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moved by the carrier, is a mere cover for rebates and discrimina-
tions, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to prevent
such practices. United States v. Butler County R. R. Co., 29.

37. Division of rates as to lumber; authority of Congress over tap lines.
It is beyond the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to

order a tap line to cease a division of rates as to lumber owned by it
or by those having proprietary interest therein, if it is allowed such
division as to lumber shipments by others. Tap Line Cases, 1.

38. Division of rates between carrier and tap line; power of Commission to

prevent rebate or discrimination in.
If the division of joint rates between the principal carrier and the tap

line really amounts to a rebate or discrimination in favor of the tap
line owners, it is within the power and duty of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to reduce such division to a proper point. Ib.

39. Preferences and discrimination, application of $3 of Act to Regulate

The prohibition of g 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce is not directed

solely against voluntary acts of the carrier amounting to unjust
discrimination or undue preference, but relates to all such acts.
Houston & Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 342.

40. Passes; power of carrier to issue in consideration of services; quære.
Quære whether under $ 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, an in-

terstate carrier can issue a pass in consideration of services.
Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 576.

41. Evidence as to condition of traffic; application in suit against railroads.
In a proceeding against several railroads, testimony as to the condition

of traffic on certain railroads does not tend to establish conditions
on another road in regard to which no testimony is given and where
the record shows essential differences between it and those roads in
regard to which the testimony was given. Florida East Coast Ry.

Co. v. United States, 167.

STATES, 6, 7, 9.

1. Resort to; right of; to determine reasonableness of switching charges;

Although the Interstate Commerce Commission may not have found

that a switching charge if legal was unreasonable in amount or that

the shippers had objected thereto as the service must be performed
according to the law of the land, the shippers are not estopped from
bringing the matter before the Commission to the end that the car-
rier's charges should not be unreasonable or unjustly discrimina-
tory. Los Angeles Switching Case, 294; Interstate Com. Comm. v.
Southern Pacific Co., 315.

2. Jurisdiction to determine nature of terminal services.
Industrial spur-tracks established within the carrier's switching limits,

within which the team tracks are also located, may constitute an
essential part of the carrier's terminal system, and whether or not
delivery on the spur-track is an additional service on which to base
a charge or merely a substituted service included in the line-haul
rate is a question of fact for the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion to determine. Ib.

3. Jurisdiction; determination of commodities included within class tariff.
Whether a class tariff includes a particular commodity is a controversy

primarily to be determined by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion in the exercise of its power concerning tariffs and the authority
to regulate conferred upon it by the Act to Regulate Commerce.
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. American Tie & Timber Co., 138.

4. Jurisdiction; determination of character of crossties as lumber.
Whether crossties are or are not lumber and therefore within the tariffs

filed for the latter is a question on which there is great diversity of
opinion even among experts upon the subject, and one that should
be determined in the first instance by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Ib.

5. Jurisdiction; interference by courts.
The courts may not, as an original question, exert authority over sub-

jects which primarily come within the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Ib.

6. Power to prevent discriminations against interstate commerce.
By 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, 24 Stat. 379, 380, Congress

has delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission power to
prevent all discriminations against interstate commerce by inter-
state carriers which it is within the power of Congress to condemn.
Houston & Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 342.

7. Power to correct unjust discriminations against localities.
Where the Interstate Commerce Commission has found after duo in-


vestigation that unjust discrimination against localities exists
under substantially similar conditions of transportation the Com-
mission has power to correct it; and this notwithstanding the lim-
itations contained in the proviso to § 3 of the Act to Regulate
Commerce. Ib.

8. Power to prevent unjust discrimination; prior action; effect of.
The earlier action of the Interstate Commerce Commission was not of

such controlling effect as to preclude the Commission from giving
effect to the Act to Regulate Cominerce, and in this case having,
after examination of the question of its authority, decided to make
a remedial order to prevent unjust discrimination and the Com-
merce Court having sustained that authority of the Commission
this court should not reverse unless, as is not the case, the law has
been misapplied. Ib.

