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clear, what would probably be sufficiently plain from the language above quoted from the instrument, that the contract of August 16, 1910, between Captain Williams and Erickson was made not in behalf of the United States, but in behalf of the State of Washington. An engineer officer of the United States Army was probably selected to represent the State as a matter of convenience, in view of the fact that before acceptance of the finished work by the Government, the approval of the Secretary of War was a necessary prerequisite. But this did not in any wise enlarge the authority of Captain Williams with respect to the performance of the agreement. The act of Congress gave him no authority to act in behalf of the Federal Government with respect to the work of excavating the canal, or making a connection between it and Lake Washington which would necessarily lower the level of that lake. Hence it is a matter of no moment, for present purposes, whether the work for which plaintiff in error was held guilty of contempt of court, and which he claims was done under order of Captain Williams, was within or without the Erickson contract.
We are aware that the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, upon review of the decree in the Bilger suit, held that while the actual work of dredging the canal was done by the State and the County, it was done on behalf of the United States. It was for this reason, in part, that the decree awarding an injunction to restrain the further excavation of the canal was reversed. Bilger v. State, 63 Washington, 457, 467. So far as this view may have influenced the court in declaring the policy of the State, we have no concern with it. But we deem it clear that, under the acts of Congress, no agency for the Federal Government could arise with respect to anything done in the construction of the canal or the lowering of the level of Lake Washington. Neither the fact that the title to the right of way was vested in the United States, nor
the presumed purpose that the Secretary of War should take charge of the work when finished, can override the evident policy of Congress that the canal should be accepted only when completed and ready for use, free of cost to the United States, and that the local interests should do the work of excavation and assume sole responsibility for lowering the level of the water.
Since we are of the opinion that Captain Williams derived no authority from the acts of Congress, it follows that the immunity here asserted with respect to acts done under his command is without legal support. And this renders it unnecessary to consider whether plaintiff in error, being subject to the restraint of the decree of the state court in the Bilger suit as an agent of Erickson, one of the parties thereto, could, without modification of that decree, have successfully claimed immunity for a violation of the restraint upon the plea that he acted under the authority of the Federal Government. Upon this question, therefore, we express no opinion.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA V. STATE OF
MOTION OF THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA FOR LEAVE TO
FILE A SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO THE BILL OF COMPLAINT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA.
No. 2, Original. Argued April 16, 17, 1914.-Decided June 8, 1914.
The ordinary rules of legal procedure applicable to cases between in
dividuals cannot be always applied to controversies between States involving grave questions of law determinable by this court under the exceptional grant of jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution.
In this case the defendant State is permitted to file a supplemental
answer, the averments in which are to be considered as traversed by the complainant State, and the subject matter of the supplemental answer is referred to the Master before whom previous hearings were had with directions to report at the commencement of the next term of this court.
The facts, which involve the procedure and practice in an original case between two States of the Union and the rules to be applied in regard to the filing of a supplemental answer, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. William A. Anderson and Mr. Randolph Harrison, with whom Mr. John B. Moon, Mr. John G. Pollard, Attorney General of the State of Virginia, and Mr. Samuel W. Williams, former Attorney General, were on the brief, for complainant.
Mr. A. A. Lilly, Attorney General of the State of West Virginia, and Mr. John H. Holt, with whom Mr. V. B. Archer and Mr. Charles E. Hogg were on the brief, for defendant.
Mr. Sanford Robinson, with whom Mr. Holmes Conrad was on the brief, for the bondholding creditors.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.
This case, which was begun in 1906, was elaborately argued in 1907 on a demurrer, which was overruled. 206 U. S. 290. It was again argued in 1908 on a motion to appoint a Master 209 U. S. 514. Before that officer there was an extended hearing and a full report of all the matters involved was filed in March, 1910. It was then argued on a motion to take further testimony, and was ultimately heard in an argument which extended many
234 U. S.
Opinion of the Court.
days, every party in interest being represented, in the month of January, 1911.
Notwithstanding these facts when in March, 1911, the court came to decide the controversy, although it fully reviewed and passed upon the fundamental issues, as its obvious duty required it to do, and fixed the principal sum due by the State of West Virginia to the State of Virginia, in view of the consideration due to the parties as States and that the cause was, as then said, “no ordinary commercial suit, but,
a quasi-international difference referred to this court in reliance upon the honor and constitutional obligations of the States concerned rather than upon ordinary remedies,” the controversy was not completely and irrevocably disposed of but was left open for a time not specified to the end that any clerical errors that might have crept into the calculations of the sums due could be corrected and to give the States time to consider the subject of liability for interest in the light of what had been decided and to agree as to the rate and period of the interest to be paid on the principal sum which was determined. 220 U. S. 1, 36.
On the convening of the court in the following October, 1911, a motion was made on behalf of the State of Virginia to proceed at once to a final decree. Listening to the suggestion of the State of West Virginia to the effect that it desired further time to consider the subject, and in view of the public considerations which had prevailed when the decree was entered, the motion of Virginia was overruled. 222 U. S. 17.
Yet further, when in November, 1913, another motion on the part of Virginia was made to set the case down to be finally disposed of at once upon the statement that no agreement between the parties was possible, again giving heed to the request of West Virginia through its constituted officers for a postponement for a stated time and to the statement that they were engaged in an honest en
deavor to deal with the controversy and if possible to come to an agreement as to the subjects left open, the motion of Virginia was again refused, 231 U. S. 89, and as it was possible to give to the State of West Virginia all the time which that State in resisting the motion asked and yet secure against the possibility of the hearing being carried over to another term, the case was assigned for hearing on the thirteenth of April of this year. When that day was reached, the State of West Virginia, in accord with a motion filed some days before, prayed leave to be permitted to file a supplemental answer asserting the existence of credits, which if properly considered would materially reduce the sum fixed as due to the State of Virginia, the said answer in addition asserting various grounds why interest should not be allowed in favor of Virginia and against West Virginia on the sum due. Resisting this request the State of Virginia insists that the items embraced in the supplemental answer asked to be filed had in effect already entered into the considerations by which the principal sum due was fixed, and that if not, the case should not be postponed for the purpose of permitting the rights urged in the answer to be availed of because every item concerning such alleged rights was proved in the case before the Master, was mentioned in his report and was known or could have been known by the use of ordinary diligence by those representing West Virginia. And it is this controversy we now come to dis
Without intimating any opinion whatever as to whether the items with which the proposed supplemental answer deals entered into the processes of calculation or reasoning by which the sum due was previously fixed, and moreover, without intimating any opinion as to how far the items embraced in the answer could serve as credits upon the sum previously found due and therefore to that extent reduce the amount, we think it is obvious that most of the