is an example of such circumstances, where a stranded ship was in danger of falling to pieces, and the expense and risk of rafting the timber, and reloading it on transhipment, and carrying it to its destination, was supposed to have exceeded the value of the cargo when there. Such a case seems expressly included in the part of the judgment in Roux v. Salvador (3 Bing. N. C. 279), where it is said, that "if goods damaged by the perils of the sea, and necessarily landed before the termination of the voyage, are, in the case of perishable goods, in such a state that they cannot in safety be reshipped; if, though imperishable, they are in the hands of strangers, not under the control of the insured; if, by any circumstances over which he has no control, they can never be brought to their original destination: in any of these cases, the circumstances of their existing in specie at that forced termination of the risk is of no importance; the loss is in its nature total to him who has no means of recovering his goods, whether his inability arises from their annihilation, or other insuperable necessity." The judgment in Knight v. Faith (15 Q. B. 657), accords with Roux v. Salvador, in holding that there may be a total loss without abandonment, when there has been a right sale caused by urgent necessity, with full proof that everything was done optima fide, and for the real benefit of all concerned. There is an apparent difference of opinion in these two decisions as to the degree of imminent danger which should be beld to be such urgent necessity as would justify a sale. But the sufficiency of the degree of danger is within the province of the jury, and it is useless to attempt to define a degree without a standard for measure. Lord Campbell observes on the degree of fraud; but those observations are relevant to the caution required from the jury, not to the law of the case, when the necessity for the sale has been properly found. In King v. Walker (33 L. J., Ex., 325) it was not necessary to decide that a valid sale from necessity was an actual total loss, without any notice of abandonment; but the Court clearly sanctioned the rational principles respecting the effect of a valid sale from necessity laid down in Roux v. Salvador, saying (p. 326), "It may not be easy to understand why notice of abandonment should be required in a case where a vessel cannot be made to sail except at an expense for repair which no reasonable man would incur, and is therefore properly, and in a sense necessarily, sold for old materials. In these three cases all the authorities relating to abandonment are fully reviewed, and no useful object would be gained in repeating the review. We consider that we act on the principles laid down in Roux v. Salvador, in holding that the jury, finding that the sale was right under the circumstances in evidence before them, found that there was an actual total loss, with benefit of salvage, although the cargo existed in specie at the time of the sale, and there was no notice of abandonment. all cases of alleged constructive loss, where the captain takes upon himself to sell the ship, and still more so when he sells the cargo, the necessity of so doing ought to be strictly proved, and the jury are not at liberty to act on conjecture. It is plain, on the figures appended to the report of the learned judge, that the expenses of bringing the cargo to Liverpool would not have equalled the value of the cargo, when brought there in its integrity, by 2097. The jury have found, that there would have been a diminution of the quantity of timber to this extent, and, therefore, that the expenses would have equalled the value of the diminished cargo, which alone could have been actually brought home; but I can find no evidence on the judge's notes to support this amount of deduction from the original quantity of the cargo. It may be that there would be some deduction, but it may also be that, if any, there would be a very much smaller deduction. Again: on the assumption that such a diminution of quantity were proved, the expenses of bringing home the cargo should be calculated on the diminished quantity; but they are all calculated on the larger quantity of timber contained in the whole original cargo. It is possible (but I see no evidence to prove it) that the expenses of landing and rafting would be the same, whether any portion of the cargo were lost or not. This might depend on the period at which the loss of the quantity took place, of which there is no evidence that I am aware of. But assuming the landing and rafting to be constant quantities, yet the freight, both original and additional, is at so much per load, and is calculated by the insured on the quantity contained in the entire cargo. But the freight actually payable for