even were such an agreement made, it would be of no value, as no dependence would be placed upon it.

If these reasons are good, it results that the situation must remain as it is with an unlimited right to arm, or that disarmament must be general (save always for internal police purposes and the prevention of piracy on the seas).

Non-Justiciable Cases

NATIONAL HONOR

Mr. Carnegie, in the address quoted elsewhere, made use of an old and almost forgotten truth that should clear away the barrier to the submission of causes to arbitration, or judicial decision, on the ground that they involve national honor, namely:

"Never did man or nation dishonor another man or nation. That is impossible. All honor's wounds are selfinflicted. All stains upon honor come from within, never from without."

The writer maintains that the sentiment regarding honor, is simply a false attitude that disappears as civilization advances.

In the early years of the American Republic it still obtained regarding personal honor, but it seems to have met its death blow when one of its most respected and beloved citizens fell by the bullet of one of unfavorable repute, and public opinion caused the latter to be abandoned to a miserable existence for the rest of his life; so, that, in the more advanced parts of the country, but few cases of the kind are recorded.

Public opinion is such that the individual feels that he would debase himself did he make a statement of another

derogative of character, unless it were well founded, and he guards himself from it; should he do so by mistake, he would be ready to humiliate himself by acknowledging his error and seeking to make reparation; while, on the other hand, were the statement true, the same public opinion would prevent the party affected from making any remonstrance.

Nations are subject to the same pressure of public opin

ion.

VITAL INTERESTS

The society of nations is so large and intelligence so widespread, that what can be termed "vital interests" are the interests common to all, or at least to the most progressive; and their solidarity under a world-wide convention can be depended on to uphold all such pretentions as are reasonable. It surely could not be maintained, that the safe-guarding of those that were unreasonable is so important, that it should prevent the general disarmament of the nations and thereby preclude the security of the whole which that condition would afford.

Almost the only concrete example which Americans offer under this head, is the Monroe Doctrine.

It must, however, be conceded, that the gravamen of this Doctrine is the fear that some military base may be established by some European power on the Western Continent to threaten the peace and security of the latter. Should general disarmament be introduced, however, that fear would be removed.

America has long welcomed immigrants from Europe and speedily incorporated them into the nation on equal

.

terms with its older citizens; and especially is this the case with those from the very powers that might establish such bases; so why, under general disarmament, should she not welcome their coming to neighboring territory?

Reliance on the mother country for military aid is the chief motive that has given to those unions their strength; but, under general disarmament, only sentiment would remain; and the attachment would endure only so long as advantageous commercial relationships would continue, which would be a very healthy situation for the development of the country by such colonists.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

The recognition by the Convention of only independent states and the treatment of them as equals in their international relationship, disposes of the question of territorial integrity in all cases in which delimitations have been established. Where they have not been, the questions might well be left for arbitration.

The Least Possible Derogation from National Sovereignty

This plan is formed on the basis, that the nation that is governed the least, is governed the best; and therefore represents the minimum of federation necessary for its effectiveness.

The organization of international bodies, means the surrender by the individual States of certain powers now exercised by them singly. It has been proposed in furtherance of the various ideas for the federation of the World, to have, not only a permanent court with a fixed personnel and a legislative body to make international laws, but an

international executive to enforce the laws, possibly by the aid of an international army.

Such a plan would infringe upon the prerogatives of at least every national legislative body and of every sovereign. Is it not well, therefore, before a discussion of its arrangement is provoked, to examine into the necessity for such an organization? Those born and reared in America have probably had instilled into them a keener appreciation than other peoples of the greatness of the struggles over the surrender of such rights, although limited. At the outset, the erection of the Constitution of the United States was accomplished only at a time when the Articles of Confederation and the Continental Government had proven to be inefficient and the States were impelled to such action to preserve the Union. The contentions between the federalist and democratic (centralization and decentralization) factions are still reflected each year in the decisions of the Supreme Court.

It will be remembered also that the heads of the several States held only elective offices. By what means, then, is it supposed that, when no such exigency exists, the States of the World are going to cede even more substantial rights to this body or that their sovereigns are going to resign a portion of their hereditary power to a Mr. X, or a Mr. Y?

Consider, too, the surrender that even the erection of a court of permanent judges would entail (see above, under Judicial Court, page 12), and no consideration is given there to the enforcement of its decrees.

Why should the cause of arbitration and disarmament be jeopardized by reason of the antagonisms that such a discussion would arouse?

To accomplish all that is necessary, only the minimum of organization would be required: no more, it might be said, than what at present exists under the Convention of The Hague.

Under it, each of the signatory powers has the right to name four Members of the Court, which most of them have done. The latter have no powers, however, but depend for such upon the grant thereof in the compromis, or treaty, by which provision may be made for their ministry, in the same manner as would be that of any other individual who might be chosen. It is already in operation under an ample provision for its small expenses through joint contributions by the States.

Then, under Article 28, the provision is made:

"A Permanent Administrative Counsel, composed of the diplomatic representatives of the Signatory Powers accredited to The Hague and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, who shall fulfill the functions of President, shall be constituted in that City," etc.

As its functions are simply to keep up the organization and administer the property, no fear can be aroused by the powers delegated to it or any of its members.

With this very simple organization, all that remains to be done is to obligate nations to arbitrate their differences, when they cannot settle them otherwise; if they cannot agree upon the arbitrators, to select them according to an accepted plan, supposed to afford a choice of impartial persons; and finally, to conform to the award rendered.

To do this, it would not always be necessary that the disputing nations even place themselves in contact with