FEDERAL SUPPLY MANAGEMENT (Overseas Survey) MONDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1951 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES MORNING SESSION-FIRST GROUP The subcommittee divided into two groups, the first group met Monday morning, October 29, 1951, at Tachikawa, Japan, Hon. Bill Lantaff, acting chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. Members of Congress present: The first group consisted of Bill Lantaff, acting chairman, presiding; W. J. Bryan Dorn, Cecil M. Harden, and Charles B. Brownson. Staff representative present: Ray Ward, Bureau of the Budget. Members of the Far East Air Matériel Command present: Brig. Gen. D. H. Alkire, Brig. Gen. J. P. Doyle, Col. R. J. Friedman, Col. B. Hamlett, Col. F. G. Huish, Col. J. D. Lavelle, Col. P. B. Foote, and Col. W. W. Horton. Mr. LANTAFF. First we will hear from Brig Gen. J. P. Doyle, who will brief us on the Far East Air Matériel Command, then from Brig. Gen. D. H. Alkire. Brig. Gen. J. P. Doyle first briefed the subcommittee on FEAMCOM and its operations. STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. P. H. ALKIRE, FAR EAST AIR MATÉRIEL COMMAND Brigadier General ALKIRE. There are two points the general touched on which I would like to further clarify for the ladies and gentlemen and bring to their attention. The industrial planning was verboten as far as the military was concerned here and was handled by the SCAP agencies under the ESS, and at the time when the military were waved away from it-it was done for a very good reason. The Russians were here, the rest of us were here and other nations were involved-it was for expediency only. Because of that, we were not allowed to touch anything concerning the Japanese economy. So, it was not failure to comply so NOTE.-Asterisks denote classified material deleted for security reasons. far as the military was concerned, because the Army, Navy, and Air Force were all in the same boat, but because it was a matter of political expedience rather than any dereliction on the part of the military services. AIR FORCE SUPPLY TRAINING PROGRAM One other thing that General Doyle mentioned casually. On the educational program, we ran an experiment here, bringing a group commander from the combat zone in Korea into this depot for 6 months, and he is now in my shop for 6 months just terminating his tour. We hope some day to get around 20 percent of our combat people I mean the tactical people-filtering through each year in the logistical system. We feel if we can do that we will increase their cost cautiousness basically because they will see the other side of the picture directly and the finest people we can get for the program are the youngsters right out of combat zone. They have been up against it and know what we are faced with. They know the headaches of the over-all logistical system and when they can get in here first hand and fresh from that experience and go through this 1-year cycle-10 years from now we will have an Air Force that knows how to run logistics and we will be saving dollars every day. It is worth throwing on the table because it is right in line with what you people are thinking of. STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN P. DOYLE, COMMANDING GENERAL, HEADQUARTERS, FEAMCOM Brigadier General DOYLE. That's good. This officer, incidentally, who General Alkire mentioned-if I could just get a regular procession of people of his quality coming through here, it would be mighty good for all of us. That, gentlemen, is a very brief picture of what FEAMCOM is. I think we have some information here on the walls that would be interesting to you in your particular line of work which is supply management, as I understand it. If there are any questions you would like to bring up here, we will certainly try to answer them for you. Mr. LANTAFF. Thank you, General. Is any of the information which you have given us this morning classified? Brigadier General DOYLE. The only thing classified-you did not get the detail figures unless you copied them down-is the number of people we have here. There is nothing else I can think of that is classified. Mr. LANTAFF. General, the main concern of this subcommittee, other than our general aim of trying to achieve all possible economies within the military operation, is the effort on the part of the Air Force to establish its own complete logistical support. I think there is little difference of opinion as to the need of the Air Force to maintain such facilities as you have shown us here this morning for your own special types of equipment, but we are concerned with the reasons for the directive which apparently has been issued, that you take over the procurement, distribution, warehousing, and issue of many common-use items. AIR FORCE SUPPLY SYSTEM FOR COMMON ITEMS For example, this committee can not see why it is necessary for the Air Force to take over the procurement, distribution and issue of carbon paper and pencils, and typewriters and desks-administrative supplies which are common to all the services. It would appear to us that it would be most advantageous from the standpoint of warehousing, of personnel, and of cutting procurement costs, to standardize that type of supply within all three principal services. Rather than having triplication, there should be unification where supplies are common to all the services. We can not understand why cooks' and bakers' outfits which are the same for the Army and for the Air Force have to be taken over by the Air Force-why one service can't do that for all three. Those