sending a smaller quantity would be less; therefore, in calculating the expense of sending the diminished cargo home, so much is charged for freight; but any deduction from the charge for freight makes the sale unlawful, and, indeed, destroys the claim for a constructive total loss, for it does not appear on the figures, that even if the freight could be charged on the original quantity, it would do more than bring the expenses of sending home the cargo up to the value of the cargo so sent home: no excess of charge beyond the value of the cargo is shewn. I much regret, that on this preliminary question I am unable to concur with the rest of the Court; but though I fear I must be in error, I do not feel at liberty to yield my opinion; for if it be correct, the plaintiff will still be entitled to hold his verdict to the extent of a partial loss; the amount of which loss is, by agreement, to be settled by competent parties; and on a careful consideration of the evidence, I feel strongly, that this result would be more likely to advance the real justice of the case than the verdict as it now stands.-Rule discharged. The above is the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice, my brother Keating, and myself. My Brother Byles assents to it, subject to the remarks upon the [Coram preliminary point, which I am about to read. BYLES, J.-I agree with my Lord and the rest of the Court, that if the cargo had been sold by the captain of the vessel, because the expense of forwarding it to its destination would have exceeded its value when so forwarded, it was rightly sold; that a sale under such circumstances would have changed the property; and that there would have been, not merely a constructive, but an actual total loss of the timber. I also agree, that in the case of such an actual total loss, no notice of abandonment is necessary. But in COURT OF EXCHEQUER. EASTER TERM. POLLOCK, C. B., MARTIN, BRAMWELL, and PAIN v. TERRY.-April 22 and 24. Motion for new trial-Practice. The Court will not entertain a motion for a new trial in the term subsequent to that during which the cause has been tried, on the ground that the trial took place on the last day but one of the term, and that the defendant's attorney had not the time to consult his principal, who lives in the country, and to receive his instructions to move during the same term. On the fourth day of this term Wordsworth moved for a rule nisi, calling upon the plaintiff to shew cause why the nonsuit should not be set aside, and a new trial had. The learned counsel not being prepared with the necessary affidavits, the motion was postponed till to-day (April 24), and was then renewed. The Court then objected, that the motion should have been made during the last term, when the cause was tried. It appeared that the cause was tried on the 30th January; that the defendant was resident in the country, at Sandwich, and that he was not in town when the verdict was delivered at the last day of the sittings during term, and that Bramwell, B., had stayed execution in order to allow this motion to be made. Wordsworth now contended, that the Court were not bound by the rule of practice on this subject as by an act of Parliament; that the rule being the creation of the Court, might be suspended, modified, or set aside when the occasion called for it; and that this was a case requiring such a course, as it was impossible, under the circumstances, for the party's attorney to consult his client and receive instructions to move, and thereupon to instruct counsel before the expiration of the term. There was no opposition from the other side for the motion, for the stay of execution was not opposed at chambers. [Bramwell, B.-When I made that order, I had forgotten that the cause had been tried during Hilary Term.] [He cited Birt v. Barlow (1 Dougl. 171).] [Pollock, C. B., referred to Rex v. Gough (2 Dougl. 791), where it is laid down, that a new trial may be granted at any time before judgment.] THE COURT being of opinion that the preliminary objection was fatal, Wordsworth did not argue the case upon its merits. POLLOCK, C. B.-The rule is too well established to be departed from in this case. I do not say we would not depart from it in any conceivable case. If a plaintiff were to obtain a verdict, which he knew to be open to exception, and were to enter into negotiations for a compromise, in order to throw the defendant over to the end of term, and were then to leave him to take the consequences of the verdict, I do not say that in such a case we might not consider the propriety of departing from the rule. MARTIN, B.-All we decide is, that in this case we will not depart from the rule. BRAMWELL and PIGOTT, BB., concurred.