simple form of refusing a license to ship this or that to the offending state until the international requirements have been complied with. The last step would be the waging of actual war, and there is no disagreement among writers on this matter that war may be either a joint or delegated action on the part of the League. A recalcitrant Germany might need the coercion of all the powers; to reduce a Guatemala or a Venezuela to a proper sense of its duties in the family of nations, might be a duty delegated to the United States or Brazil. That any of these states might refuse to act because their "vital interests" were not involved cannot be conceded. Their vital interests are always involved. For the

last quarter of a century a war anywhere in the world promised to become a world war. And if any sort of international order whatsoever can get established the only alternative to inaction would be a return to international anarchy. In sum, if it is once conceded that the interests of all the classes of mankind, the worker, the trader, the capitalist, will on the whole be better served by a League of Nations, the sanction of the League and the enforcement of its laws are also conceded. But the advantages of a League, particularly of an economic League, are conceded even by governmental authorities and conservatives. The economic agreement of the Versailles Conference was in effect an agreement to create such a League. Its inimical intention toward Germany is on the whole irrelevant to the free and equal economic relations it hoped to maintain among the Allies. Mr. Lloyd George has recently reaffirmed both intentions. But it is a very peculiar shortsightedness which does not see that if the Allies are to gain from free and equal economic relations among each other, they stand to gain so much more from free and equal economic relations with Germany. The English Trades Unions, who have voted overwhelmingly against economic war with Germany, understand this. They remember that Germany was England's best customer. They recognize that unless the German people are exterminated, they will, no matter how complete the Allied victory over their armies, go on living after the war. They will be consumers as well as producers, and to have the wherewithal to buy, they will need to have the wherewithal to sell. Their prosperity is a condition of the prosperity of the countries that deal with them, just

as is China's or Africa's. Their needs are very much. greater, and their value as customers is measured by their needs. To wage economic war upon them is to wage economic war upon ourselves, and to maintain conditions of strain and friction which must sooner or later break into another military war. Germany must be admitted into the League of Nations on the same conditions as all states. If she refuses admission she chooses extermination, but it will be upon her own head. The advantages of international economic organization are obviously reciprocal. And the sanction of organization lies basically in this reciprocity. The enforcement of international law rests ultimately upon the clear recognition of this fact by the constituent states of the League. The war organization of the Allies has rendered it conspicuous for the organization of war. Shall it be less so for the organization of peace?

VIII. THE REVENUES OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS A. THE INTERNATIONAL BUDGET: 1. The International Council shall prepare annually a budget on the basis of the costs and charges of all international agencies under its governance.

B. LEVIES, FEES, TOLLS AND TAXES: 1. The budget may be raised by levies on the constituent States of the League, the levies to be proportional to the votingpower of the States and

2. By fees, tolls and taxes on the use of international ways and other international organs and instruments.

Perhaps nothing is so ultimately important as the determination of the taxing power of a political organization. On this power all its other powers depend.