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that some limit be set to the privilege of amendments. The amendments now presented are offered without explanation or excuse, and in the main are unsubstantial, and would not change the opinion of the court on the merits of the case.' Having said this, the court proceeded to analyze the amendments and show their lack of merit and insufficiency to bring about a different conclusion if they had been filed. The decision relied upon to sustain this contention is Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, asserting lack of due process in the entry of a decree for the plaintiff, after having stricken out the defendant's answer, because he was guilty of contempt in neglecting to pay into court a certain sum of money. This was a total denial of the right of defense, upon an insufficient ground. In that case, the action of the court was arbitrary and oppressive. Here, the plaintiff had been allowed a hearing. He had filed an original and two amended bills and had no doubt had opportunity to tender the third amended bill long before the submission of the cause. It is certainly competent for a court to say, within reasonable limits, what amounts to a compliance with its rules and the principles of law, respecting the order and limitations of proceedings in a case. Besides, in the opinion of the court, the proposed amendment would not have changed the character of the plaintiff's claim, nor relieved the contract of its infirmity. An erroneous decision in respect to either of these matters would not amount to a denial of due process of law. As to them, it is not a case in which the plaintiff has had no day in court.'
For present purposes it is sufficient to say that there is nothing upon the face of the record to indicate that the refusal of the Virginia court to entertain complainant's third amended bill was arbitrary or unlawful, or otherwise inconsistent with the “due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that there is nothing to show that in the Virginia court complainant based his right to
file a third amended bill upon the Fourteenth Amendment; and that if he had in fact set up such a right in the Virginia court and it had been there denied, his proper mode of obtaining a review of the Federal question would have been by prosecuting a writ of error under $ 709, Rev. Stat. ($ 237, Jud. Code) to review the judgment of the court of last resort of Virginia, and not by attacking the judgment collaterally upon that ground when it was invoked against him in the courts of West Virginia.
With respect to the third assignment of error, it is contended that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to give full faith and credit to the objection interposed by plaintiff in error to the plea of res adjudicata based upon the decrees -rendered in the Virginia case of Roller v. Murray, the objection being based upon the record in the case of Chesapeake-Western Company v. Roller, a subsequent decision in the Virginia courts, which, it is contended, overruled the decision in the first Virginia suit so far as it tended to debar plaintiff in error from suing upon a quantum meruit. It appears that the decision in the Chesapeake-Western Company Case was to dissolve an injunction that had been issued against the prosecution of the West Virginia suit. Its effect as res adjudicata was denied by the West Virginia court (71 W. Va. 172), upon the ground that it was not a final decree. It is now contended that subsequent to the decree dissolving the injunction a final decree was rendered in the same cause which in effect concluded the merits. We find nothing in the record, however, to show that any such contention was presented to the West Virginia courts.
Since we are unable to find that any substantial question of Federal right was raised by plaintiff in error in the courts of West Virginia and there decided against him, it follows that the writ of error must be
Opinions Per Curiam, Etc.
OPINIONS PER CURIAM, ETC., FROM APRIL 6,
TO JUNE 22, 1914.
No. 887. CLINCHFIELD COAL CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. R. L. MANESS. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted March 23, 1914. Decided April 6, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454; Preston v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 447. Mr. John W. Price and Mr. J. Norman Powell for the plaintiff in error. Mr. Isaac Harr and Mr. Robert Burrow for the defendant in error.
No. — Original. Ex parte: IN THE MATTER OF G. & C. MERRIAM COMPANY, PETITIONER. Submitted March 23, 1914. Decided April 6, 1914. Motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus denied. Mr. William B. Hale for the petitioner.
No. 244. CHICAGO, Rock ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. PINE TREE LUMBER COMPANY, LIMITED. In error to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of Louisiana. Submitted March 9, 1914. Decided April 6, 1914. Judgment affirmed with costs by an equally divided court. Mr. Thomas S. Buzbee for the plaintiff in error. Mr. Walter Elder for the defendant in error.
No. 418. NORTHERN TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE, ETC., PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
Opinions Per Curiam, Etc.
OF ILLINOIS. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted March 16, 1914. Decided April 13, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Hazeltine v. Central Bank of Missouri, 183 U. S. 130; M. & K. Interurban Railway Co. v. Olathe, 222 U. S. 185; Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 226 U. S. 99; Pons v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. R. Co., 232 U. S. 720. Mr. Samuel Alschuler and Mr. Charles R. Holden for the plaintiff in error. Mr. Patrick J. Lucey and Mr. Lester H. Strawn for the defendant in error
No. 879. THOMAS W. SYNNOTT, ETC., APPELLANT, v. THE TOMBSTONE CONSOLIDATED MINES COMPANY, LIMITED, ETC. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Motion to dismiss or affirm submitted April 6, 1914. Decided April 13, 1914. Per Curiam.
Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon authority of: 1. Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, 234235; Tefft, Weller & Co. v. Munsuri; 222 U. S. 114, 118; 2. Chapman v. Bowen, 207 U. S. 89, 91; Calnan Co. v. Doherty, 224 U. S. 145, 147; 3. Conboy v. First National Bank of Jersey City, 203 U. S. 141, 144-145. Mr. Amos L. Taylor for the appellant. Mr. Aldis B. Browne, Mr. Alexander Britton, Mr. Evans Browne, Mr. Everett E. Ellinwood and Mr. John Mason Ross for the appellee.
No. 1000. HENRY E. MEEKER, SURVIVING PARTNER, ETC., PETITIONER, v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD COM
No. 1001. HENRY E. MEEKER, PETITIONER, v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY. Petitions submitted April 6,
Opinions Per Curiam, Etc.
1914. Decided April 13, 1914. Per Curiam. Petitions for writs of certiorari granted, upon the authority of § 262 of the Judicial Code; In re Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 462; Whitney v. Dick, 202 U. S. 132; McClellan v. Garland, 217 U. S. 268; United States v. Beatty, 232 U. S. 463, 467. Mr. William A. Glasgow, Jr., for the petitioner. No appearance for the respondent. Mr. Joseph W. Folk and Mr. Charles W. Needham filed a brief for The Interstate Commerce Commission.
No. Original. Ex parte: IN THE MATTER OP HENRY H. EVANS, PETITIONER. Submitted April 6, 1914. Decided April 13, 1914. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of mandamus denied. Mr. Albert J. Hopkins for the petitioner.
No. — Original. Ex parte: IN THE MATTER OF JOHN DENNETT, JR., ET AL., PETITIONERS. Submitted April 13, 1914. Decided April 20, 1914. Motion for leave to file petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus denied. Mr. William M. Seabury for the petitioners.
No. 806. Louis W. PRENICA, ETC., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. May BULGER. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska. Motion to dismiss submitted April 20, 1914. Decided April 27, 1914. Per Curiam. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the authority of: 1. Consol. Turnpike v. Norfolk &c. Ry. Co., 228 U. S. 596, 600, and cases cited; 2. De Bary & Co. v. Louisiana, 227 U. S. 108, and cases cited. Mr. William C. Prentiss and Mr. Walter L. Clark for the plaintiffs in error. Mr. W. T. Thompson for the defendant in error.