-Rule refused. on behalf of Watson, moved for an order that Manning should be made a co-respondent, and relied on the 28th section of the Divorce Act. "Upon any such petition presented by a husband, the petitioner shall make the alleged adulterer a co-respondent, unless on special grounds, to be allowed by the Court, he shall be excused from so doing." Mundell opposed the motion, and cited Hunter v. Hunter (28 L. J., P. & M., 3) and Codrington v. Codring ton and Anderson (33 L. J., P. & M., 62). THE JUDGE ORDINARY.-I certainly was at one time under the impression, from Hunter v. Hunter, that Sir C. Cresswell was of opinion that it was not necessary that there should be more than one corespondent, although the petition charged the wife with adultery with more than one. I think, however, that the petitioner ought to make all the alleged adulterers co-respondents, unless there are special grounds for excusing him from doing so. On the application of Mundell, THE JUDGE ORDINARY ordered the motion to stand over, that affidavits might be filed, shewing that the application was made bonâ fide, and also special grounds for not making Manning a co-respondent. Jan. 24.-Mundell moved the Court to excuse the petitioner from making Manning a co-respondent, and read affidavits filed by the petitioner, stating the nature of the evidence as to the adultery with Manning, which consisted chiefly of diaries and letters of the respondent. The Queen's Advocate and A. S. Hill, contra. THE JUDGE ORDINARY.-It certainly is a great hardship cast upon the petitioner, that if he has unquestionable evidence of adultery against his wife, he must, by the terms of the act, make the adulterer a co-respondent, for he may be placed in this position, that he may have evidence against his wife, but none whatever against the co-respondent. In such a case, if a man were made a co-respondent, and at the trial it should turn out that there was no evidence against him, he might be dismissed from the suit. Apply that to this case. It may be taken as a datum that there is evidence against the wife and none against Manning. If I were to insist upon his being made a co-respondent as soon as he came here, and the case was tried, he would be in a position to ask to be dismissed from the suit with costs. That would be a very curious state of things. I am, however, clear, that if the petitioner chooses to charge Manning with adultery, he is bound to make him a co-respondent. The question is, whether a case has been made out COURT FOR DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL to-day to dispense with that necessity in the exercise CAUSES. of the discretion of the Court. As to the special grounds, I should like the intercepted letters and the CARRYER v. CARRYER and WATSON.-Jan. 10, 24, diaries to be brought into the registry, that I may see and 31. them before deciding the question. Cur, adv. vult. Jan. 31.—THE JUDGE ORDINARY.-This was an application on the part of a co-respondent, that Manleged in the petition, should also be made a co-rening, another person against whom adultery was alspondent. It was urged, that under the 20 & 21 Vict. This was the husband's petition for dissolution of marriage. The petition alleged, that on divers occasions between the 1st January, 1858, and the 1st Sep-man, that man must be made a co-respondent. The tember, 1864, and in September, 1864, the co-respondent Watson had committed adultery with the respondent. It also alleged that Charles Manning, then residing at Natal, in Africa, had on divers occasions, between the 7th October, 1856, and August, 1862, committed adultery with the respondent. Watson had been cited, and had appeared and filed an answer. Manning had not been cited. Jan. 10.—The Queen's Advocate and Dr. Deane, Q. C., c. 85, s. 28, it is not necessary to make more than one co-respondent. But the Court was of opinion, that whenever adultery is alleged in a petition against any application then took another form. The same section which imposes the necessity of making the alleged adulterer a co-respondent, gives the Court a discretion to dispense with that necessity; and it was urged, that this was a proper case for the exercise of that discretion. The ground on which it was placed was, that Manning is now resident at Natal, and that the bulk of the evidence, as to the adultery charged to have been committed with him, is contained in the PRIVY COUNCIL. THE JURIST.-REPORTS. [Privy Council.] 