ures so to do it may be necessary to control intrastate transactions
of interstate carriers. Ib.
5. Commerce clause; paramount authority of Congress.
Although there is gravity in any question presented when state and
Federal views conflict, it has been recognized from the beginning
that this Nation could not prosper if interstate and foreign trade
were governed by many masters; and where the freedom of such
commerce is involved the judgment of Congress and the agencies it
lawfully established must control. Ib.
6. Commerce clause; validity of state statute attempting to regulate conduct
of telegraph companies.
The statute of South Carolina making mental anguish caused by the
negligent non-delivery of a telegram a cause of action is, as applied
to telegrams the negligent non-delivery of which occurred in the
District of Columbia, an unconstitutional attempt to regulate con-
duct within territory wholly under the jurisdiction of the United
States; such statute is also unconstitutional, as to messages sent
from that State to be delivered in another State, as an attempt to
regulate interstate commerce. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown,
542.
7. Commerce clause; validity of state police regulation incidentally affecting
interstate commerce.
A state police regulation designed to promote the payment of small but
well founded claims and to discourage litigation in respect thereto,
and which only incidentally includes claims arising out of interstate
commerce, does not constitute a direct burden on interstate com-
merce, and is not, in the absence of legislation by Congress on the
subject, repugnant to the commerce clause or otherwise in conflict
with Federal authority. (Atlantic Coast Line v. Mazursky, 216
U. S. 122.) Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 412.
8. Commerce clause; validity of Texas statute allowing attorney fee in cases
of claims for loss on interstate shipments.
The Texas statute of 1909 allowing a reasonable attorney's fee as a
part of the costs in suits on contested but proper claims of less than
$200 is not unconstitutional as applied to claims for loss on inter-
state shipments, nor is it inconsistent with any of the provisions
of the Act to Regulate Commerce. Ib.
9. Commerce clause; rights secured by; effect of refusal of state court to
allow filing of amended pleading averring indirect effect on interstate
The State has full authority over shipments purely intrastate, and an
averment that a service required at one point as to intrastate ship-
ments might be required at other points in regard to interstate
shipments only avers an indirect effect upon interstate commerce;
and a defendant carrier denied leave to file an amended pleading
to that effect is not deprived of rights secured by the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution. Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co. v. Higdon, 592.
See INFRA, 12;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
10. Contract impairment; effect of change of decision of state court.
A change in decision of the state court in reference to the scope of a
state statute held, in this case, not to be a law impairing the obliga-
tion of a contract. Moore-Mansfield Co. v. Electrical Co., 619.
Delegation of power.-See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 34.
11. Due process and equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of state
statutes penalizing delay in payment of proper claims.
This court has already decided that state statutes, such as that of
Texas imposing a 12% penalty and an attorney's fee, for damages
for delay in payment of proper claims, are not unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment as depriving life insurance com-
panies of their property without due process of law or as denying
them the equal protection of the law. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v.
Cohen, 123.
12. Due process; equal protection; interstate commerce; validity of Georgia
Locomotive Headlight Law.
The statute of Georgia of 1908, Civil Code, §§ 2697, 2698, requiring
railroad companies to use locomotive headlights of specified form
and power, is not unconstitutional either as a denial of equal pro-
tection of the law, as deprivation of property without due process
of law, or as an interference with interstate commerce. Atlantic
Coast Line v. Georgia, 280.
13. Due process of law; what constitutes; distinction between actions in
personam and in rem in service of process.
In determining what is due process of law within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, there is a distinction between actions in
personam and actions in rem; in the former judgments without per-
sonal service within the State are devoid of validity either within or
without the State but in the latter the judgment although based
on service by publication may be valid so far as it affects property
within the State. (Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714.) Grannis v.
Ordean, 385.
14. Due process of law; fundamental requisite; effect of misnomer in
process.
While the fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportu-
nity to be heard, that does not impose an unattainable standard of
accuracy; and a defendant served with process either personally,
or by publication and mailing, in which his name is misspelled can-
not safely ignore it on account of the misnomer. Ib.
15. Due process of law; accuracy required as to names.
The general rule in cases of constructive service of process by publica-
tion tends to strictness, but even in names due process of law does
not require ideal accuracy. Ib.
16. Due process of law; constructive notice by publication; effect of mis-
nomer; test as to sufficiency of summons.
In constructive service of process by publication and mailing where
there has been a misnomer, neither the test of idem sonans nor that
of substantial similarity in appearance in print is the true one; but
whether the summons as published and mailed complies with the
law of the State so as to give sufficient constructive notice to the
party mis-named. Ib.
