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items embraced in the answer were contained in the Master's report, and in any event all were available then for every defense now based upon them if their consideration had been pressed in the aspect and with the assertions of right now made.
The question then is, Under these conditions ought the permission to file the supplemental answer be granted? We think it must be conceded that in a case between ordinary litigants the application of the ordinary rules of legal procedure would render it impossible under the circumstances which we have stated to grant the request. We are of the opinion, however, that such concession ought not to be here controlling. As we have pointed out, in acting in this case from first to last the fact that the suit was not an ordinary one concerning a difference between individuals, but was a controversy between States involving grave questions of public law determinable by this court under the exceptional grant of power conferred upon it by the Constitution, has been the guide by which every step and every conclusion hitherto expressed has been controlled. And we are of the opinion that this guiding principle should not now be lost sight of, to the end that when the case comes ultimately to be finally and irrevocably disposed of, as come ultimately it must in the absence of agreement between the parties, there may be no room for the slightest inference that the more restricted rules applicable to individuals have been applied to a great public controversy, or that anything but the largest justice after the amplest opportunity to be heard has in any degree entered into the disposition of the case. This conclusion, which we think is required by the duty owed to the moving State, also in our opinion operates no injustice to the opposing State, since it but affords an additional opportunity to guard against the possibility of error, and thus reach the result most consonant with the honor and dignity of both parties to the controversy.
Opinion of the Court.
234 U. S.
Because of these convictions, we therefore make the following order:
That the motion on the part of the State of West Virginia to file the supplemental answer be and the same is hereby granted; and that the averments in such answer be and the same shall be considered as traversed by the State of Virginia; that the subject matter of the supplemental answer as traversed be at once referred for consideration and report to Charles E. Littlefield, Esq., the Master before whom the previous hearings were had, with directions to hear and consider such evidence and testimony as to the matters set forth in the supplemental answer as the State of West Virginia may deem advisable to proffer and such counter showing on the part of the State of Virginia as that State may deem advisable to make. The report on the subject to embrace the testimony so taken and the conclusions deduced therefrom as well as the views of the Master concerning the operation and effect of the proof thus offered, if any, upon the principal sum found to be due by the previous decree of this court. Nothing in this order to vacate or change in any manner or in any particular the previous decree, and the same to stand wholly unaffected by the order now made or any action taken thereunder until the examination and report herein provided for is made and this court acts upon the same. It is further directed that the proceedings before the Master be so conducted as to secure a report on or before the second Monday of October, 1914.
234 U. S.
Statement of the Case.
MANHATTAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NEW YORK v. COHEN, EXECUTOR.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF TEXAS.
No. 160. Submitted April 17, 1914.-Decided June 8, 1914.
A Federal question may not be imported into a record for the first time by
way of assignment of error made for the purpose of review by this court. As a general rule, for the purpose of review by this court, rights under
the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution are re
quired to be expressly set up and claimed in the court below. Denial of full faith and credit to the statutes of another State cannot
be made the basis of review by this court where it appears that the court below reached the same result that plaintiff contended for on grounds wholly independent of the Federal question and sufficient
to sustain its action. This court has already decided that state statutes, such as that of
Texas imposing a 12% penalty and an attorney's fee, for damages for delay in payment of proper claims, are not unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as depriving life insurance companies of their property without due process of law or as denying them the
equal protection of the law. A payment made by a life insurance company to one of two claimants
on receiving a bond of indemnity, held, under the circumstances of 'this case, not to have been the payment of a stakeholder seeking to discharge his duty but of a person espousing the cause of one claimant against the other and thereby subjecting himself to the legal con
sequences arising from his action. This court cannot review on its merits a case which it must dismiss
for want of jurisdiction.
THE defendant in error was the plaintiff below and sued the Manhattan Life Insurance Company, which we shall speak of as the Company, on two policies on the life of Jacob Cohen in his own favor, written in 1893 in Texas where Cohen resided, the Company then doing business in that State through an agency. It was averred that although the Company had admitted liability on the policies, it had not paid the loss and was therefore responsible
Statement of the Case.
234 U. S.
not only for the sum due insured with interest, but also for 12 per cent. as statutory penalty or damages and $1000.00 attorneys' fees.
The answer denied liability to the plaintiff. It admitted issuing the policies, but averred that in 1907 the insured, Cohen, borrowed $875 on each and pledged the policies as security, which loans were unpaid. It was averred that in July, 1907, Cohen sold to Hilsman, of Atlanta, Georgia, his interest in the policies and executed assignments and orders on the Company to deliver the policies to him on payment of the debts for which they were pledged. These documents were annexed to the answer. The origin and course of the negotiation which ultimated in the assignments were thus stated: Hilsman had an agent at San Antonio, Texas, where Cohen lived. The transactions "were begun" and "definitely agreed upon” between Cohen and the agent, “the agreement being that Hilsman would pay Jacob Cohen $460.00 for his equity in said policies, whereupon Cohen wired Hilsman to send papers, and the following correspondence, by letter and telegram, passed between them.” Hilsman in answer to the first, telegram from Cohen wrote enclosing him assignments of the policy and necessary notices to the Company with directions for their execution and asking besides for certain papers which he required to show Cohen's ownership free from the claims of other persons, the letter ending with the statement, “Send all the papers, that are herewith enclosed, duly executed in a sealed envelope, with this draft attached, (evidently the draft for the price) and upon arrival if in good shape—we will duly honor." Cohen replied by letter explaining that he did not have particular papers which had been asked for, but had others which he thought were their equivalent and proposing to execute the assignment and send these papers, the letter concluding with the statement, "if this meets with your approval please wire me upon receipt of this letter and I
Statement of the Case.
shall forward papers.
Hilsman answered by telegram favorably and confirmed it by letter saying that if the papers were sent, “we will promptly honor the draft, provided the papers are in good shape.” On the day the telegram last referred to was received, Cohen transmitted the executed papers with the accompanying documents by mail saying, "I beg to inclose all documents which I trust you will find correct and will honor my draft for $460.00 attached to these documents.” The answer specifically alleges that the draft was sent from San Antonio for collection through a bank in that place and as the answer states that the draft was attached to the papers and this conformed to the instructions which we have seen were given by Hilsman to Cohen, the answer therefore in effect averred that the papers and draft were delivered to a bank in San Antonio to be transmitted to Atlanta, the papers to be delivered to Hilsman if after examination he found the papers satisfactory and paid the draft. The answer then in paragraph 8 contained the following averments:
“Said Jacob Cohen, Hilsman and his said agent were engaged in speculative transactions, and said assignments were made as a part of and in connection with a certain transaction in what is commonly called 'cotton futures,' the money being paid to and received and used by Jacob Cohen to speculate in the future price of cotton, without its being contemplated that there would be actual delivery thereof, or bargain and sale, the said Hilsman or his said agent, being interested in the transaction, and the purpose of the transaction being known by all the parties, which purpose was carried into effect, through the said agency of J. H. Hilsman and J. H. Hilsman he being engaged in the brokerage business.'
It was averred that after the death of Cohen both his executor and Hilsman, as owners of the policies, made demand upon the Company for payment; that the Company admitted liability to some one and simply professed its