353 wife's journals, and in letters in her possession, which the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, dated the 31st would not be evidence against him; and the argu- May, 1844, the district of Natal was annexed to the ment went so far as to insist, that though there was settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, and the Legisevidence against the wife with regard to Manning, there lature of the said settlement was empowered to make was none upon which a jury could find a verdict against laws for its good government; that by letters-patent, him. If that had been clearly made out, I am not dated the 30th April, 1845, the said district was erected disposed to say that the Court would not have re- for certain purposes into a distinct and separate golieved the petitioner from making him a co-respond-vernment administered by a lieutenant-governor; that ent. On the other hand, I do not intend at once to by letters-patent, dated the 2nd March, 1847, so much decide that the Court would so act. It is rather diffi- of the first-mentioned letters-patent as authorised the cult to ascertain with certainty what was the motive Legislature of the Cape of Good Hope to make laws of the Legislature in requiring that the alleged adul- for the said district, was revoked under powers reterer should be made a co-respondent. There may served in them for that purpose, and it was ordained have been several motives. First, it may have been and declared that a legislative council therein partiintended that any man against whom adultery is cularly described should make such laws and ordicharged should have a citation served on him in order nances as might be required for the said district; that that he may, if he like, appear and defend his cha- by letters-patent, dated the 25th September, 1847, the racter. In that view of the case, this enactment colony or settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, with would be intended for his benefit. Another motive its dependencies, and the island of St. Helena, was may have been, that it would be desirable, on behalf erected and constituted to be a bishop's see and dioof the public, who are interested in not having di- cese; and by the same letters-patent it was signified vorces lightly granted, that there should be a party to to the then Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, that her the suit who should be interested in disproving the Majesty had appointed Robert Gray, D. D., to be the charge of adultery, quite independently of the peti- bishop of the said diocese; and the said archbishop tioner's interest in the matter, and his right to get was commanded to consecrate the said Robert Gray costs; so that the mere fact of want of evidence as such bishop, which he accordingly did; that the against the alleged adulterer might not in all cases be said letters-patent reserved to the said Robert Gray a sufficient reason for dispensing with a co-respondent. a right of resignation; and by an instrument under In this case I am by no means satisfied that the peti- his hand and seal the said Robert Gray did resign his tioner could not get evidence against Manning. I office and dignity, and the same became vacant before therefore reject the application to relieve him from the 23rd November, 1853, and were then vacant; that the necessity of making the alleged adulterer a co- by letters-patent, bearing date the 23rd May, 1850, respondent. the Legislature of the Cape of Good Hope was empowered to pass ordinances establishing a representative government for the said colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and such ordinances were accordingly her Majesty; that on the 23rd November, 1853, letpassed by the said Legislature, and were confirmed by ters-patent were issued under the Great Seal, for the purpose of erecting the district of Natal into a separate and district see and diocese. The said letterspatent recited that the said see or diocese of Cape Town had become and was then vacant; that the said see or diocese was of inconvenient size; and that, for the spiritual care and superintendence of the religious interests of the inhabitants thereof, and for the maintenance of the doctrine and discipline of the United Church of England and Ireland, it was expedient and desirable that the same should be divided into three bishoprics or sees, to be styled the Bishoprics of Cape said sees of Graham's Town and Natal, and their sucTown, Graham's Town, and Natal; the bishops of the Cape Town, and the bishop thereof, and his successors, cessors, to be subject and subordinate to the see of in the same manner as any bishop of any see within of the archiepiscopal see of that province, and the the province of Canterbury was under the authority archbishop of the same. In consideration of these erected the district of Natal into a separate see and premises, her Majesty, by the said letters-patent, dained and consecrated bishop of the said see, signified diocese, named and appointed the appellant to be orthe same to the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, and commanded him to ordain and consecrate the appellant to be bishop of the said see or diocese in manner accustomed; and the appellant was accordingly This was a petition of complaint and appeal to her ordained and consecrated on the 30th November, 1853. Majesty in Council by the Right Rev. John William On the 8th December, 1853, the said Robert Gray was Colenso, D. D., Lord Bishop of Natal, against a judg-appointed metropolitan Bishop of the see of Cape Town ment and sentence of the Right Rev. Robert Gray, Lord Bishop of Cape Town. The respondent appeared, but under protest, alleging that the Privy Council had no jurisdiction in the matter. [Present The LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord WESTBURY), Lords CRANWORTH and KINGSDOWN, Dr. LUSHINGTON, and Sir J. ROMILLY.] Re THE BISHOP OF NATAL.