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Opinion of the Court.
country" was defined, for the purposes of that act, as meaning land to which the Indian title had not been extinguished. At the making of the treaty, therefore, the restriction respecting the liquor traffic was in force within the ceded area, because until then the Indian title had not been extinguished. It was the evident purpose of Article VII to continue the restriction in force in the ceded territory, notwithstanding the extinguishment of the Indian title. Such stipulations were not unusual. A contemporaneous treaty with the Winnebagoes contained a similar one. 10 Stat. 1172, 1174, Article VIII. And it has been uniformly recognized that such stipulations amount in effect to an amendment of the statute, so as to make the restriction effective throughout the ceded territory. United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U. S. 188, 196; Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204, 208.
The fundamental contention that underlies the entire argument for complainants is that the first part of Article VII had for its object that the laws of Congress, present and future, regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, were to continue and be in force within the reservations created by the treaty; while the latter portion of the Article had for its object to keep in force in the ceded country-which, it is said, excludes the reservations those portions of the laws that prohibited the introduction, manufacture, use of, and traffic in ardent spirits, etc., in the Indian country until otherwise provided by Congress; the particular insistence being that the latter clause applies merely to the so-called ceded territory, and not to the lands included within the reservations.
With this construction of the treaty we cannot agree. We think it rests upon a misconception of the fair import of the terms employed in Article VII, whether considered alone or together with the context, and fails to give due effect to the reason and spirit of the stipulation.
It seems to us that in the qualifying clause “within
Opinion of the Court.
the entire boundaries of the country herein ceded to the United States";-the words "entire boundaries" are equivalent to "outer boundaries," and therefore include the reservations that lie within. And this agrees with the context; for, if we turn back to see what is "herein ceded," we find, that by the terms of Article I the cession is of all the right, title, and interest of the Indians in the lands owned and claimed by them included within designated boundaries (this being the great tract in question), and then, in a separate clause, a relinquishment and conveyance of all right, title, and interest of the Indians in any other lands in the Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere. There is here no suggestion that the reservations are excepted out of the cession. On the contrary, Article I in terms vests the Indian title in the United States as to all the described lands, including the reservations mentioned in Article II. The latter article reserves a number of comparatively small and isolated tracts "for the permanent homes of the said Indians." Of these, all are within the outer boundaries of the cession excepting the Mille Lac Reservation, which lies outside. Reading the two articles together, it is evident that the framers of the treaty intended that the reservations themselves should become the property of the United States, subject only to a trust for the occupancy of the Indians. This is placed beyond controversy when we observe that by the latter part of Article II it was provided that the President of the United States might cause the reservations or portions thereof to be surveyed; assign a reasonable quantity, not exceeding eighty acres in any case, to each head of a family or single person over twenty-one years of age for his or their separate use; issue patents for the tracts so assigned, which tracts were to be exempt from taxation, levy, sale, or forfeiture, and not to be aliened or leased for a longer period than two years at one time, unless otherwise provided by the legislature of the State with the
234 U. S.
Opinion of the Court.
assent of Congress; not to be sold or aliened in fee for a period of five years after the date of patent, and not then without the assent of the President; and that prior to the issue of the patents the President might make rules and regulations respecting the disposition of the lands in case of the death of the allottee, etc.
The subdivision of the reservations, allotments to individual Indians, and the ultimate alienation of allotments, being thus in view at the making of the treaty, it is unreasonable to give such a construction to the stipulation contained in the second portion of Article VII as would defeat its object, by removing the restriction from scattered parcels of land whenever it should come to pass that the Indian title therein was extinguished. The restriction would be of little force unless it covered the entire ceded area en bloc, so that no change in the situation of the reservations by way of extinguishing the residue of Indian title or otherwise should operate to limit its effect. And so, upon the whole, we deem it manifest that the second clause of Article VII dealt with the entire ceded country, including the reservations, as country proper to be subjected to the laws relating to the introduction, etc., of liquor into the Indian country until otherwise provided by Congress. It was evidently contemplated that the bands of Indians, while making their permanent homes within the reservations, would be at liberty to roam and to hunt throughout the entire country, as before. The purpose was to guard them from all temptation to use intoxicating liquors.
That it is within the constitutional power of Congress to prohibit the manufacture, introduction, or sale of intoxicants upon Indian lands, including not only lands reserved for their special occupany, but also lands outside of the reservations to which they may naturally resort; and that this may be done even with respect to lands lying within the bounds of a State, are propositions so
Opinion of the Court.
thoroughly established, and upon grounds so recently discussed, that we need merely cite the cases. Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 483; United States v. Fortythree Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U. S. 188, 195, 197; Dick v. United States, 208 U. S. 340.
And we cannot agree with the District Court that Article VII of the treaty of 1855 was repealed by the Minnesota Enabling Act, or by the admission of that State into the Union upon equal terms with the other States. Neither the Enabling Act nor the Act of Admission contains any reference to the treaty, although the latter was so recent that it can hardly have been overlooked. The court seems to have considered that the continued existence of Article VII, so far as it prohibited the introduction, manufacture, and sale of liquors within the ceded country outside of the reservations, was inconsistent with the "equal footing" clause of the Enabling and Admitting Acts. That there is no such inconsistency results very plainly, as we think, from the reasoning and authority of the cases above cited. The court deemed that United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, supra, and Dick v. United States, supra, were distinguishable upon the ground that in each of those cases the treaty under consideration was made after the State had been admitted into the Union. But if the making of such a treaty after the admission of the State is not inconsistent with the "equal footing" of that State with the others— as, of course, it is not-it seems to us to result that there is nothing in the effect of "equal footing" clauses to operate as an implied repeal of such a treaty when previously established.
234 U. S.
In Ex parte Webb, 225 U. S. 663, we had to deal with the effect of the Oklahoma Enabling Act (June 16, 1906, c. 3335, 34 Stat. 267) upon a previous statute (act of March 1, 1895, c. 145, § 8, 28 Stat. 693, 697), which prohibited (inter alia), the "carrying into said [Indian] Terri
Opinion of the Court.
tory any of such liquors or drinks," in view of the fact that the Enabling Act itself required that the constitution of the new State should prohibit the manufacture, sale, or otherwise furnishing of intoxicating liquors within that part of the State formerly known as the Indian Territory; and we held that in view of the existing treaties between the United States and the Five Civilized Tribes, and because the Enabling Act and the constitution established thereunder dealt only with the prohibition of the liquor traffic within the bounds of the new State, the act of 1895 remained in force so far as pertained to the carrying of liquor from without the new State into that part of it which was the Indian Territory.
In United States v. Wright, 229 U. S. 226, we held that the prohibition against the introduction of intoxicating liquors into the Indian country found in § 2139, Rev. Stat., as amended by the acts of July 23, 1892, c. 234, 27 Stat. 260, and January 30, 1897, c. 109, 29 Stat. 506, was not repealed, with respect to intrastate transactions, by the Oklahoma Enabling Act, in spite of the provision respecting internal prohibition contained therein as already mentioned.
Upon the whole, we have no difficulty in concluding that Article VII of the Treaty of February 22, 1855, was not repealed by the admission of Minnesota into the Union.
We come, therefore, to the principal contention of complainants and appellees, which is that the Article was repealed by the effect of the Treaties of 1865 and 1867. The argument in support of this contention may be outlined as follows: that by the earliest of the three treaties the several bands of Indians ceded to the United States the great tract of approximately 21,000 square miles, but excepted from that cession the several reservations created for the Mississippi bands and for the Pillager and Lake Winnibigoshish bands; that when the Treaty of 1865 was