ment of supplies in the overseas commands and the management of the movement of supplies to those commands. This improvement is being accomplished by strengthening the control of stocks in overseas commands that is, control under the overseas commanders, and by shortening the distribution cycle for the movement of supplies to those commands. Our objectives are to provide the overseas commander with a more responsive supply service and at the same time to effect an advancement in economy of operation of our supply system.

Economy of operation will obtain through reducing the amount of supplies required to be stocked in overseas areas and required to fill the pipeline extending to those areas. Strengthening the control of stocks in overseas commands allows for a reduction in the quantities of supplies required to be held within those commands, specifically by applying all assets held against the stockage objective of that command and by basing the computation of theater requirements on the recent local issue experience. We will effect some reduction in the quantities of supplies required to fill the pipeline extending to the overseas commands through a reduction of the supply distribution cycle.

We are developing a higher degree of efficiency in our supply operations by designing our system to function effectively while operating on minimum pipeline and stockage requirements. We believe the new system will meet the needs of our expanding forces and will do so with fewer supplies in the supply system.

ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-DAY SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION CYCLE

The supply distribution cycle we are attempting to reduce is 120 days in length. It begins with the preparation of a requisition in the overseas command which requires 15 days and ends with the delivery of the requisitioned supplies to that overseas command, and the slices of this cycle in terms of days are shown at the place of preparation of the requisition and along the line of flow of the requisition or movement of supplies.

The first 40 days of the cycle are ordering time and shipping out; 15 days in the overseas command in preparation of the requisition; 5 days in transit to the zone of the interior overseas supply division; 5 days in the zone of the interior depot, and 5 of these 35 days are zone of the interior depot slices. That is ordering time.

A reduction of that time, while it will improve the supply service furnished the overseas command, will not reduce the quantity of supplies in pipeline.

The balance of the distribution cycle, the last 80 days, is processing and movement time for supplies. It consists of 30 of those 35 days of processing supplies for movement, 10 days in movement to the port, 10 days in port, 18 days on the water, and 12 days in the overseas port and going to the overseas depot. A reduction in this part of the cycle will not only make for a more responsive supply service, but it will actually reduce the quantities of supplies required to be committed. to or actually moving in pipeline.

The air shipment time which is shown on the bottom of the chart is considerably less. Using this method of transportation and using emergency order and processing procedures, we have placed small

quantities of supplies in the hands of front-line troops in as little as 17 days after those supplies were requisitioned.

I believe chart 2 will give a little better idea of the quantity of supplies required to be committed to and moving in pipeline and required to be stocked in overseas commands.

SIXTY-DAY STOCKAGE OBJECTIVE IN OVERSEAS COMMANDS

The overseas command has a requisition objective, which you members will see referred to many times oyerseas, of 180 days. It is composed of 60 days' stockage objective. By the way, these days are in terms of days of supply for the overseas command served. The overseas requisition objective is 180 days, composed of the 120-day cycle plus the 60-day stockage objective they have. In supplies committed to pipeline, you recall the first 5 days of the zone of the interior depot's portion of that distribution cycle did not involve supplies committed to pipeline. The last 30 days, however, do involve supplies and they involve almost a corresponding number of days of supplies in terms of the overseas command served that are committed to the pipeline. In other words, they have been dropped from the depot's availability records. They are being picked up, processed, or awaiting stocking in; so for all practical purposes, they are committed to pipeline. You will find another 20 days or so moving of supplies, days of supply, moving to port or actually in port, another 30 days or so on water or being unloaded in overseas port and processed onto the depot records.

Mr. BROWNSON. Just to give us an idea, have you any idea of the tonnage involved in a day's supply?

Colonel COATS. No, sir. I can get it for you very easily.

Mr. BROWNSON. I was just curious to translate that into something more tangible.

Colonel COATS. As I recall, for normal operation-not hopping islands and so forth-it is 7 pounds per man per day. That will increase, of course, with the type of terrain or the type of organization or operation.

Mr. BROWNSON. Then a day's supply, if you were supplying half a million troops, would be 3.5 million pounds for every day of supply? Colonel COATS. That is the way it is arrived at.

