dening interstate commerce even though such commerce may be
incidentally affected. (Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424.)
Ib.
9. Federal power; requirement that common carriers in substance become
such in form.
While the control of Congress over commerce among the States cannot
be made a means of exercising powers not committed to it by the
Constitution, it may require those who are common carriers in sub-
stance to become so in form. The Pipe Line Cases, 548.
10. Absence of Federal action; presumption arising from.
The absence of Federal action does not presuppose that the public in-
terest is unprotected from extortion. Port Richmond Ferry v. Hud-
son County, 317.
11. State interference; power to exact license fee for privilege of.
A State may not make commercial intercourse with another State or
a foreign country a matter of local privilege and require that it can-
not be carried on without its consent, and to exact a license fee as
the price of that consent. Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit
Co., 333.
12. State interference; power to exact license fee for privilege of.
One otherwise enjoying full capacity for the purpose of carrying on
interstate commerce cannot be compelled to take out a local license
for the mere privilege of carrying it on. Ib.
13. State burdens on; invalidity of license exaction for operation of ferry.
An ordinance enacted by the city of Sault Ste. Marie under state au-
thority, requiring a license fee for the operation of ferries to the
Canadian shore opposite, held unconstitutional, as applied to the
owners of a ferryboat plying from the Canadian shore, as a burden
on interstate commerce. Ib.
14. States; power to regulate rates on ferries and bridges over boundary
A State has the power to establish boundary ferries and bridges, not a
part of a continuous interstate carrier system, and regulate the
rates to be charged from its shores, subject to the paramount au-
thority of Congress over interstate commerce; and, even though
there might be a difference in the rate of ferriage from one side of
the stream as compared with the rate charged from the other side.
Port Richmond Ferry v. Hudson County, 317.
15. States; discriminatory use of instrumentality of interstate commerce;
Federal intervention; conflict with Federal authority.
The use by the State of an instrument of interstate commerce in a
discriminatory manner so as to inflict injury on any part of that
commerce is a ground for Federal intervention; nor can a Statē
authorize a carrier to do that which Congress may forbid and has
forbidden. Houston & Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 342.
16. State discrimination against; power of Congress to remove; relation of
intrastate to interstate rates.
In removing injurious discriminations against interstate traffic arising
from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates Congress is not
bound to reduce the latter to the level of the former. Ib.
17. Hepburn Act; application to pipe lines.
The provision in the Hepburn Act, amending the Act to Regulate Com-
merce by making persons or corporations engaged in transporting
oil from one State to another by pipe lines common carriers, applies
to the combination of pipe lines owned and controlled by the
Standard Oil Company and to the constituent corporations united
in a single line, although the only oil transported is that which
has been purchased by the Standard Oil Company or by such con-
stituent corporations prior to the transportation thereof. The Pipe
Line Cases, 548.
18. Hepburn Act; pipe line provision; application to existing corporations.
As applied to existing corporations, the pipe line provision of the Hep-
burn Act does not compel persons engaged in interstate transporta-
tion of oil to continue in operation, but it does require them not to
continue to transport oil for others or purchased by themselves ex-
cept as common carriers. Ib.
19. Hepburn Act; pipe line provision; when transportation of oil merely
incidental to use.
A corporation engaged in refining oil may draw oil from its own wells
through a pipe line across a state line to its own refinery for its own
use without being a common carrier under the pipe line provisions
of the Hepburn Act, the transportation being merely incidental to
the use of the oil at the end. Ib
20. Hepburn Act; free pass provision; nature of pass issued to member of
family of employé.
Under the free pass provision of the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906,
a free pass issued by a railroad company between interstate points
to a member of the family of an employé is gratuitous and not in
consideration of services of the employé. Charleston & W. Caro-
lina Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 576.
21. Hepburn Act; free pass provision; validity of stipulations in pass is-
sued to member of family of employé.
As a pass issued to a member of the family of an employé of a railroad
company is free under the provision of the Hepburn Act permitting
it to be issued, the stipulations contained in it and on which it is
accepted, including one exempting the company from liability in
case of injury, are valid. Ib.
22. Commodities clause; exemption of lumber.
Under the Commodities Clause it is not unlawful for a common carrier
to carry lumber owned by it, and until the law otherwise provides,
it may treat freight owned by it in the same manner as like freight
independently owned. United States v. Butler County R. R. Co., 29.
23. Commodities clause; exemption of lumber; power of Congress.
Congress has expressly excepted the transportation of lumber from
the operation of the commodities clause, and had power so to do.
(United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366.) Tap Line
Cases, 1.
24. Commodities clause; exemption of lumber; effect on status of tap
lines.
