house the material that will be coming off the lines in the next year. They do not have room for it under the present conditions. That is one question that the committee has asked: Whether or not space that they now have is being properly used.

Of course, if your program is successful in getting tremendous quantities of surplus out of the existing space it is going to alleviate the need to some extent, at least, for bringing additional warehouse space into existence.

Mr. WARNER. That is right; yes. We are of the opinion that the services are carrying an awful lot of obsolete parts and equipment.

DELAYS IN DECLARATIONS OF SURPLUS

Mr. WARD. The second part of the question is this: Do you feel and do the military people feel that the pressure that the Congress has put on disposal has caused them to freeze items that they otherwise would declare?

Mr. WARNER. Yes; I think that is hurting us. I believe it now takes about 9 months to declare something scrap. It is first declared surplus and then it is screened by the Veterans' Administration, the Bureau of Prisons, and so on. We need it now.

I do not question that it ought to be screened; that it ought to be looked over. Some of it is perfectly usable. But we ought to be in a position to get it in the steel mills a little faster than we can presently. Mr. WARD. What steps are under way with the General Services Administration to speed up the disposal regulations, or do you know?

Mr. WARNER. We have not gone to General Services yet. We are working on the list to see what can be done. As soon as we know exactly what we want we are going to take it up with the General Services Administration, yes.

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Warner, has there been any consideration given to setting up a scrap-gathering team, a civilian organization, in the islands or in Korea to gather scrap that belongs to the United States? Has there been any thought about that?

Mr. WARNER. I suppose you might say that this General Services Administration team is more or less that. They were instructed when they went out there to purchase no scrap, but they are in a position to buy it. As I told you, we gave them a $7 million loan to allow them to buy it throughout the Far East. They can operate almost any place they want.

ORGANIZATION FOR SCRAP

Mr. BONNER. How is your scrap organization set up in DPA and NPA?

Mr. WARNER. Well, most of it is really an NPA operation. We have a Salvage Division. That is headed by a man named Edward Greb. There are roughly 25 people in that Division. Most of them worked on salvage under the War Production Board. It is their job to collect scrap.

Then in the Steel Division we have a scrap group also. It is their job to allocate scrap where it is scarce, to place it where it is needed. My own job is Special Assistant to the Administrator, to work on this salvage program. I am not connected with either division.

Mr. BONNER. You are depending on General Services getting this scrap from abroad?

Mr. WARNER. From abroad, presently, yes.

Mr. BONNER. Do you know what effort they have made?

Mr. WARNER. Well, this mission has just gone forth and just returned. I think we should have been represented on that mission. Had I known it was going there earlier I would have suggested that somebody be put on it from our organization. If they go again I think our outfit should have a scrap expert with them.

Mr. BONNER. If you think of anything that might be of value to us, in addition to what you have said, which has been very valuable, I wish you would send us a memorandum.

Mr. WARNER. Thank you.

Mr. BONNER. Thank you very much.

Mr. BRODSKY. Mr. Chairman, may I say something about scrap? Mr. BONNER. Yes, Mr. Brodsky.

Mr. BRODSKY. I am not a scrap expert. I know that Mr. Warner says, however, that he has been in it about 2 weeks. There may be some chance that he does not know this, for he omitted it, and I would like to bring it forth.

REPORTS ON SCRAP

The GSA report is available. We have a copy of the report. I have one on my desk right now.

In addition to the GSA team the Munitions Board sent out two people. They have come back, and they had a report, which I am looking at right now.

I have told Mr. Kennedy, your counsel, that I would make our team available to your committee, and he has scheduled our team to talk to you as to what they actually found in Korea in terms of scrap, and how much scrap actually is there and how much has been a figment of some people's imagination.

As to Mr. Fleischmann's asking for a return of scrap to the United States, I think Mr. Warner should know-unfortunately he is gone, I guess that Mr. Fleischmann some months ago did make such a request and that there is a specific State Department policy with respect to Japan, that a certain amount of scrap does have to go to Japan. As to the validity of that or not I am not arguing, but I do want to say that our team has returned. I have talked with them only briefly, because they are physically worn out. I told them to take the rest of the week off, to be ready for you next week.

Our team did find, in connection with engineer bridging equipment, better than 90 percent of the equipment used in Korea in this present war came directly from Japan. If that is true I think we would want to take a second look as to whether or not scrap should be brought back from Korea to the United States.

Mr. Lovett's policy is definitely that scrap should be brought back to the United States except in areas such as Japan. A similar situation may arise in Europe.

I did want you to know that these two people on our team will be available. They have seen the situation and can give you all the dope on just what is available in Korea. They have talked to Syngman Rhee and his people.

Mr. BONNER. Thank you, Mr. Brodsky. Of course, we want to weigh all the information and come to some conclusion of what should be done ourselves. I appreciate your statement very much.

The next gentleman is the colonel?

Mr. BRODSKY. Colonel Hains will speak on the military advisory assistance groups.

Mr. BONNER. Colonel, will you please give your full name.

STATEMENT OF COL. PETER C. HAINS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Colonel HAINS. I am Col. Peter C. Hains, Deputy Commissioner, Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen: As I understand it, sir, in your trip you will visit six countries in which we have military assistance advisory groups; those six countries being the Philippines, Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, and England.

I have for you a list of the names of the chiefs of these various missions which I will leave with you, sir.

Mr. BONNER. Did you include Trieste?
Colonel HAINS. Pardon me, sir?

Mr. BONNER. Did you include Trieste?

Colonel HAINS. No, sir; I did not include Trieste. We do not have a military assistance advisory group in Trieste.

Mr. BONNER. What do you have there?

