before much progress had been made. The necessary cooperation, too, was lacking, as it was never doubted by the nations in combination with Napoleon, that his efforts were not primarily for his own aggrandizement. It has been seen in the present war how serious the effect of shutting off supplies from a nation can be, even when the latter is mightily armed at the start, It is to be distinguished from a boycott, in that it would be imposed by an impartial body, only after the nation against which it was directed had had an opportunity to be heard, while the boycott is always applied ex parte. Indorsements of the Isolation Plan Two of the strongest endorsements, now too many to present, are the following: The late Justice Brewer stated: "Now, if the nations in the coming conference at "The Hague, or in coming conferences, shall agree that "any nation which refuses to enter into arbitration "with a nation with which it has a dispute, or which "refuses to abide by the award of the arbitrators "selected in accordance with the provisions of The "Hague Convention, or some other convention, shall "be isolated from all intercourse with and recognition "by any other nation on the face of the earth, can "you imagine any compulsion which would be more "real and peremptory than that?" * "there is no nation, however mighty, "that could endure such an isolation, such an out"lawry as that would be. The business interests of "the nation would compel the government to recede "from its position and no longer remain an outlaw on "the face of the globe." "Such a procedure would involve no military force, "no bloodshed on the part of the other nations. 66 * The very fact that it was outlawed would "place it in a position where it would have to submit; "it would be compulsion, as real as the compulsion "of a marshal with a writ in his hands." (Report of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Mohonk Lake Conference on International Arbitration [1905], p. 38.) Mr. Carnegie has expressed himself as follows regarding this plan: 66 "Five nations co-operated in quelling the recent "Chinese disorders and rescuing their representatives "in Pekin. It is perfectly clear that these five nations 'could banish war. Suppose even three of them "formed a League of peace,-inviting all other "nations to join-and agreed that since war in any "part of the civilized world affects all nations, and 'often seriously, that no nation shall go to war, but "shall refer International disputes to the Hague "Conference or other arbitral body for peaceful settle"ment, the League agreeing to declare non-intercourse with any nation refusing compliance. Imag"ine a nation cut off today from the world." 66 66 "The relations between Britain, France and the "United States today are so close, their aims so simi"lar, their territories and fields of operation so clearly "defined and so different that these Powers might "properly unite in inviting other nations to consider "the question of such a League as has been sketched. "It is a subject well worthy the attention of their * "rulers, for of all the modes of hastening the end of No Americans have been better qualified to express opinions upon this subject: the one, knowing so intimately the effectiveness of combinations; the other, having had experience as an arbitrator; and both possessed of such a wide acquaintanceship with foreigners, and having given so much study to the subject. The weight of these opinions should establish the superiority of this plan in the judgment of all, until it can be shown to be defective. Partial Disarmament, as Long as the Right to Wage War is Recognized, an Impossibility Were the situations of all nations equal in geographical position, in area, in population, in colonial development, in commercial advantage and in every other respect, the proposition might be maintainable; but how could it be expected, that Great Britain would reduce her navy to the size of that of any other power, when her possessions, much more extensive than her home territory, lie in all of the seas? How would America consider a proposition to limit her naval force to that of France or of Japan, when she is open to attack on one ocean by the one and on another ocean by the other? If America were given a double allotment because of this fact, Germany would claim like treatment because of the scattered position of her colonial trade. Because of having practically but a single naval base, even a much smaller navy might give Japan an equal amount of protection, but she would insist upon a full quota. Again America, in addition to her great seaboards on two wide-spreading oceans, has her distant possessions to protect. Should she again engage in war, it would not be improbable that she would again be opposed to the power which has twice imperilled her in the past, its great colony to the north and its ally, the new naval power in the Orient. She could not agree to arrest further development with the possibility of being exposed some day to attack by such a united force, for in a such case, the abandonment of her possessions and the division of her forces along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts would become imperative and the consequences ineluctable. Suppose that America did, in principle, agree to such a plan. How could a percentage of reduction be arranged that would be acceptable to America, when the navy of Great Britain is so much greater than that of America, and yet the latter has outstripped her in resources? If war is to continue as the arbiter of disputes, those nations whose resources are still plentiful will continue preparations, so that they may win from any possible adversary. They will not consent to confine themselves to a limited force, but will expect to employ, if necessary, their last man and last dollar of credit. Anything else would be simply to allow the dispute to be decided by a duel. Intelligence is far too advanced to revert to such processes of barbarism. The attempt is now to replace might by intelligent judgment, such as comports with our civilization. But even suppose that a protocol were arranged recognizing that differences, when important, might continue to be determined by war and that America might arm to a certain limit only. Could it be expected that its ratification would be accomplished? Would it be reasonable that the country of the greatest material resources should deliberately place itself in so disadvantageous a position? What would it gain thereby? At the most, it would be the reduction of the naval budget; but that is still so inconsiderable that there is no outcry against it. As humanity is constituted, it could not be expected that a nation, because bound by a treaty, would refrain from further arming itself, should it perceive that it was about to be drawn into a war, its territory invaded and its property destroyed, while it still had abundant resources, for no interior force could thereafter repress such activities. The law of self-preservation is still that of the masses and some excuse, probably based upon some peculiar disadvantage in the way in which the nation would be affected by such a convention, would be pleaded as a justification for a breach. To permit a nation to enter into such an agreement would hardly be honorable. Finally, the suspicion under which each nation would be held by the others that it was exceeding the limit, would constantly give rise to charges of deception, even were very broad opportunities for inspection afforded. The writer contends, that no conceivable proposition based on the limitation of armament, or partial disarmament, can ever reach the status of an agreement; and |