PROBATE-See WILL, 3, 7.

PROOF OF CLAIM.

Where a widow was entitled to an annuity, during life or widowhood, out of property bequeathed to her sons, and the sons had given bonds for the payment of the same, and then went into bankruptcy, held, that the value of her claim was capable of being fixed and proved through the report of an actuary.-Ex parte Blakemore. In re Blakemore, 5 Ch. D. 372. RAILWAY.

1. A person was informed against under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, § 145, for not showing his ticket on a railway company's carriage, for which offence a by-law of the company required him “to pay the fare from the station whence the train originally started to the end of his journey." Held, that to recover under this by-law, there must have been a demand of the specific sum due thereunder in this particular case complained of.-Brown v. The Great Eastern Railway Co., 2 Q. B. D. 406.

2. By the Railway and Canal Traffic Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 31), § 2, railway companies are forbidden to "give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to, or in favour of, any particular person or company," in the matter of carrying and forwarding traffic. Plaintiff had a brewery at B., where there were three other breweries. The latter were connected with the M. Railway; plaintiff was not. In order to get some of the freight from the three breweries for themselves away from the M. railway, the defendant company carried their goods from the breweries to the freight depot, free of charge, and still made a profit on the transportation. They made a charge to the plaintiff for the same service. Held, that this was "undue preference" within the Act, and the plaintiff could recover an amount equal to the cost of carting his goods to the defendant's depot.-Evershed v. The London & Northwestern Railway Co., 2 Q. B. D.

SALE.

1. March 3, 1876, D., a broker, bought for B. & Co., his undisclosed principals, certain dry goods lying at the K. Docks consigned to C., payment to be made in fourteen days. C. signed a delivery order to the Docks' superintendent to the order of D. D. indorsed it to B. & Co. B. & Co. indorsed it to plaintiffs, as March 18, being security for advances.

prompt day, plaintiffs sent the delivery order to the Docks' office, with the request to hold the order, and have warrants made out as soon as possible. He was told the goods would be ready for delivery on the 20th; and a clerk was sent to the Docks' warrant office with the order, where he arrived at 3 P. M. Meantime

D., hearing that B. & Co. had suspended, paid C. for the goods, sent to the Docks' warrant office, and obtained a warrant for the goods in the name of C. before the other order arrived, had C. indorse the warrant to him, and give him a second delivery order. The Docks Company returned the first delivery order unexecuted, and plaintiffs brought__suit It is a against C., D., and the company. usage of the London Dry Goods Market, that a broker who does not disclose his principal is liable as surety for the latter's default. Held, that the unpaid vendor's lien had passed to D., who was surety for R. & Co., and the plaintiffs gained no title.-Imperial Bank v. London & St. Katharines Docks Co., 5 Ch. D. 195.

2. A man brought in pigs from his infected herd, out of which many had died, and had them sold, expressly stating that they were to be taken with all faults. Held, that at common law, as well as by the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869, he was liable in damages to the buyer, on whose hands the pigs died.-Ward v. Hobbs, 2 Q. B. D. 331.

3. N. undertook to sell to E. three farms. The agreement to purchase was signed Sept. 3, 1873, and payment was to be made and possession given Sept. 29 following. In case the purchase was not completed on that day, the purchaser was to pay interest to such reasonable date as might be agreed upon. On that day it turned out that the seller had not a legal

title to the property, and the purchaser refused to accept the same, and afterwards, when the seller offered him a clear title, persisted in his refusal. Held, that time was of the essence of the contract, and therefore the refusal was justified.Noble v. Edwards, 5 Ch. D. 378.

