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Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Friday, 232 U. S. 694, followed in Schmidt v. Bank
of Commerce, 64.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601, followed in Carlson v.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 233 U. S. 80, followed in Cincinnati North-
ern Ry. Co. v. Dillon, 753.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Carson, 194 U. S. 136, followed in Cincinnati North-
ern Ry. Co. v. Dillon, 753.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Gadd, 233 U. S. 572, followed in Cincinnati Northern
Ry. Co. v. Dillon, 753.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, followed in Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. v. Harris, 412.
Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158 U. S. 240, followed in Lane v. Watts, 525.
Sun Printing Asso. v. Moore, 183 U. S. 642, followed in United States v.
United Engineering Co., 236.
Taney v. Penn Bank, 232 U. S. 174, followed in Dale v. Pattison, 399.
Tap Line Cases, 234 U. S. 1, followed in United States v. Butler County
R. R. Co., 29.
Tefft, Weller & Co. v. Munsuri, 222 U. S. 114, followed in Synnott v.
Tombstone Cons. Mines Co., 749.
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Louisiana Railroad Commission, 232 U. S.
338, followed in Gilson v. United States, 380.
The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, followed in Atlantic Transport Co. v.
Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521, followed in Ocampo v. United
United States v. Beatty, 232 U. S. 463, followed in Meeker v. Lehigh Val-
ley R. R. Co., 749.
United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, followed in Tap
Line Cases, 1.
United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, followed in United States v. Buf-
falo Pitts Co., 228.
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 112, followed in Lewiston v.
Whitney v. Dick, 202 U. S. 132, followed in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley
R. R. Co., 749.
Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co. v. Greenwood Grocery Co., 227 U. S. 1, followed
in Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Beatty, 753.
York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15, followed in Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v.
Zeller v. New Jersey, 231 U. S. 737, followed in Egan v. New Jersey, 751.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 2.
See PLEDGE, 1.
See INDIANS, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11.
CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED STATES.
1. Tucker Act; conclusiveness of findings of fact; questions open in this
In cases brought under the Tucker Act and coming to this court from
a District or Circuit Court the findings of fact of the trial court are
conclusive, and the question here, unless the record would warrant
the conclusion that the ultimate facts are not supported by any
evidence whatever, is whether the conclusions of law are warranted
by the facts found. (Chase v. United States, 155 U. S. 489.)
United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 228.
2. Tucker Act; jurisdiction under; implied contract on part of Government.
Where property is left with the officer of the Government who has
charge of the work by the owner relying upon the fact that his title
is not disputed and upon representations made to him that pay-
ment would be recommended for such use, and Congress has given
authority to appropriate property necessary for the particular
work and to pay therefor, there is an implied contract on the part
of the Government to pay for the property and jurisdiction exists
under the Tucker Act. United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, fol-
lowed, and Harley v. United States, 198 U. S. 229, distinguished.
See INDIANS, 4.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25, 26, 27, 30-34;
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS, 2;
CLOUD ON TITLE.
See ACTIONS, 1;
JURISDICTION, C 1, 2, 3;
LOCAL LAW (Miss.).
See PUBLIC LANDS, 1.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 38;
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 1, 4;
PUBLIC LANDS, 4, 20.
See LOCAL LAW (Tenn.).
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 24, 26;
RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-9, 12;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 10, 11;
See BILLS AND NOTES.
See LOCAL LAW (Ohio).
COMMISSIONER OF LAND OFFICE.
See ACTIONS, 1;
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 22, 23, 24.
1. What constitutes; conversion of plant facility into.
Although a railroad may have originally been a mere plant facility,
after it has been acquired by a common carrier duly organized un-
der the law of the State and performing service as such and regu-
lated and operated under competent authority, it is no longer a
plant facility but a public institution, even though the owner of the
industry of which it formerly was an appendage is the principal
shipper of freight thereover. Tap Line Cases, 1.
2. What constitutes; test as to character of railroad.
The extent to which a railroad is in fact used does not determine
whether it is or is not a common carrier, but the right of the public
to demand service of it. Ib.
3. What constitutes; railroads as.
Railroads owned by corporations properly organized under the laws of
the State in which they are and treated as common carriers by the
State, authorized to exercise eminent domain, dealt with as com-
mon carriers by other railroad corporations, and engaged in carry-
ing for hire goods of those who see fit to employ them, are common
carriers for all purposes, and cannot be treated as such as to the
general public and not as to those who have a proprietary interest
in the corporations owning them. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19, 39;
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT;
See FERRIES, 1, 2.
See ECCLESIASTICAL BODIES.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 3, 5;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 5, 6, 7, 15, 25.
CONGRESS, ACTS OF.
See ACTS OF CONGRESS.
CONGRESS, POWERS OF.
Legislative discretion; evidence that, problem not beyond.
The fact that there has been a recent communication and recommenda-
tion from the President to Congress on a particular subject and
Congress has not acted thereon is evidence that the problem is not
so entirely obvious of solution that the courts can declare it to be
beyond the range of legislative discretion. Johnson v. Gearlds, 422.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-5; INDIANS, 7, 8, 10;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1-4, 7, 9,
14, 16, 23, 34.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 20.
1. What constitutes.
An act, harmless when done by one person, may become a public wrong
when done by many acting in concert in pursuance of a conspiracy.
(Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U. S. 433.) Eastern
States Lumber Asso. v. United States, 600.
2. Proof of; inference from things done.
Conspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct testimony and a
conspiracy to accomplish that which is their natural consequence
"may be inferred from the things actually done. Ib.
See RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 1.
1. Commerce clause; what within; ferries.
Transportation between States and foreign countries is within the
protection of the constitutional grant to Congress, and this includes
transportation by ferry. (Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114
U. S. 196.) Sault Ste Marie v. International Transit Co., 333.
2. Commerce clause; object of; dominant power of Congress.
The object of the commerce clause was to prevent interstate trade from
being destroyed or impeded by the rivalries of local governments;
and it is the essence of the complete and paramount power con-
fided to Congress to regulate interstate commerce that wherever
it exists it dominates. Houston & Texas Ry. Co. v. United States,
3. Commerce clause; dominant power of Congress.
Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so
related that the government of the one involves and controls the
other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe
the final and dominant rule; otherwise the Nation would not be
supreme within the National field. Ib.
4. Commerce clause; dominant power of Congress; incidental control of
While Congress does not possess authority to regulate the internal
commerce of a State, as such, it does possess power to foster and
protect interstate commerce, although in taking necessary meas-