9. Power to make order permitting lower rate for longer haul, etc.
Under $ 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by the act of

June 18, 1910, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to
make an order, such as that involved in these cases, permitting a
lower rate for the longer haul but only on terms stated in the order,
establishing zones for the intermediate points and relative per-
centages upon which proportionate rates should be based. Inter-
mountain Rate Cases, 476.

10. Review of orders of, by Commerce Court; what constitutes affirmative

An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, based on its
finding that the service rendered by a connecting line is not a serv-
ice of transportation by a common carrier railroad, but a plant
service by a plant facility, to the effect that allowances and divi-
sions of rates are unlawful and must be discontinued, is affirmative
in its nature and subject to judicial review by the Commerce Court.
Tap Line Cases, 1.

11. Review of orders of; what reviewable.
Where the validity of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission

directing discontinuance of divisions of rates with another railroad
depends upon whether the latter is a common carrier or a plant
facility, the determination of that question upon undisputed facts
is a conclusion of law which is subject to judicial review. Ib.

12. Review of findings; what are conclusions of fact not subject to review.
Findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission as to the character

and use of industrial spur-tracks within the switching limits of a
city are conclusions of fact and not subject to review. Los Angeles
Switching Case, 294; Interstate Com. Comm. v. Southern Pacific Co.,

13. Review of findings; conclusions of fact not reviewable.
This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Interstate

Commerce Commission upon matters of fact within the province of
the Commission. Ib.

14. Findings of fact by; binding effect; limitation upon rule.
The rule that a finding of fact made by the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission concerning a matter within the scope of the authority dele-
gated to it is binding and may not be reëxamined in the courts, does
not apply where the finding was made without any evidence what-
ever to support it; the consideration of such a question involves
not an issue of fact, but one of law which it is the duty of the courts
to examine and decide. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. United States,
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 5, 6, 8, 27, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38;



See INDIANS, 6–11.


1. Collateral attack; decision as to removability not subject to; mode of

When a Federal court decides that a case removable from a state court

on independent grounds is not made otherwise by § 6 of the Em-
ployers' Liability Act, the decision is a judicial act done in the
exercise of jurisdiction conferred by law, and, even if erroneous, is
not open to collateral attack, but only subject to correction in an
appropriate appellate proceeding. Ex parte Roe, 70.

2. Review; mode of, in case of decision as to removability of cause.
The authorized mode of reviewing such a ruling in an action at law is

by writ of error from the final judgment. Judicial Code, $$ 128,
238. Ib.

3. Validity of judgment in suit in rem; sufficiency of service of process.
Where a State has jurisdiction over the res the judgment of the court to

which that jurisdiction is confided, in order to be binding with re-
spect to the interest of a non-resident not served with process
within the State, must be based upon constructive service by mail-
ing, publication or otherwise in accordance with the law of the
State. Grannis v. Ordean, 385.

4. Correction of determination of stockholder's liability under Minnesota

law; collateral attack.
Whether a former stockholder is ratably or otherwise liable with

present stockholders is not a question which goes to the jurisdiction
of the Minnesota court making the order, but a question to be sub-
mitted for correction, if any, to the court making the order and
not to another court in a collateral attack. Selig v. Hamilton, 652.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13, 37, 38; INDIANS, 2, 3;







1. Of appeals from Circuit Courts of Appeals; when suit one arising under

laws of United States.
A suit does not arise under the laws of the United States unless it really

and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the
validity, construction or effect of some law of the United States
upon the determination of which the case depends and so appears
not by mere inference but by distinct averments according to rules
of good pleading. Hull v. Burr,


2. Of appeal from Circuit Court of Appeals; when suit one arising under

law of United States.
In this case held that a suit to restrain trustees in bankruptcy from pros-

ecuting an equity suit against complainants in the state court on
the ground that the bankruptcy proceedings were a fraud and that

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