4. The defendants were auctioneers, and issued a list headed: "Great Western Railway Co., catalogue of unclaimed property, which will be sold by auction by Messrs. H. & E., on Tuesday, Nov. 7, or following day. By order of the directors of the above company," &c. There were the following conditions also printed on the same document: "The lots to be cleared away within three days after the sale, at the purchaser's expense. If any deficiency arise, or from any cause the auctioneer shall be unable to deliver any lot then, in such case, the purchaser shall accept compensation. Upon failure of complying with the above conditions, the money deposited in part payment shall be forfeited. All lots unclaimed within the time aforesaid shall be resold by public or private sale, without further notice, and the deficiency made good by the defaulter." Plaintiff bought a lot on Wednesday, and paid his deposit, but did not go for the goods till Monday, when he was told the lot had been delivered to another party. A witness said that he saw the goods Saturday morning in process of being delivered. Defendants claimed that they were not liable, on the ground that they were the agents merely of the railway company, and, also, on the ground that plaintiff was bound to take the goods within three days, that being a condition precedent. Held, that there was evidence of a personal contract on the part of the defendants, and that the condition to remove the goods was not a condition precedent. Woolfe v. Horn, 2 Q. B. D. 355. SEA-WALL.-See PRESCRIPTION. SEAWORTHINESS.-See INSURANCE. SLANDER-See LIBEL AND SLANDER.

SOLICITOR AND CLIENT.-See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.

STATUTE.-See CONSTRUCTION, 3; EVIDENCE, 2. STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-See LEASE.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

1. Demurrer that the following note did not revive a debt otherwise barred by the statute: "Your note . . . forwarded to me here. I return to S. about Easter. If you send me there the particulars of your account, with vouchers, I shall have it examined, and check sent to you for the amount due ; but you must be under

some great mistake in supposing that the amount due to you is any thing like the sum you now claim." Demurrer overruled.--Skeet v. Lindsay, 2 Ex. D. 314.

2. In 1783, a lease was granted for ninety-nine years, and there was enjoyment under the lease until 1876, when an action was brought for possession, on the ground that the lease was void under 13 Eliz. c. 10. Demurrer that the claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Held, that the lease was voidable, not void, and that consequently the statute did not begin to run till the action was brought.-Governors of Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts, 5 Ch. D. 175.

See COMPANY, 2.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.-See BILL OF LADING;
VENDOR AND PURCHASER; VENDOR'S LIEN.
SUBSTITUTION.-See CONSTRUCTION, 1.
TENANT for Life.

A tenant for life was allowed by the court to retain possession of the title. deeds, as against the remainder-man, who applied to have them deposited in court.Leathes v. Leathes, 5 Ch. D. 221. TIME.-See CONTRACT; SALE, 3. TIME POLICY.—See INSURANCE. TRUst.

1. In 1807, a testator left a will, with the following clause: "I appoint my executor, Charles E., my youngest brother, to be trustee for the following_legacies," naming them: "Considering that money will be more essential to my brother Samuel than a distant possession of land I bequeath to Samuel during his natural life the interest of £3,000; and, after his death, to his eldest son, James, by his last wife, Margaret J., or M. or E., till he attains twenty-one, and then to obtain the principal. I order that my youngest brother, Charles E., shall be liable to all my lawful debts of every description, and pay them as soon as he can ; and also pay my legacies when regularly due; and, to enable him to do this, I bequeath unconditionally to him all my estates in Armagh. I also bequeath to him . . all my

estates in Louth or elsewhere." The legacy of £3,000 to Samuel was not paid; but, in 1833, his son accepted £300 in settlement, on the ground, urged upon him by Charles's representative, that he was entitled to nothing, as being illegitimate. In 1872, a bill was filed by parties interested under his claim, asking that the composition of 1833 be set aside as unconscionable, and the £3,000, with interest, be declared well charged upon the estates and for general relief. Held,

that the agreement of 1833 was null and void, all the parties having plainly proceeded upon the assumption that the question of the illegitimacy of Samuel's son decided his right; whereas, on the words of the will, that had nothing to do with it; that there was created a trust in respect of the £3,000 on the estates in Armagh bequeathed to Charles (quære as to the Louth estate, that point not having been disputed), and consequently the Statute of Limitations did not apply. Interest on the legacy was, however, allowed for six years only, on the ground that no direct proceedings had been taken to enforce the claim before 1872.-Thomson v. Eastwood, 2 App. Cas. 215.