-March 20. Colonies-Church of England-Status of-Metropolitan After the establishment of an independent Legislature in The petition stated that, by letters-patent under by letters-patent under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, dated the 8th December, 1853. In the said letters-patent were contained the words following: “We will and ordain that the said Right Rev. Father in God Robert Gray, Bishop of the said see of Cape Town, and his successors, the bishops thereof for the time being, shall be, and be deemed and taken to be, the metropolitan bishops in our colony of the Cape of Good Hope and its dependencies, and our island of St. Helena, subject, nevertheless, to the general superintendence and revision of the Archbishop of Canterbury for the time being, and subordinate to the archiepiscopal see of the province of Canterbury; and we will and ordain that the said Bishops of Graham's Town and Natal respectively shall be suffragan bishops to the said Bishop of Cape Town and his successors; and we will and grant to the said Bishop of Cape Town and his successors full power and authority, as metropolitan of the Cape of Good Hope and of the island of St. Helena, to perform all functions peculiar and appropriate to the office of metropolitan within the limits of the said sees of Graham's Town and Natal, and to exercise metropolitan jurisdiction over the bishops of the said sees and their successors, and over all archdeacons, dignitaries, and all other chaplains, ministers, priests, and deacons, in holy orders of the United Church of England and Ireland, within the limits of the said dioceses." And also the words following:-" And we do further will and ordain, that in case any proceeding shall be instituted against any of the said Bishops of Graham's Town and Natal, when placed under the said metropolitical see of Cape Town, such proceedings shall originate and be carried on before the said Bishop of Cape Town, whom we hereby authorise and direct to take cognisance of the same.' And also the words following:-“ And if any party shall conceive himself aggrieved by any judgment, decree, or sentence pronounced by the said Bishop of Cape Town or his successors, in any cause originally instituted before the said bishop or his successors, it shall be lawful for the said party to appeal to the said Archbishop of Canterbury or his successors, who shall finally decide and determine the said appeal; provided always, that in any such case of appeal, notice of the intention of the party to make such appeal. . . shall be given to the bishop by whom the sentence appealed from shall have been pronounced, within fifteen days from the promulgation thereof. And we do further will, and by these presents ordain, that in all cases in which an appeal shall be made. . . as aforesaid, a copy of the judgment or sentence in such case promulgated or given, setting forth the causes thereof, together with a copy of the evidence on which the same was founded, shall, without delay, be certified and transmitted. . . . by the said bishop or his successors to the said Archbishop of Canterbury." On or about the 8th December, 1853, the appellant took an oath of due obedience to the Bishop of Cape Town, which was administered to him by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and was in the words following: "I, John William Colenso, appointed bishop of the see and diocese of Natal, do profess and promise all due reverence and obedience to the metropolian Bishop of Cape Town, and to his successors, and to the metropolitan Church of St. George, Cape Town." Neither at nor before the time when he took such oath, nor for several years afterwards, had the appellant any knowledge of the provisions of the letterspatent of the Bishop of Cape Town, nor did he ever in any way recognise or submit himself to the provisions of the said letters patent, or to the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Cape Town, or, except as aforesaid, to his authority. On the 1st July, 1863, a citation was served on the appellant to appear before the Bishop of Cape Town, at