equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment because
there might be other instances to which it might be equally well
applied. Keokee Coke Cc. v. Taylor, 224.
31. Equal protection of the law; validity of Virginia statute providing
method of payment of employés of certain industries.
Section 3 of Chapter 391, Virginia Laws of 1888, reënacting the act of
1887 aimed at the evil of payment of labor in orders redeemable
only at the employers' shops and forbidding certain classes of em-
ployers of labor to issue any order for payment thereto unless pur-
porting to be redeemable for its face value in lawful money of the
United States, is not an unconstitutional denial of equal protection
of the law because it does not apply to other classes of employers
who also own shops and pay with orders redeemable in mer-
chandise. Ib.
32. Equal protection of the law; classification; reasonableness of; railroads
and receivers of railroads.
A state police statute requiring railroad companies to use a specified
safety device is not unconstitutional as denying equal protection of
the laws because it does not affect receivers operating railroads; in
view of the temporary and special character of a receiver's manage-
ment the classification is reasonable and proper. Atlantic Coast
Line v. Georgia, 280.
33. Equal protection of the law; classification; reasonableness; effect of
provision on acts regulating judicial procedure.
A classification which is based on the distinction between that which is
ordinary and that which is extraordinary is reasonable and not
repugnant to the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment which only restrains acts regulating judicial procedure
so transcending the limits of classification as to cause them to con-
flict with the fundamental conceptions of just and equal legislation.
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Larabee, 459.
34. Equal protection of the law; validity of state statute imposing attorney's
fee in mandamus proceedings against party refusing to obey writ.
A state statute imposing reasonable attorneys' fees in actual mandamus
proceedings against the party refusing to obey a peremptory writ is
not repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment either because it does not apply to other proceedings
or because it is not reciprocal. The classification is not unreason-
able; and so held as to the statute to that effect of Kansas involved
in this case and as herein applied. Ib.
35. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of Tennessee statute of 1865
relative to inheritance by issue of slave marriages.
The statute of Tennessee of 1865, c. 40, § 8, declaring that children of
slave marriages should be legitimately entitled to inherit, as it has
been construed by the highest court of that State as not extending
the right of inheritance beyond lineal descendants of the parents,
is not unconstitutional under the equal provision clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Jones v. Jones, 615.
See SUPRA, 11, 12, 18;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 35.
36. Full faith and credit; contracts; obligation on courts.
Under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution the
courts of one State are not bound to declare a contract, which was
made in another State and modified a former contract, illegal be-
cause it would be illegal under the law of the State where the
original contract was made and of which neither of the parties is
a resident or citizen. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 149, 166.
37. Full faith and credit to which judgment of one State entitled in courts
of another.
If the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the subject-
matter and the parties, the merits of the controversy are not open
for reinvestigation in the courts of another State; but, under the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution and § 905,
Rev. Stat., the latter must give the judgment such credit as it has
in the State where it was rendered. Roller v. Murray, 738.
38. Full faith and credit; effect of denial by court rendering judgment of
due process of law.
The proper method of obtaining a review of the Federal question ad-
versely decided by the state court is by writ of error to this court
under § 237, Judicial Code, and not by collaterally attacking the
judgment on the ground that it denies due process of law when it
is invoked in the courts of another State. Ib.
39. Property rights; effect to take, of provision of Hepburn Act requiring
owner of oil carrying pipe line to become common carrier.
Requiring a person engaged in interstate transportation of oil by pipe
lines to become a common carrier does not involve a taking of
private property, and the provision in the Hepburn Act to that
effect is not unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. The
Pipe Line Cases, 548.
See SUPRA, 19, 23;
ECCLESIASTICAL BODIES, 2, 3.
40. States; operation of Constitution on.
The Constitution and its limitations are the safeguards of all the
States preventing any and all of them under the guise of license or
otherwise from exercising powers not possessed. New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Head, 149, 166.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. Government; annulment for breach; assumption of benefit and burden of
provision.
The benefit and burden of a provision in a Government contract giv-
ing a right to annul in consequence of a breach by failure to com-
mence work must hang together and the Government cannot avail
of the former without accepting the latter. Stone & Gravel Co. v.
United States, 270.
2. Government; reletting on breach; damages to which Government entitled.
Where the contract contains a provision for a method of annulment and
liquidated damages in case of a breach by failure to commence
work and the Government avails of that provision it is only en-
titled to the liquidated damages and cannot recover damages for
difference in cost on reletting the contract under a provision for
failure to complete or abandonment after commencing the work.