2. A testator devised his property to trustees upon trust, inter alia, that they should, "in their discretion and of their uncontrollable authority, pay and apply the whole or such portion only of the annual income as they shall think expedient to or for the clothing, board, &c., for the personal and peculiar benefit and comfort of my dear wife." One of the trustees was residuary legatee. The wife was an insane person, and had property in fee in her own right. Held, that the court would not make a decree that the trustees "should exercise such discretion by paying and applying such portion only of the income of the estate of the testator as with the income from other sources will make up" the amount needed for the wife's support, &c. The court would not interfere with the exercise of the discretion given to the trustees by the will.-Gisborne et al. v. Gisborne et al., 2 App. Cas. 300.

3. Residuary bequest to trustees to hold "in trust for such of my nieces, M. and N., as shall be living at my death, my desire being that they shall distribute such residue as they think will be most agreeable to my wishes." Held, that M. and N. took absolutely for their own benefit.-Stead v. Millor, 5 Ch. D. 225. See DEVISE, 2.

TRUSTEE

Trustees advanced money to A., a builder, on security of land purchased by A. of B., the defendant and one of the trustees, and which A. had built upon. The money was used partly to pay for the land, and partly to repay other sums which A. owed B. The plaintiff, the other trustee, knew that A. and B. had had business relations. A. went into bankruptcy, and the plaintiff filed a bill against B., his co-trustee, alleging that the security was insufficient, and asking that the property be sold, and that the

defendant be held to make up the deficiency. Refused.-Butler v. Butler, 5 Ch. D. 554.

USAGE.-See VENDOR'S LIEN.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Feb. 10, 1876. L., a merchant, and W., a manufacturer, made an agreement under which W. was to supply L. with goods from time to time, and W. should draw upon L. bills of exchange for the invoice price, which L. should accept, L. having regularly a credit of £5,000. L. was to ship the goods to R. & Co., Shanghai, for sale on his account; sending the bills of lading by post, and made out to R. & Co.'s order. W. was to have a lien on the bills of lading, and the goods in transit to Shanghai, or in anybody's hands as well as upon the proceeds or the goods purchased therewith in the hands of the consignees, or in transit homewards; such lien not to be general, but to be confined to the particular shipment, and cease when the bills for such shipment had been paid by L. L. was to insure primarily for the benefit of W., as mortgagee or pledgee. L. promised W, to give R. & Co. notice of this agreement; but they had no notice of it. Under the agreement, L. ordered goods of W.; they were packed by W.'s packer, and marked "Shanghai." W. sent the invoice to L., headed 66 L., bought of W." L. wrote the packer to send the goods to the G., a Shanghai vessel loading at the dock. W. paid the freight to the dock, and the packer advised L. that he had sent the goods thither, at L.'s disposal. W. drew on L., at six months, for the amount of the bill of the goods; and L. accepted the bill. The carriers who took the goods to the dock notified L. that they had arrived at their warehouse, and would be sent to the G.; and they were shipped on board that vessel, and the bills of lading made out to L.'s order. He did not, however, pay the freight, and the bills of lading remained in the ship-owners' hands. Subsequently, April 5, 1876, L. suspended payment. April 8, the G. sailed. April 12, L. filed his petition in bankruptcy, and, May 20, was adjudged bankrupt. The trustee in bankruptcy and W. each demanded the bills of lading before the ship reached Shanghai; and it was agreed that the goods should be sold, and the proceeds held to abide the decision of the court. Held, that W, had a right of stoppage in transitu until the goods reached Shanghai; and that, by demanding the bills of lading, he had exercised his right, and could have the bill of exchange accepted by L. paid out of the proceeds of

sale of the goods.-Ex parte Watson. In re Love, 5 Ch. D. 35.

See BILL OF LADING; SALE, 3.

VENDOR'S LIEN.