a time and place therein mentioned, to answer cer tain charges of false, strange, and erroneous doctrine and teaching preferred against him by the Dean of Cape Town, the Archdeacon of Graham's Town, and the Archdeacon of George. On the 5th October, 1853, the appellant wrote to the Bishop of Cape Town, stating that he was advised that the Bishop of Cape Town had no jurisdiction, and no legal right to take cognisance of the charge. The petition then stated, that on the 17th November, 1863, the Bishop of Cape Town, in the said Cathedral Church of Cape Town, announced that he was ready to hear the charges mentioned in the said citation, with the assistance of the Lord Bishop of Graham's Town and the Bishop of the Orange Free State. The petitioner by his counsel attended at the same time and place, and delivered to the said Bishop of Cape Town a protest, repudiating the jurisdiction of the Lord Bishop of Cape Town. The petition then stated, that afterwards, on the 8th December, 1863, notwithstanding the said protest, the said Bishop of Cape Town assumed to exercise jurisdiction, and to hear the said charges; and proceedings took place before him; and he and his assessors delivered opinions or judgments; and that afterwards the said Bishop of Cape Town did, by an instrument under his hand and episcopal seal, sentence, adjudge, and decree the said Bishop of Natal to be deposed from his said office as a bishop. The petition then prayed that their Lordships would report to her Majesty their opinion, that the appellant was entitled to hold his said office and see for the term of his natural life, under the letters-patent so granted to him, unless and until the same should be recalled and vacated by due process of law, for some sufficient cause of forfeiture in the law; and further, that their Lordships would report to her Majesty their opinion that, if her Majesty shall see fit to refuse the relief as prayed for, she ought, nevertheless, to admit and hear this petition, by way of appeal from the said sentence of the said Bishop of Cape Town, as the appellant's metropolitan, and to do according to right and justice therein. W. M. James, Q. C., Fitzjames Stephen, and Westlake, for the petitioner and appellant. The pretended sentence is in contempt and violation of her Majesty's letters-patent of the 23rd November, 1853. The sentence assumes to be founded upon, and to be deli vered in exercise of, a power of jurisdiction supposed to be conferred upon the Bishop of Cape Town over the appellant by the letters-patent of the 8th December, 1853; but the said letters-patent are void in so far as they purport to create a court of criminal justice within the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, and to give the Archbishop of Canterbury such appellate jurisdiction as aforesaid; and also in so far as they purport to confer by letters-patent an ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and also in so far as they derogate from the rights conferred on the appellant by the letters-patent of the 23rd November, 1853 The proceedings and assumed jurisdiction were based on the statement, that the appellant's letters-patent, appointment, and consecration were subsequent to the said letters-patent of the Bishop of Cape Town, which they were not. There is no court of law which can take notice of the said usurpation of jurisdiction either in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, or in the colony of Natal, or in the United Kingdom. It is the right and privilege of any of her Majesty' subjects to apply for relief to her Majesty for any wrong done in her Majesty's foreign and colonial dominions under or under colour of her Majesty's authority, and for which no other provision is by law made. The Bishop of Cape Town claims to exercise jurisdiction over the appellant, not only by virtue of 6 the provisions of the letters-patent of the 8th Decem- cipline within their body, which will be binding on those who, expressly or by implication, have assented to them. It may be further laid down, that where any religious or other lawful association has not only agreed on the terms of its union, but has also constituted a tribunal to determine whether the rules of the association have been violated by any of its members or not, and what shall be the consequence of such violation, the decision of such tribunal will be binding, when it has acted within the scope of its authority; has observed such forms as the rules require, if any forms be prescribed; and, if not, has proceeded in a manner consonant with the principles of justice. In The Bishop of St. David's v. Lucy (1 Ld. Raym. 447) the same objections were taken as in this case, but all the objections were overruled. These authorities shew how doubtful is the status of the ecclesiastical