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Opinion of the Court.

in Kentucky, but might there receive payment in money, checks or drafts. They might take notes of customers, which notes were made payable, and doubtless were collected, at any bank in Kentucky. This course of conduct of authorized agents within the State in our judgment constituted a doing of business there in such wise that the Harvester Company might be fairly said to have been there, doing business, and amenable to the process of the courts of the State.

234 U. S.

It is argued that this conclusion is in direct conflict with the case of Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 205 U. S. 530. We have no desire to depart from that decision, which, however, was an extreme case. There the Railway Company, carrying on no business in Pennsylvania, other than that hereinafter mentioned, and having its organization and tracks in another State, was sought to be held liable in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by service upon one Heller, who was described as an agent of the corporation. As incidental and collateral to its business proper the Company solicited freight and passenger traffic in other parts of the country than those through which its tracks ran. For that purpose it employed Heller, who had an office in Philadelphia, where he was known as district freight and passenger agent, to procure passengers and freight to be transported over the Company's line. He had clerks and travelling passenger and freight agents who reported to him. He sold no tickets and received no payment for the transportation of freight, but took the money of those desiring to purchase tickets and procured from one of the railroads running west from Philadelphia a ticket for Chicago and a prepaid order which gave the holder the right to receive from the Company in Chicago a ticket over its road. Occasionally he sold to railroad employés, who already had tickets over intermediate lines, orders for reduced rates over the Company's line.

Opinion of the Court.

In some cases for the convenience of shippers who had received bills of lading from the initial line for goods routed over the Company's line, he exchanged bills of lading over its line, which were not in force until the freight had been actually received by the Company. Summarizing these facts, Mr. Justice Moody, speaking for the court, said (p. 533): "The business shown in this case was in substance nothing more than that of solicitation. Without undertaking to formulate any general rule defining what transactions will constitute 'doing business' in the sense that liability to service is incurred, we think that this is not enough to bring the defendant within the district so that process can be served upon it."

234 U.S.

In the case now under consideration there was something more than mere solicitation. In response to the orders received, there was a continuous course of shipment of machines into Kentucky. There was authority to receive payment in money, check or draft, and to take notes payable at banks in Kentucky.

It is further contended that as enforced by the decision of the Kentucky court the law, in its relation to interstate commerce, operates to burden that commerce. It is argued that a corporation engaged in purely interstate commerce within a State cannot be required to submit to regulations such as designating an agent upon whom process may be served as a condition of doing such business, and that as such requirement cannot be made the ordinary agents of the corporation, although doing interstate business within the State, cannot by its laws be made amenable to judicial process within the State. The contention comes to this, so long as a foreign corporation engages in interstate commerce only it is immune from the service of process under the laws of the State in which it is carrying on such business. This is indeed, as was said by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, a novel proposition, and we are unable to

Opinion of the Court..

find a decision to support it, nor has one been called to our attention.

234 U. S.

True, it has been held time and again that a State cannot burden interstate commerce or pass laws which amount to the regulation of such commerce; but this is a long way from holding that the ordinary process of the courts may not reach corporations carrying on business within the State which is wholly of an interstate commerce character. Such corporations are within the State, receiving the protection of its laws, and may, and often do, have large properties located within the State. In Davis v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 217 U. S. 157, this court held that cars engaged in interstate commerce and credits due for interstate transportation are not immune from seizure under the laws of the State regulating garnishment and attachment because of their connection with interstate commerce, and it was recognized that the States may pass laws enforcing the rights of citizens which affect interstate commerce but fall short of regulating such commerce in the sense in which the Constitution gives sole jurisdiction to Congress, citing Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103; Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 23; Pennsylvania:R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477; and The Winnebago, 205 U. S. 354, 362, in which this court sustained a lien under the laws of Michigan on a vessel designed to be used in both foreign and domestic trade.

In International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, it was held that a law of Kansas which required the filing by a foreign corporation engaged in interstate commerce of a statement of its financial condition as a prerequisite of the right to do such business and which required a certificate from the Secretary of State showing that such statements had been filed as a condition precedent to the right of the corporation to maintain a suit in that State, was void. But that case did not hold, as we should be


required to do to sustain the contention of the plaintiff in error in this case, that the fact that the corporation was carrying on interstate commerce business through duly authorized agents made it exempt from suit within the State by service upon such agents.

234 U.S.

We are satisfied that the presence of a corporation within a State necessary to the service of process is shown when it appears that the corporation is there carrying on business in such sense as to manifest its presence within the State, although the business transacted may be entirely interstate in its character. In other words, this fact alone does not render the corporation immune from the ordinary process of the courts of the State.

It follows that the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky must be




No. 298. Argued April 24, 1914.-Devided June 22, 1914.

Where the state court has denied a motion to quash the service of process on a foreign corporation, and has also held that the statute on which the action is based is not unconstitutional, both the question of validity of the service and that of the constitutionality of the act are before this court for review.

International Harvester Company v. Kentucky, ante, p. 579, followed to effect that the plaintiff in error was doing business in the State in which process was served.

International Harvester Company v. Kentucky, ante, p. 216, followed to the effect that the provision of the anti-trust statute of Kentucky

Opinion of the Court.

under which this suit was brought is unconstitutional under the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. 149 Kentucky, 41, reversed.

234 U.S.

THE facts, which involve the sufficiency of service of process upon a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Kentucky and also the constitutionality of the anti-trust act of Kentucky, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Alexander Pope Humphrey and Mr. Edgar A. Bancroft, with whom Mr. Victor A. Remy was on the brief, for plaintiff in error in this case and in No. 297.1

Mr. Charles Carroll, with whom Mr. James Garnett, Attorney General of the State of Kentucky, Mr. Frank E. Daugherty, Mr. J. R. Mallory, Mr. J. C. Dedman, Mr. C. R. Hill and Mr. C. D. Florence, were on the brief, for defendant in error in this case and in No. 297.1

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

A penal action was instituted by the defendant in error against the plaintiff in error in the Boyle Circuit Court of Kentucky under the anti-trust laws of that State. Summons having been served upon an alleged agent of the plaintiff in error, it filed a motion to quash the return for the reason, as alleged, that the person upon whom service had been made was not the authorized agent of the plaintiff in error and that it was not doing business in Kentucky. The facts in this case which are identical with those set out in the previous case, International Harvester Company of America v. The Commonwealth of Kentucky, just decided, ante, p. 579, show that the plaintiff in error had prior to the commencement of this action revoked the authority of an agent designated by it in com

1 For abstracts of arguments see ante, p. 579.

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