17. Due process of law; constructive notice by publication; effect of mis-
In this case, held, that a summons in an action of foreclosure based on
publication and mailing otherwise in strict compliance with the
state statute did not deprive a defendant of his property without
due process of law because his name was misspelled Albert Guil-
fuss, assignee, in the various papers instead of correctly, Albert B.
Geilfuss, assignee. Ib.
18. Due process and equal protection of the law; validity of state statute
allowing attorney fee in certain cases.
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, followed to effect
that the Texas Statute of 1909 allowing an attorney fee in certain
cases for claims of less than a specified amount is not unconstitu-
tional under the due process or equal protection provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harris,
412.
19. Due process of law; validity of provision of Hepburn Act requiring oil
carrying pipe lines to become common carriers.
The provision in Hepburn Act requiring persons or corporations en-
gaged in interstate transportation of oil by pipe lines to become
common carriers and subject to the provisions of the Act to Regu-
late Commerce is not unconstitutional either as to future pipe
lines or as to the owners of existing pipe lines as depriving them of
their property without due process of law. The Pipe Line Cases,
548.
20. Due process of law; violation by state penal statute which prescribes
no standard of conduct possible to know.
A state penal statute which prescribes no standard of conduct that it
is possible to know violates the fundamental principles of justice
embodied in the conception of due process of law. Collins v. Ken-
tucky, 634; Malone v. Kentucky, 639.
21. Due process of law; violation of laws of Kentucky relative to pooling
of crops.
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, ante, p. 216, followed to the
effect that the provisions in regard to pooling crops in chapter 117
of the Laws of Kentucky of 1906 as amended by chapter 8 of the
Laws of 1908, as construed by the courts of that State, in connec-
tion with the anti-trust act of 1890 and § 198 of the Kentucky con-
stitution of 1891, do not prescribe any standard of conduct, and
therefore amount to a denial of due process of law under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Ib.
22. Due process of law; validity of stockholders' liability law of Minnesota.
The legislation of Minnesota with respect to the liability of stock-
holders, as construed by the courts of that State, has heretofore
been reviewed and its constitutional validity upheld by this court
in Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, and Converse v. Hamilton,
224 U. S. 243. Selig v. Hamilton, 652.
23. Eminent domain; implied promise on part of Government to pay for
property taken.
When in the exercise of its governmental rights it takes property, the
ownership of which it concedes to be in an individual, the United
States, under the constitutional obligation of the Fifth Amend-
ment, impliedly promises to pay therefor. United States v. Lynah,
188 U. S. 445, 464, followed. Hooe v. United States, 218 U. S 322,
distinguished. United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 228.
24. Equal protection of the law; effect of state statute prohibiting all com-
binations, good and bad.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude the State from adopting
a policy against all combinations of competing corporations and
enforcing it even against combinations which have been induced by
good intentions and from which benefit and not injury may have
resulted. International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 199.
25. Equal protection of the law; power of classification; effect of inequality.
The power of classification which may be exerted in the legislation of
States has a very broad range; and a classification is not invalid
under the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because of simple inequality. Ib.
26. Equal protection of the law; classification; reasonableness of; Missouri
anti-trust Laws of 1899, 1909.
A state statute prohibiting combination is not unconstitutional as
denying equal protection of the law because it embraces vendors of
commodities and not vendors of labor and services. There is a
reasonable basis for such a classification; and so held as to the Mis-
souri anti-trust Laws of 1899 and 1909. Ib.
27. Equal protection of the law; classification; reasonableness.
As classification must be accommodated to the problems of legislation;
it may depend upon degree of evil so long as it is not unreasonable
or arbitrary. Ib.
28. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of compelling one to guess
as to market value of commodity.
An anti-trust criminal law may not necessarily be unconstitutional
merely because it throws upon men the risk of rightly estimating
what is an undue restraint of trade, but to compel a man to guess
what the fair market value of commodities manufactured or sold
by him would be under other than existing conditions is beyond
constitutional limits. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 216.
29. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of provisions of Kentucky
anti-trust laws.
The anti-trust provision of the constitution of 1891 and of the acts of
1900 and 1906 of Kentucky, as construed by the highest court of
that State, are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as offering no standard of conduct that it is possible to know
in advance and comply with. Ib.
30. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of state statute which does
not cover entire field.
A state statute aimed at an evil and hitting it presumably where
experience shows it to be most felt is not unconstitutional under the
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