establishment in the colonies. It is contended, that, as the Bishop of Natal was appointed to his office by letters-patent under the Great Seal, he can only be dismissed by a writ of scire facias. The Crown has no power proprio vigore to try a colonial bishop for heresy. The Bishop of Natal may apply to the Civil Court of Natal or Cape Town, as Mr. Long did, and say, "I have been injured by the Bishop of Cape Town in my status as Bishop of Natal;" and then, if dissatisfied, he may appeal. The Imperial Government has no jurisdiction over a colonial bishop. It does not contribute to his salary. There is, however, both a question of law and a question of contract. The Bishop of Natal promised obedience to the Bishop of Cape Town as his metropolitan, and, in fact, took an oath of obedience to the Bishop of Cape Town. It is said that the Bishop of Natal was not aware of the contents of the letters-patent by which he was appointed; but this can make no difference. Assuming that the Bishop of Cape Town had no jurisdiction to try the Bishop of Natal for the alleged heresy, then all the proceedings are void, and there is no judgment to appeal from. The metropolitans of the Roman Catholic Church always exercised jurisdiction over the bishops of their province, and exercised the right of deposing them. No doubt, an appeal lies to the Queen in Council from the judgment of all colonial courts, but the mode of proceeding varies, and this appeal is premature. [They referred to Long v. The Bishop of Cape Town; The Bishop of St. David's v. Lucy; Le Queux, 243; Linwood's Provinciale, b. 1, 32; Life of Archbishop Sancroft, by D'Oyley, 192; and the stats. 25 Hen. 8, c. 15, s. 4, and 1 Eliz. c. 1, s. 17.] The Queen's Advocate (Sir R. Phillimore, Q. C.), Sir H. Cairns, Q. C., and Badeley appeared on behalf of the Bishop of Cape Town, but under protest.-There are precedents for the Bishop of Cape Town under protest. In The Bishop of St. David's case (1 Ld. Raym. 447) the Archbishop of Canterbury himself appeared by counsel before the House of Lords, although he had been judge in the case. In Poole v. The Bishop of London (5 Jur., N. S., 522) the Bishop of London, who had in that case deprived a curate, as judge, nevertheless appeared before the Archbishop of Canterbury to vindicate the course he had adopted. The Bishop of Cape Town, for the same reasons, appears before your Lordships. It is difficult to apply the customs and usages of the Church of England to the Church in the colonies. Bishops have been created under several statutes. The 53 Geo. 3, c. 155, by sect. 52, gave power to the Crown to grant to a bishop ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the East Indies. The 6 Geo. 4, c. 88, constituted a bishoprick in the West Indies, and sect. 3 of that statute gave power to the Crown to create a bishop, with jurisdiction over a diocese embracing Jamaica, the Bahama Islands, and our settlements in Honduras; but in the case of Bowerbank v. The Bishop of Jamaica, it was so doubtful whether an appeal lay to the Queen, and delegates in Chancery, or to the Judicial Committee, that a double commission was issued, appointing the same persons who would sit on the Judicial Committee delegates under the Court of Chancery. In Australia the different dioceses are governed by local enactments. In Long v. The Bishop of Cape Town, an authority which we contend is pre-macy of the Crown. cisely in point, it was held, that the Church of Further their respective and relative rights and England in places where there is no church esta- liabilities must be determined by the principles of blished by law, is in the same situation as any other religious body in no better, but in the worse, position, and the members may adopt, as the members of any other communion may adopt, rules for enforcing dis THE LORD CHANCELLOR delivered the judgment of their Lordships.-The Bishop of Natal and the Bishop of Cape Town (who are the parties to this proceeding) are ecclesiastical persons who have been created bishops by the Queen, in the exercise of her authority as Sovereign of this realm, and head of the Established Church. These bishops were consecrated under mandate from the Queen by the Archbishop of Canterbury, in the manner prescribed by the law of England. They received and hold their dioceses under grants made by the Crown. Their status, therefore, both ecclesiastical and temporal, must be ascertained and defined by the law of England; and it is plain that their legal existence depends on acts which have no validity or effect, except on the basis of the supre English law applied to the construction of the grants to them contained in the letters-patent; for they are the creatures of English law, and dependent on that law for their existence, rights, and attributes. |