Mr. BROWNSON. That really runs into tonnage.

Colonel COATS. Just a word about the stockage objective of the overseas command. This is the stockage objective in Europe and the Far East: for general supplies, 60 days supply for the command. It is broken down into a 30-day safety level or emergency level and a 30-day operating level.

On this chart [exhibiting] we have pictured the time when this operating level is one-half way consumed. In other words, it is an operating level which fluctuates from zero to 30 days' supply, leaving only a safety level of 30 days for each item and 15 days of programed stocks.

IMPROVED SYSTEM OF STOCK CONTROL FOR OVERSEAS DEPOTS

The Army is converting all of its overseas depots to an improved system of stock control. The new system is a mechanized one which allows for the maintenance of up-to-date information on the status

of all depot stocks of the theater and for the accumulation of issue experience as a byproduct of the accounting job. The important point here is that the study of levels in relation to issue experience is made easy by bringing the transaction information out of the accounting file and summarizing it in a form convenient for review and analysis. And here I would like to point out we use our mechanized system of accounting to allow us to apply judgment in establishing stockage objectives. In other words, we merely bring the information to the central stock control point, summarize it in a form so that one man can review the entire stocks for the technical service in that command. You will get a complete picture of this operation at the theater stock control point that you plan to visit in Giessen, Germany.

Coming now to stock status reports, a supply status reporting system has been developed to bring stock status and transaction information to each level of management, from the depot at the end of the supply pipeline to the central stock control point in the continental United States. We found stock management to be absolutely dependent on this information. In other words, if you are going to manage depot supplies, you must know all you have; you must know your issue experience if you are going to set a realistic stockage objective. Mr. BROWNSON. Is that an IBM record stock control system you have?

Colonel COATS. Yes, sir; it is. Under depot C data, you see the maximum amount of information that we could bring up through the stock status management channel while the depots were working under the old accounting system in our overseas command. It consisted of reporting on a limited number of items, the item nomenclature and the stock level of that item for the depot, the total serviceable stocks on hand, and the total unserviceable or repairable stocks on hand, and the stocks due in. Now, missing from this insofar as good management is concerned was the actual utilization or issue experience in the local theater. In other words, this stock level on this base was computed on a factor established back in the Department of the Army which was based on world-wide utilization, and you can see how it would not fit the local operation. I am sure some of the excesses we experienced in the last war in front line axle assemblies in Europe were because of the increased requirement for that item in the island hopping operation in the Pacific. I am sure, too, where we rolled up an item because of a long run in Europe more rapidly than short runs in the Pacific they had their difficulties with reconciliation and so forth.

The Far East Command and the European Command are presently in the stage of conversion to the improved stock control system which allows them to bring in from all of their divisions to the central stock control point of the theater, such as the one you will see at Giessen, Germany, more comprehensive information for their use and their subsequent reporting to the Department of the Army. That is shown under depot B. The number of items reported in is being extended to the entire stockage for each depot. That has been accomplished for the quartermaster items which you will review at Giessen, Germany. It shows issues for the past month broken down, coming up from each depot, by initial issues and by replenishment of supplies. It shows the quantities at the depot as estimated as its requisition objective; it includes the stockage objective and the order and shipping time.

And the important point here is that this item, even at the depot level, is based directly on the issue experience and as it flows in, only using this general factor when it has not accumulated a usual issue experience. It shows the serviceable stockage, the unserviceable stockage, due in and due out.

This information comes into that theater stock control point from all depots and is reviewed and summarized into the theater stock position and the theater issue experience and is reviewed in establishing the theater requisition objective. I wish to make very clear on that that we get the judgment factor in there. We merely summarize this information to give us the best picture possible of what our recent experience is, and we analyze it in view of our projected increase in strength or decrease in strength or changes in season or changes in mission. And from that basic information we apply a judgment to arrive at the theater requisition objective for each item used in the

theater.

