that these inducements might suffice to determine men of eminence to accept the positions when they would not care to sit in a court of first instance, as above considered under. A Judicial Court, nevertheless, under the present plan, by which the highest talent could be secured for the arbitration court, a nation should be satisfied with a single decision. It would only be following the example of the English, in confiding their most vital interest, that of passing upon life, to the court of first instance. Permeated with the feeling that the success of the system would depend upon the fairness of the decisions, the arbitrators would have an almost equal incentive to do all that human wisdom could, to give satisfaction.

However, should, by rare chance, some cardinal principle of international right be so disregarded that the precedent might be considered by the nations as a general menace, it would be quite possible for a group of nations to induce the nation in whose favor the decision had been made, to renounce that part of the award, or accept some compensatory satisfaction.

Expense of Appeals

The late Mr. Cramer expressed the opinion at the Boston Congress, that the expense of assembling a Court at The Hague was so great that an amendment to submit cases to Boards of Arbitration in the first instance, and to the Court of The Hague on Appeal, should be made, in order to relieve the smaller countries of such a forbidding condition. Against this argument, and in addition to the reason already given, consideration should not be lost of the fact that the wealthy countries, when not satisfied, would invariably take a second chance, just as wealthy

litigants do in municipal cases, and the small nations would find litigation still more burdensome.

The Sanction of 'Isolation, or Non-Intercourse

The facts that, in international relations, it is the nation that is the delinquent and that the nations are already segregated, are the conditions that make possible this sanction.

It is, in its essence, the only plan of punishment that has survived the test of time, where the individual is the offender: namely, imprisonment; and would be much more effective should the application be against a nation, rather than an individual.

When the offender is an individual, he must be kept on the territory of the government inflicting the punishment, and must, at the latter's expense, be sheltered, nourished and closely confined.

While the idea of imprisoning a whole nation, at first thought, may seem grotesque, for the cost of apprehending and convicting a single wrongdoer has not infrequently embarrassed a whole county financially, the means for doing it are so simple that the cost would be almost inconsiderable. In fact, it would be self-reacting, like jiu jitsu, as the offending nation would almost imprison itself.

Were a nation to be imprisoned, it would be done upon its own territory and without expense for keeping and guarding.

Should its territory be insufficient for self-maintenance, no question of sympathy would arise, as it would have brought the imprisonment upon itself voluntarily and

could terminate it at any time upon complying with the decree.

The nation in default would simply be refused an entrance to the territories of other nations, did it make the attempt to disregard the decree.

Suppose that the condemned nation did send even a fleet of merchantmen to an unprotected port of another nation with the intention of engaging in trade. Imagine its predicament, upon realizing that no person would be allowed to deal, or even to communicate, with it!

Being allowed to retain defenses on its territory, every nation, at small expense and without much provision, could ward off even an invasion, should the condemned nation be so misguided as to attempt it, without having taken years of time to prepare for it, and such preparation could always be effectively forestalled by proceeding against it under the present plan, the moment that it was suspected that the nation was making a start to arm.

Were the plan that simply intercourse between the nations in conflict should stop, no decisive result could be expected as each would have the rest of the world with which to deal and as the nationals of each country whose business would be disturbed would influence their respective governments as much as they could against the measure, and thus render it ineffective. However, were it the joint action of all the nations, the result would be such a tremendous loss to the nation or few nations thus cut off, that the latter would almost certainly comply. It can well be said to be the greatest force of the kind conceivable; for, while it would be working ruin within the nation at fault by cutting off its supply of raw materials and its international intercourse, the proceeding would not be

costing its opponent but, it may be, some loss of trade with the nation isolated, as the opponent would still have all of the other countries with which to deal.

As increased armament gives an increased sense of security in and dependence upon that form of protection, so, on the other hand, a decrease weakens such confidence; and, in a corresponding degree, as it falls off, the effectiveness of this sanction without physical or armed force, increases.

The greatest virtue of the Isolation Plan, therefore, would appear when the absence of armament was complete.

Its effectiveness, moreover, is not to be measured by what the belligerent nations in the present war are willing to endure, now that they are angered to the point where they will suffer to almost any extreme rather than to consider possible terms for a cessation of the war, but by what they would determine before reaching that state of mind as to whether they would be warranted in facing the barrier of Isolation set up to keep them from war, rather than to attempt to settle the matter otherwise.

The facts to be established by the Tribunal before inflicting the decree, being dissociated from the questions in contest, and being simply a matter of procedure under the Convention, non-compliance would be a breach of the Convention1 and would hardly elicit sympathy from other nations, as the latter would consider, that being obligated themselves, it behooved the delinquent to fulfill the obligation on its part.

It presents but one inflexible form of punishment, the

1Mr. Balfour, on July 30th, at San Sabastian, is reported to have stated: "We must have an economic blockade *** to apply against a nation which defies the League."

extent and severity of which can be well comprehended; and the duration being only commensurate with the offense, assurance would be had in the certainty of its application.

It is probable that its application would never be made, but that it would simply stand as a possible last resort.

Distinctions

The prototype of this sanction is found in the Continental blockade, especially as it was applied on the Napoleonic side, through the warding off of the British at the line of the Continent by the land forces; but this plan contemplates three great distinctions in its applications:

(1) Its imposition would be systematically and scientifically administered by a body as nearly impartial as could be devised, composed largely of the choice of the offending nation, unless it refused to act, and only after the latter had had an opportunity to be heard.

(2) Its imposition would be made at a time when the offending nation was impotent as to armed force. (3) It would be backed by a moral solidarity.

As to its effectiveness, no comparison can be made. The Continental Blocus was not attempted until the war had assumed its full proportions and was little more than the extension of the ancient practice of cutting off the enemy by siege. Because of the fact that the opposing forces were almost equal, the attempt to apply it at the time that it was done was about as hopeless as would be that to stop some great conflagration in the midst of its course with water; and yet water would suffice, if applied