Congress, by the exemption of lumber from the operation of the com-
modities clause, shows that it regarded railroad tap lines for lum-
ber, owned and operated by the owners of the timber, as essential
for the development of the timber interests of the country. Ib.
25. Carmack Amendment; effect on state legislation.
While the Carmack Amendment supersedes state legislation on the
subject of the carrier's liability for loss of interstate shipments, it
does not interfere with a state statute incidentally affecting the
remedy for enforcing that liability, such as a moderate attorney fee
in case of recoverable contested claims for damages. Atlantic Coast
Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, distinguished. Missouri,
K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 412.
26. Charges by carriers; additional services justifying; delivery and re-
ceipt of goods on industrial spur track.
The delivery and receipt of goods on an industrial spur-track within
the switching limits in a city is not necessarily an added service for
which the carrier is entitled to make, or should make, a charge ad-
ditional to the line haul rate to and from that city when that rate
embraces a receiving and delivery service for which the spur-track
service is a substitute. Los Angeles Switching Case, 294; Interstate
Com. Comm. v. Southern Pacific Co., 315.
27. Charges for switching in terminal district; right of railway to make;
power of Commission.
It is permissible for a railway company to establish a terminal district
and to make an average charge for switching within it, where legal,
but where illegal the Commission may require it to deliver on spur-
tracks within that district regardless of the variations in distance
within its own established terminal lines. Ib.
28. Charges for switching freight to industrial spur-tracks in terminal dis-
trict; prohibition of Commission sustained.
The order of the Interstate Commerce Commission that the carriers
desist from making a switching charge for carload freight moving
in interstate commerce to industrial spur-tracks within the switch-
ing limits of Los Angeles, California, sustained. Ib.
29. Charges for terminal services; validity of order of Commission prohibit-
ing.
An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring railway
companies to desist from exacting charges for delivering and receiv-
ing carload freight to and from industries located upon spurs and
sidetracks within the switching limits of a terminal city when such
carload freight is moving in interstate commerce incidentally to a
system line haul is not open to the objection that it rests upon a
construction of the Act to Regulate Commerce which would forbid
a carrier from separating its terminal and haulage charges on the
same shipment. Los Angeles Switching Case, 294; Interstate Com.
Comm. v. Southern Pacific Co., 315.
30. Rates; publication; what contemplated by Act to Regulate Commerce;
quære as to.
Quare, and not involved in this decision, whether the rate which the
Act to Regulate Commerce requires to be published is a complete
rate including not only the charge for hauling but also the charge
for the use of terminals at both ends of the line. Ib.
31. Rates; reduction by Commission; evidence to justify.
The record does not disclose any evidence justifying the order of the
Commission directing a reduction of rates which had been held to
be reasonable by a prior order of the Commission. Florida East
Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 167.
32. Rates; discrimination; effect of identical control of freight offered and
stock of railroad.
The fact that the same ownership controls the freight offered and the
stock of a railroad company which is a common carrier, does not
justify a different rate imposed upon the same kind of traffic.
United States v. Butler County R. R. Co., 29.
33. Rates; long and short haul; lodgment of power before and after act of
June 18, 1910.
Prior to the amendment of June 18, 1910, § 4 of the Act to Regulate
Commerce lodged in the carrier the right to exercise a primary
judgment, subject to administrative control and ultimate judicial
review, concerning the necessity and propriety of making a lower
rate for the longer than the shorter haul, thus giving the carrier
power to exert its judgment as to things of a public nature; but the
amendment withdrew that right of primary judgment and lodged
it in the Interstate Commerce Commission to be exercised on re-
quest and after due investigation and consideration of the public
interests concerned and in view of the preference and discrimina-
tion clauses of §§ 2 and 3 of the act. Intermountain Rate Cases,
476; United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 495.
34. Rates; long and short-haul provisions of §4 of Act to Regulate Com-
merce as amended; constitutional validity.
The long and short-haul provisions of § 4 of the Act to Regulate Com-
merce as amended by the act of June 18, 1910, are not repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States as a delegation of power to
the Interstate Commerce Commission beyond the competency of
Congress. Ib.
35. Rates; long and short-haul clause; constitutional validity.
In Louis. & Nash. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, this court de-
cided that a general enforcement of the long and short-haul clause
of the Act to Regulate Commerce would not be repugnant to the
Constitution, and will not now reconsider and overrule that de-
cision. Ib.
36. Division of rates between trunk line and common carrier; power of
Commission to prevent rebate or discrimination in.
If the division of rates between a trunk line and a common carrier
controlled by the same interest as controls the bulk of the freight
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