are just a few brief examples. We know there are thousands of items common among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This committee, of which we are a subcommittee, was the committee in Congress which considered and reported the unification bill. The main tenor of the testimony at that time was that we would achieve great economies through unification as well as achieve greater operational efficiency. Unquestionably, we have achieved much along the lines of operational efficiency, but apparently now there is developing a triplication of supply systems rather than a unification of them, and we are very concerned about triplication, with respect to supplying common-use items. We realize that your operations here at FEAMCOM are a very highly specialized operation; you would not save anything by having Army Ordnance take over this operation. This is your business-your peculiar know-how. But why is it necessary for the Air Force to take over the procurement, distribution, issue, warehousing, administrative handling of common-use items? LOGISTIC SYSTEM FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES Brigadier General ALKIRE. You caught us rather short because the directive asking us to plan on taking over was very recent. We have not had the opportunity to delve into the implications and what that would mean to us. However, I feel that I am giving our unified opinion, if I may express it that way, that our experiences so far have convinced us here at least that the logistical system as such which is geared to maintain a ground army committed to combat cannot meet the requirements of an air force also committed to combat for several reasons. Let me show you one of them against this map we have right here. From the inception and the processing of the thirty-eighth until we were down in this perimeter it was a struggle of existence, as you all well know. It wasn't a question of having what to do it with-it was a question of doing it with what we had. Everyone was short-Army, Navy, and Air Force-and they were thrown into combat because they were here good, bad, or indifferent. Now, as the situation has changed and as they started forward, the entire ground-support logistical system is geared on their entire communications not to carry those supplies to the Eighth Army in combat. The tonnage the Air Force tries to divert from that pipeline is less than 20 percent of the total logistical tonnage going into Korea. These people are straining every nerve to get their stuff forward in the hands of the troops that are shooting at the enemy. The commander asked the Air Force, particularly in times of stress, to render every iota of ground support they could. We have repeatedly been handicapped during this Korean operation because we could not get the things it took to put our ships in the air; not because anybody willfully kept us from it, but because the system was geared to a 60-mile-an-hour tank at best and can't take care of a 600-mile-an-hour airplane. Mr. LANTAFF. Well, General, that is the peculiar, special type of equipment we are talking about. Brigadier General ALKIRE. I am talking about the support crews in there that have to eat. Let me show you a picture. We moved one group from the Taegu area in the thirteenth and the fourteenth, to Pyongyang, and Hamhung, and back, in a matter of weeks. Now every item that that outfit needed was shipped and we were trying to follow it along because nowhere along that system was anybody geared to know they were moving and take care of them as they went. Do you see what I am trying to bring out? It was not because they could not if they had known. Mr. LANTAFF. Then that same thing applies to a quartermaster truck company as opposed to, say, an infantry outfit. Brigadier General ALKIRE. No, sir; I would not say that, because your flow of supply is geared to your net forward and that is exactly where it is going and everybody knows it is going forward there. But, if you have to.shuffle this thing up; they did not have the trucks to move it for us; and we did not have the trucks to move it ourselves—the results are you kept airplanes on the ground and they were badly needed in combat. You could not even get the material to keep the people going. It was not a question of technical supplies peculiar to the Air Force, it was the trucks; it was the gas, the ammunition that had to be laid down. Mr. LANTAFF. Would not the same situation have prevailed even if the Air Force had its own trucks and its own Brigadier General ALKIRE. No, sir, it would not-at least to this extent, that at least if the item came from the ZI and it was a critical item we were waiting for, we had control of that item from the time it reaches port until it was laid down to the using agency. Mr. LANTAFF. Suppose you give me an example, in the case of underwear, cooks' and bakers' uniforms, or common-use items of that type. Now, what tactical advantages would the Air Force achieve by procuring warehousing, distributing AIR FORCE NOT CONCERNED OVER PROCUREMENT BUT WANTS THEATER DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION Brigadier General ALKIRE. No, we don't want procurement. I am wrong if I have given you that attitude. I don't care who hangs on to it-when it comes into the combat zone-that is what I am talking about. Mr. LANTAFF. When these common-use items come into the theater, they are delivered to the warehouse at the Tokyo Quartermaster Depot. There they are separated from a bookkeeping standpoint and you are credited with so many of each common-use item. What advan |