The P. Company, defendants, manufacturers of steel rails, made a contract for rails with S. & Co., to furnish them a certain quantity at stated times, delivered at Liverpool on board ships; payment to be made three-fifths net cash, and two-fifths by buyer's acceptance, at four months, as each five hundred tons of rails were ready for shipment. The warrant signed by the defendant company for the delivery of the rails contained the phrase, "Iron deliverable (f. o. b.) to S. & Co., or to their assigns by indorsement hereon ;" and it was shown to be the usage of the iron trade that such warrants were considered to pass the goods to the holder hereof free from vendor's lien. Several warrants in this form were sent, with invoice and drafts, to S. & Co., as the instalments of rails were finished, and the rails stored at the company's works. S. & Co. pledged the warrants to the plaintiff banking company for advances; and, before the contract was completed, and while some of the goods were still at the works, and some had been sent to Liverpool on the order of S. & Co., and were in the railway company's warehouse, S. & Co. suspended. Held, that under the above usage, the plaintiffs were entitled to the goods at the works, and were, moreover, entitled to those in the warehouse, as being no longer in transit.-Merchant Banking Co. of London v. Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co., 5 Ch. D. 205.

See BILL OF LADING. WARRANTY.-See INSURANCE.

WILL.

1. Testatrix made a will disposing of all her property. In 1860, she made another, making some changes in the bequests as they stood in the first document. The second will contained no residuory clause, and made no allusion to the previous will; but it declared that "this is the last will of me." Held,

that the first will must be considered revoked the second alone admitted to probate.-Dempsey v. Lawson, 2 P. D. 98. 2. Clause: "I appoint my sister

my executrix, only requesting that my nephews," F. & J., "will kindly act for or with this dear sister." Held, that F. and J. were duly namee executors with the sister of the testatrix.-In the goods of Brown, 2 P. D. 110.

3. Testatrix wished to revive a will and codicil dated respectively Jan. 26, and Feb. 21, 1876, and which had been sub

soqueutly revoked. Her solicitor made copies of them, and had the two documents re-executed Jan. 18, 1877. He neglected to change the reference to the date of the will made in the codicil, and the codicil read, "my last will dated Jan. 26, 1976." Held, that the will and codicil should be admitted to probate.In the goods of Ince, 2 P. D. 111.

4. Clause in will: "I hereby appoint one of my sisters my sole executrix." Testator had three sisters living at the date of the will; but only one survived him. The court refused to granl probate to her on the gfound of uncertainty.-In the goods of Blackwell, 2 P. D. 72.

5. Testator, living in Brighton, left a will appointing twelve executors thereof, one of whom he described as "Percival

of Brighton, the father." There was evidence that testator had an intimate friend in Brighton, named William Percival Boxall; that testator was accustomed to call him Percival, and had appointed him executor in his previous will; that Boxall had a son named Percival, well known to the testator; and that testator knew no other person named Percival. This evidence was admitted to determine who was meant.-In the Goods of De Rosaz, 2 P. D. 66.

6. He made a will dated March 15, 1864, giving his property to his wife. Oct. 12, 1874, he and his wife made a joint will," in case we should be called out of this world at one and the same time, and by one and the same accident" There was a clause revoking all previous wills. He died Dec. 31, 1876; his wife surviving. Held, that the joint will was made in view of an event which never happened, and hence it had become and was of no effect. The other will was good. -In the Goods of Hugo, 2 P. D. 73.

7. Testator used a blank lithographed form for a will to give property absolutely to children after the life-estate of the widow. The lithographed words giving to the children were marked out, and the words, "to my only son, H.," written in. No note was made on any part of the will to these alterations, and the attesting witness (one witness had died) knew nothing about it. Testator left five children by a former wife, and the said son H. by a wife living. Testator has said to the trustee named in the will that he meant to provide for his son H.; and this evidence was admitted, and the will admitted to probate.-Dench v. Dench, 2 P. D. 60. See BEQUEST, 1, 2; DEVISE, 1, 2; ELECTION; TRUST, 1, 2, 3.

WORDS. "Money, Cattle, Farming Implements, &c.”— See BEQUEST, 2.