United States v. O'Brien, 220 U. S. 321, distinguished. Ib.
3. Government; reletting; liability of original contractor.
Where, after default of the original contractor, the contract is relet,
the original contractor is not bound for difference unless the con-
tract as relet is the same as the original contract. United States v.
Axman, 36.
4. Government; reletting; variations; liability of original contractor.
Where a contract for dredging requires the dredged material to be de-
posited in a specified location, changes made as to the location for
depositing such materials amount to such an important variation
that the first contractor cannot be held for difference. United
States v. McMullen, 222 U. S. 460, distinguished. Ib.
5. Government; changes in; importance of.
Change in location for depositing material dredged under a govern-
ment contract is not to be regarded as a minor change; it is clearly
an important one. Ib.
6. Government; District of Columbia; obligation of surety on bond; dual
aspect; change in contract; effect on liability of surety.
The obligation given by the surety under the District of Columbia
Materialmen's Act of 1899 which is modeled after the General
Materialmen's Act of 1894, has a dual aspect, being given not only
to secure the Government the faithful performance of all the obliga-
tions assumed towards it by the contractor, but also to protect
third persons from whom the contractor may obtain materials and
labor; these two agreements being as distinct as though contained
in separate instruments, the surety cannot claim exemption from
liability to persons supplying materials merely on account of
changes made by the Government and the contractor without its
knowledge and which do not alter the general character of the
work. United States v. National Surety Co., 92 Fed. Rep. 549,
approved. Equitable Surety Co. v. McMillan, 448.
7. Government; bond, discharge of surety by alteration of contract; when
rule of strictissimi juris not applicable.
Under the rule of strictissimi juris, the agreement altering the contract
must be participated in by the obligee or creditor as well as the
principal in order to discharge the surety; in the case of a bond
under the Materialmen's Acts of 1894 or 1899, there is no single
obligee or creditor to consent thereto and the rule of strictissimi
juris does not apply where the alterations agreed upon do not
change the general nature of the work. Ib.
8. Government; District of Columbia; bond given under act of 1899; effect
of change in contract to release surety.
In this case the alterations of the terms of a contract for building a
school house in the District of Columbia altering its location but
without affecting its general character, without the knowledge or
consent of the surety, did not have the effect of releasing the surety
from the obligation of the bond given under the District of Colum-
bia Materialmen's Act of February 28, 1899. Ib.
9. Government; District of Columbia; bond; change in contract releasing
surety; quære.
Quare, and not involved in this case, what would be the result of a
change not contemplated in the original contract as between the
District of Columbia and so great as to amount to abandonment
of the contract? Ib.
10. Liquidated damages for delay; enforcement; waiver.
While reasonable contracts for liquidated damages for delay are not
to be regarded as penalties and may be enforced between the par-
ties, Sun Printing Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U. S. 642, one party must not
prevent the other party from completing the work in time, and if
such is the case, even if the subsequent delay is the fault of the
latter, the original contract cannot be insisted upon and the
liquidated damages are waived. United States v. United Engineer-
ing Co., 236.
11. Liquidated damages for delay; right of Government to recover; effect of
supplemental contracts.
Where the original contract for government work provided for liq-
uidated damages for delay beyond a specified date but supple-
mental contracts contained no fixed rule for the time of completion,
the Government is limited in its recovery to the actual damages
sustained by reason of the delay for which the contractor was re-
sponsible. Ib.
12. Liquidated damages for delay; fault of both parties; effect to annul
obligation to pay.
It is the English rule, as well as the rule in some of the States, that
where both parties are responsible for delays beyond the fixed date,
the obligation for liquidated damages is annulled; and, unless there
was a provision substituting a new date, the recovery for subse-
quent delay is limited to the actual loss sustained. Ib.
13. Liquidated damages for delay; waiver by Government; effect of diffi-
culty in proof of actual damages.
Where the Government has by its own fault prevented performance
of the contract and thereby waived the stipulation as to liquidated
damages, it cannot insist upon it as a rule of damages because it
may be impracticable to prove actual damages. Ib.
See CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED STATES, 2;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10, 23, 36;
ECCLESIASTICAL BODIES, 2, 3;
PUBLIC LANDS, 10, 11, 12;
PUBLIC WORKs, 3;
RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 1;
CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES.
CONVEYANCES.
See INDIANS, 1, 2;
|