Colonel HAINS. Sir, I have no responsibility in my office with respect to Trieste.

Mr. BONNER. All right.

AMERICAN MILITARY MISSIONS ABROAD

Colonel HAINS. Under Public Law 454 of June 1946, the Congress provided for assistance to the Philippines.

Under Public Law 75 of May 1947, the Congress provided for assistance to Greece and Turkey. This was the initial military assistance program.

The missions that the Department of Defense furnished to these countries that is, the Philippines, Greece, and Turkey-have a name which is slightly different from the names of the military missions that are furnished under Public Law 329 of October 6, 1949, the MDAP Act, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. In the Philippines and in Greece they are known as the Joint United States Military Advisory Group, or JUSMAG. In Turkey it is known as the Joint American Mission for Aid to Turkey, or JÄMMAT.

The policy is that the chief of each military mission will be either a general officer or a flag officer from the Navy. In the Philippines we have General Pierson; in Turkey, General Arnold; in Greece, General Frederick.

In Italy, France, and England we have what are known as the military assistance advisory groups, MAAG. That pertains to all the other countries of the NATO organization and countries such as Indochina, Thailand, and Indonesia.

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General Rice is the chief of the mission in Italy; General Richards in France; and General Johnson in England.

I think that it is of interest to this committee to know that difference in names, and the difference in function of a JUSMAG or a JAMMAT as compared to a MAAG.

When the aid was set up for the Philippines, for Turkey, and for Greece, in the Philippines they were fighting the Huks, and in Greece they were fighting the guerrillas; so that there were active military operations going on in those countries. It was believed at that time that a similar type of organization was required for Turkey. The essential difference is that in the JUSMAG or the JAMMAT-these are all reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff-they are authorized to undertake on the request of the Governments of Greece and Turkey, some operational responsibilities, such as assisting and advising in training the personnel and troops of the military establishment of the country and military planning. In all the other military assistance advisory groups, unless spectifically written into the bilateral agreement with the country, this operational policy does not exist; so that you would have for the MAAG's in France, Italy, or England a different relationship with their military than you will have in Turkey, or Greece, or the Philippines.

TEAMWORK AMONG AMERICAN GROUPS ABROAD

Now, I think I should point out at this point that this is not a Defense Department operation in a vacuum, but we have in each of these countries that I have mentioned a team composed of the Ambassador, the chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group of whatever type he may be, for whatever organization there may be, and the chief of the ECA Mission. Pursuant to a letter of December 19, 1950 in which the President set up the International Security Affairs Committee there was drawn up a memorandum of understanding among the agencies represented in that committee. In that memorandum of understanding it was provided that each of these three key people would work together under the leadership of the ambassador but with primary responsibility in their own fields; the military man for military judgment, the economic man for economic judgment, and the political man for political judgment, so that you would find in each of these countries that the chief of the MAAG, the ambassador, and the chief of the ECA mission are working together in the development of their program and in the execution of the program.

TYPES OF MILITARY AID

Now, our program provides under the law for generally four different types of aid. The major type, dollarwise, is the grant aid on end items. I will develop that a little bit.

Equally important but small in dollar consideration is training of the foreign nationals.

Also equally important but not nearly so large is the stimulation of military production in the country for the country's support of the military establishment which we have agreed bilaterally with them to develop in the Mutual Security Program.

Finally, under section 408 (e) of the law, there is the provision for reimbursable aid, wherein the country may procure through the as

sistance of the United States Military Establishment certain agreed types of equipment in order to stimulate standardization, in order to provide equipment which has been determined necessary for the security of the country but for which they do not qualify as recipients of grant aid.

Now, the Military Assistance Advisory Group has responsibility in and the end-item program, the training program, and the production program. They do not have responsibility with respect to the reimbursable-aid program. That is direct from the country through the appropriate channels of the State Department to the Defense Depart

ment.

REGIONAL AND NONREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In the Far East and the Middle East there is at present no regional organization to coordinate the activities of the advisory groups in the various countries. Those have been considered, but it has not been deemed desirable to create regional organizations at this time.

However, in NATO in Europe there is a regional organization, and that is the European Coordinating Committee. The members of that. Committee are Mr. Spofford, who is the Ambassador; the ECA representative, who I believe is Mr. Porter now; and General Handy, who is military representative; and General Schuyler, a representative from SHAPE who sits without vote; and Mr. Batt, who is the senior United States Representative to the Defense Production Board, which is an international organization.

Working for General Handy in his capacity as Military Representative appointed by the Secretary of Defense is the Joint American Military Advisory Group, or JAMAG, under General Kibler.

The point I am trying to develop is this: With respect to the Philippines, General Pierson comes directly back to the Defense Department to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Arnold and General Frederick likewise come directly back to the Pentagon. In the case of Italy, France, and England, the MAAG chiefs go through JAMAG to the Pentagon; the reason for that being that due to the extremely complicated nature of the NATO organization it is essential that there be regional coordination of the activities in those countries.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF AMERICAN MILITARY AID GROUPS

Now, I think it would be of interest to you to know what the MAAG's or the JUSMAG or the JAMMAT do. In the first place, they are responsible for developing our program. The first element in developing the program is to determine the force basis that will be used for programing gross matériel requirements. This force basis with respect to the three countries in NATO is geared to the medium-term defense plan, which is a multilateral agreed defense plan for the European area, which is the one General Eisenhower is over there to implement.

With respect to Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines, force bases have been developed that are consistent with the security missions of those countries with respect to the security of the United States. For instance, in Greece, first you eliminated the guerrillas, and then, later, after that threat was wiped out, it was necessary to build an