Should the offending nation consider it to be advantageous to strike at once, it could precipitate war, after the complainant nation had presented its case, by simply announcing that it rested. The court would then be obliged to give its decision for the complaining nation; and moreover, it could not delay in so doing and expect the nations to use "the forces," because the defendant nation had opened war, for the delay would be the fault of the court in not performing a function at the point for doing which it had arrived.

Did the defendant nation put in a case, the court would be in a position, on the ground of requiring time to consider the conflict of testimony or law, to delay the decision and thereby render the time of its announcement uncertain. Such uncertainty, in itself, would constitute an element of great danger. Even the assurance that war would not begin before the end of a year, as under the Bryan Treaties, in which case no great precipitation in preparation would result and the heat of passion would probably pass, would be wanting; and the effect would be to cause the nation believing war to be inevitable to speed up its preparations and bring itself to a high pitch of excitement from the moment that an appeal was made to the court.

(4) Variable punishment would necessitate almost ceaseless contentions as to the interpretation of the given penalty and surveillance as to its proper execution.

(5) The Elder explanation of leaving to each nation the freedom to contribute in each case what it chose, would call for special action by each nation, possibly at a time when its legislative body was not in session; would necessitate the discussion of the merits of the controversy, in

which some of the nations might incline to the side of the refusing nation; and would permit the use of pressure and friendship, even at that point, to render the procedure ineffective.

If such uncertainty existed as to marshalling the means for punishment, how could the penalty be fixed before they had been ascertained?

(6) On the other hand, if the military force is to be effectively organized, the following problems must be solved: (a) The appointment of a commander-in-chief, which, if not at first, would sooner or later result in inconceivable strife; (b) The concentration of the several contingents in a given country for the insurance of prompt action, when contentions would arise about having them, or not having them, according as the advantages or disadvantages of their presence generally and to the tradespeople, might predominate; (c) The difficulties of passing budgets for the contributions to their support, especially when they were to be quartered in a foreign country; (d) Those of mobilizing the contingents, should each remain at home until needed; (e) Those of transporting them when the many combinations as to destination are considered; (f) Those of getting certain contingents out, should the country not favor the cause of the call; (g) The extra requirements, should they proceed against the strongest country in the League, say, a present Germany, etc., etc.

The sponsors of this program cite the case of the suppression of the Boxer uprising, as an example of its operation; but they certainly have not familiarized themselves with the reports of that affair sufficiently to take cognizance of the care and concessions that were required to

prevent its failure and to appreciate the extraordinary pressure to co-operate that the urgency of the situation imposed upon the participants. They do not stop to consider that that was a rush to protect the lives of foreigners, exposed, perhaps, to death, which permitted of no hesitation; that it contemplated nothing further; that, at the start, the foreign nations had bodies of troops in the vicinity that were easily concentrated; that such action required no joint deliberation among the nations represented and no more than executive orders from each to put their several troops in action; that, having arrived for the rush, the joint command naturally fell to the ranking officer on the spot; that the country invaded had no voice in the matter; and that it was in such a position that it could offer almost no resistance.

(7) America lacks the capacity to contract under its present Constitution. The power to declare war is vested in the federal Congress, and The President and The Senate, to whom the treaty-making power is given, cannot make a binding agreement to enter into a convention under which war could be declared on behalf of America, by some international body, or in any other way.

(8) The reason for having two bodies, the Tribunal and the Council, is not apparent. The qualifications for each would supposedly be the highest. It might be, that great endowments of tact and suavity would be desirable attributes for the members of the Council; but such qualities could never be the determining factors in choosing them, when there would be so many graver considerations and the participation of so many nations would be necessary. Even great powers of persuasion would have no

place, as the members would not be expected to make direct appeals to the people of the aggressor nation, but simply to communicate their advice to the head of its government.

(9) As to the other features, see under "Judicial Court, Non-Justiciable Cases, Conciliation," etc.

The above objections apply to the Bryce plan, save that it contains some undeveloped suggestions as to the enforcement of decrees and the compulsion of nations that had not become parties to the convention, the proposal of The World's Court League, and others as far as they follow that of The League to Enforce Peace.

Mediation, Conciliation, Inquiry

Mediation and Conciliation are admirable neighborly offices and should be encouraged between nations as well as between individuals.

Various attempts are being made to establish conventions under which nations will be obliged, before opening hostilities, to allow others to intercede before them for a given period of time.

The advocates of these plans do not pretend that the latter will operate as positive stops to strifes, but are expedients to be tried prior to hostilities. Should they prove ineffective, war would probably follow, as it is not their endeavor to effect immediate disarmament.

The Dogger Bank Commission was organized under this plan, but it surely cannot be maintained that it affords a test of it, as Russia, already in the throes of a great war and with her European fleet on its way around the world to succor her Oriental fleet, was not in the position to use force back of her remonstrances against the greatest naval

power and at the latter's very threshold, but was obliged to accept such terms as she could negotiate.

It might be that when questions were not of great importance, nations would conform to such a provision by no other persuasion; but, from the moment that the period would begin to run, which of itself would fix a date for the opening of hostilities, could it be imagined that the people of either nation—the great masses of the people that form public opinion—would not begin to occupy themselves to the utmost with the preparations of war? And should no settlement be effected by the expiration of the period, Icould either nation endure the embarrassment which its failure to strike would occasion?

Of course, were arbitration compulsory, there would be no need of mediation and conciliation, as distinct institutions to be accorded a given period of time before the opening of hostilities.

The So-called Bryan Treaties

The treaties for the submission to Commissions, for investigation and report, in cases where the nations do not have recourse to arbitration, and bind themselves not to have resort to force before the report is handed in, is subject to the same objections as the conciliation plan above stated.

The United States Supreme Court as a Model

The Supreme Court of the United States is cited as the model upon which the International Court should be formed.

This Court, however, is not without its weak points:

Foremost, perhaps, is that resulting from the plan of