Under depot A you will see here [exhibiting chart] the ultimate goal with reference to the standardization of information brought up through the stock status reporting system. Actually, although we break it down into two sections, it is very little more comprehensive than what you have under your suggestion. Insofar as stock management is concerned, it is not more comprehensive, but it does give a breakdown by amount of the total; it gives the receipts for local procurement, whereas in this report that merely was added into the overall stock status and receipts from repair-in other words, just a little more detailed.

All of our depots in the overseas commands are not completely on this system. I believe you will find only about 10 percent of them or 10-percent coverage during your visit have not made it in this manner.

With reference to the activities and agencies to be visited, we have prepared summaries of this operation which describe the logistic mission of each headquarters or installation which the committee plans to visit. In each summary, the names of the commanding officer and the principal staff officers are given for your convenience during your tour. An attempt has not been made to detail the operational missions of these commands except where necessary to explain their logistical responsibility.

TYPICAL SUPPLY ORGANIZATION FOR OVERSEAS THEATER

Chart 4 [exhibiting] is a schematic representation of a typical organization for supply to support an active theater. While every operation or theater will not lend itself to this ideal textbook set-up, it is a pattern which you will find followed in both the Far East and European Commands and, in fact, in every overseas command. The chart breaks the supply report down into the zone of the interior, United States zone, overseas zone, overseas theater, and within the overseas command it breaks the line of communication down to the base section and advanced section and breaks the combat zone down into the Army area and the division area. We are concerned today, of course, with this portion [indicating]. This chart will show in the overseas theater the supplies in the echelon and depth-the echelons in depth. This is considered necessary to avoid risking loss of all of your assets of any one item at any one time. This does not mean that

every supply item landing at this port has to travel through each of those depots. In actual practice, you normally stock your base depots with a safety level, and in service you have, plus operating stocks, stocks they require for support of communication zone troops in that area. However, the bulk of supplies moves directly to the advanced section depot which has immediate support of the combat operation.

SUPPLY ORGANIZATION OF FAR EAST COMMAND

With reference to the Far East Command, with headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, the commander in chief of the Far. East Command commands operationally the United States forces in the Far East. In addition, he exercises his administrative command over all United States Army forces in the Far East. These forces include the Eighth Army in Korea; the Japan Logistical Command, with headquarters at Yokohama; the troops in Japan, which include the 16 corps headquarters and the Fortieth and Forty-fifth Infantry Divisions.

The administrative command responsibility includes the complete supply of all Army forces and the supply of all Army purchases of common use items to all United States forces. In general, the logistical operation of this command is performed by the Logistical Command with headquarters at Yokohama under the policy guidance of the general and technical staffs of the Far East Command headquarters. In the chart which will accompany the written brief, you will have the names of those staff officers most concerned with the logistical mission at the Far East Command headquarters.

The Japan Logistical Command at Yokohama is under Maj. Gen. W. L. Weible. The supply system operated by the Japan Logistical Command supports all troops in the Far East, including the combat forces in Korea. In supporting the Korean operations, the Japan Logistical Command functions as a base section, which gives you a wide variation from this textbook set-up, while the supply installations at Pusan and Inchon function as advanced sections in immediate support of the command troops.

You have decided to look at the big five operation in Japan. It is comprised of several ordnance rebuild operations which are under the command of the Japan Logistical Command and under the immediate supervision of the Chief of Ordnance of that headquarters, Brig. Gen. J. K. Heiss. In the main, these activities are located in or near Yokohama and Tokyo.

REBUILD OPERATIONS IN JAPAN

This operation has played an extremely vital role in reclaiming the unserviceable equipment left in the wake of World War II. Vehicles are rebuilt to a condition which provides about 80 percent of the new vehicle life, at a cost of about one-quarter of the new vehicle purchase price. Over 50,000 vehicles and 713,000 small arms weapons have been rebuilt by this activity and used to support the Korean operation.

All of the technical services operate extensive rebuild programs in this command. For example, during fiscal 1951, engineer equipment of a value of $65 million was rebuilt at a cost of $14.5 million. These figures include but are not limited to the rebuild of over 7,500 major items of engineer equipment.