disputes without war, and they must be introduced simultaneously.

Under this plan, it is maintained, general disarmament would be possible through the adoption of a compulsory court system (preferably arbitral courts, as explained hereafter); the strongest support conceivable for the courts would be the sanction of isolation; and general disarmament would be the condition that would give the high value to this sanction.

If, therefore, the start could be made with general disarmament, this sanction could be applied before any conflagration would get under way; as the least move of a nation to arm, especially were it in conflict with another, would constitute, in itself, a cause for arbitration, to be followed quickly by a decree of non-intercourse.

Under the present conditions, with arms at hand, recourse to them is the first thought when rights are invaded; because, when passion is aroused, the uncontrollable spirits wish immediately to hurl the most destructive weapon at their foe. Were arms not within reach, a sufficient vent for feelings would be found in marshalling the arguments for a deliberate test of right under rules of logic; and passion itself, at the very instant that it began to well up, would be turned off by the simple reflection that the matter was one to be settled by arbitration and award. Individuals in civilized countries now do this; and there is no reason why nations should not conform to the same practice.

[In order to avoid repetition of the arguments and permit of the grouping of them under their respective heads for convenience in reference, the relationship of the

several features of the plan will not be pursued further at this point.]

The Tribunal

No compulsory system of law is conceivable without an executive power vested in some one. It is to be assumed, too, that the nations are not ready to divest themselves of a portion of their sovereignty by placing it in the hands of a World Emperor, or even a World President. If it were suggested that it be reposed in a joint committee, the same objection would apply. Fortunately, the executive duties under the present plan would be so reduced that they could be performed efficiently by a body of such restricted authority, limited to such a short term of service and constituted with so little concern for the persons who would compose it, that the thought of superiority in connection with the office would hardly enter the mind.

Its functions might be limited to inquiries of three descriptions, namely: (1) The refusal of a nation to arbitrate; (2) The refusal of a nation to comply with the decision of a court of arbitration; and (3) The commission of fraud by an arbitrator. Should an affirmative verdict be found in either the first or second of these cases, it would decree that all intercourse should cease between the offending nation and all others, would publish the decree and maintain it until the nation complied. In the third case, it would try the question of fraud only, and, should it find in the affirmative, it would order a retrial before a new board of arbitration.

This body should undoubtedly be the Court at The Hague, acting through a Tribunal composed of a limited number of the Members other than those who had acted

as arbitrators and nationals of the countries involved in the contest, who might be chosen by striking off names from the entire Roll in rotation, in the order in which the nations interested had entered their appearances in the proceedings at the Court.

This body would have no competency to entertain the questions in dispute; the fact to be established would require no lengthy session, possibly but a short sitting; no special fund would be required to execute the decree; and no nation would be obliged to amend its constitution, or organic law, to permit it to conform with the requirements of the decree.

(Regarding the composition of The Court of The Hague, see below, under Sovereignty.)

Arbitration

The institution of arbitration is taken from experience; it is the only course that has been followed where international differences have been adjudicated; many instances of such action are now recorded; and it has given general satisfaction. Almost never has there been a failure in compliance with an award.

Mr. Leon Bourgeois, the head of the French Delegation to the Second Conference of The Hague, reporting for the Committee on the plan for the establishment of a judicial court, nevertheless first stated (italicized by the writer):

"If there are at present no judges at The Hague, it is because the Conference of 1899, taking into consideration the whole field open to arbitration, intended to leave to the parties the duty of choosing their judges, which choice is essential in all cases of peculiar gravity. We should not like to see the court

created in 1899 lose its essential character, and we intend to preserve this freedom in the choice of judges in all cases where no other rule is provided.

"In controversies of a political nature, especially, we think that this way will always be the rule of arbitration and that no nation, large or small, will consent to go before a court of arbitration unless it takes an active part in the appointment of the members composing it."

In fact, it has been generally recognized in the Hague Conventions that it does not concern outside parties how nations settle their differences, if only it is done without using physical violence. One way of deciding may be considered preferable to another, and as long as all nations concerned in the matter agree, any plan can be followed; but, in order to place a nation that refused to proceed in default, it would be necessary to have one formula with the successive steps prescribed, so that the prosecuting nation could show full compliance on its part and clearly establish the default upon the part of its adversary.

In order that the refusing nation might have no just complaint to make of the personnel of the commission to which it is proposed to submit the cause, a plan for the selection of the arbitrators should be adopted which would guarantee the greatest freedom from objection that is conceivable. This requirement would probably be met by the provision that the nations that had appeared in the case at the office of the Clerk of the Court of The Hague, when less than five, might proceed, in rotation, in the order in which they had appeared, to eliminate the names from The Roll of the Members of the Court, of which each nation under the First Convention of The Hague already

has the right to name four, and the impartial members of the commission would be the three or five Members able to attend, whose names would be last stricken from The Roll; or, where five or more nations had appeared, each might nominate a certain number of persons as a panel; and, after the lapse of an interval of time in order to afford the other nations a sufficient opportunity to examine into the character and known sentiments of the persons proposed, continue by striking out in the above manner.

If some nations succeeded thereby in having one more chance to strike out than others, it would be due to their greater promptness in appearing; and the privilege, therefore, would be equally open to all.

The limitation to Members of The Court when less than five nations had appeared in a case, would, in a way, add to the dignity of the office of a Member; but, it would often drive the nations to select the arbitrators themselves, rather than to run the chance of submitting to an arbitration commission composed of the Members remaining after their opponents had had the opportunity of eliminating a considerable number of them. Were more than five nations parties to the contention, it could hardly be expected that they would agree on a selection; and a larger and open panel would afford a compensation.

A Judicial Court

The strongest contention made by the advocates of a Court with a permanent personnel is probably that contained in the instructions of the Secretary of State to the American Delegates to the Second Conference of the Hague: