volved herein, this case is controlled by Taney v. Penn Bank, 232
U. S. 174. Ib.
POLICE POWER.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7, 32;
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS, 2;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 8.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
1. Determination of scope of decision of state court.
What the Minnesota court determines as to the nature of the as-
sessment and its application to present and former stockholders
must be ascertained from the order itself. Selig v. Hamilton, 652.
2. Duty of this court in determining whether process in state court con-
stituted due process of law.
This court must exercise an independent judgment as to whether the
process sanctioned by the court of last resort of the State con-
stituted due process of law; it is not bound by, nor can it merely
accept, the decision of the state court on that question. Grannis v.
Ordean, 385.
3. Following concurrent findings of lower courts.
The settled rule of this court that the concurring findings of two courts
below will not be disturbed, unless shown to be clearly erroneous,
applies where the evidence is taken before an examiner. (Texas &
Pacific Railway Co. v. Louisiana Railroad Commission, 232 U. S.
338.) Gilson v. United States, 380.
4. Following lower courts' findings of fact.
Findings of fact concurred in by two lower Federal courts will not be
disturbed by this court unless shown to be clearly erroneous.
Washington Securities Co. v. United States, 76.
5. Following lower courts' findings of fact; what constitutes question of fact.
Whether the employer failed to provide a safe place to work is a ques-
tion of fact properly determinable by the Circuit Court of Appeals
in last resort, and this court will not disturb such a finding if con-
curred in by both courts below and justified by the record. At-
lantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 52
6. Following state court's findings of fact; when record examined to de-
termine existence of Federal question.
While, in ordinary cases, this court is bound by the findings of the state
court of last resort, that court cannot, by omitting to pass upon
basic questions of fact, deprive a litigant of the benefit of a Federal
right properly asserted; and it is the duty of this court, in the ab-
sence of adequate findings, to examine the record in order to de-
termine whether there is evidence which furnishes a basis for such
a Federal right. (Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U. S. 601.)
Carlson v. Curtiss, 103.
7. Following territorial courts' ruling on local questions.
This court accepts the rulings of the territorial courts on local questions
of pleading and practice. (Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Friday, 232 U. S.
694.) Schmidt v. Bank of Commerce, 64.
8. Following state court's construction of state statute.
This court does not go behind the construction given to a state statute
by the state courts. Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 224.
9. Following state court's construction of state statute.
The state court having held that the term "railroad company" as used
in a state police statute is inclusive of natural persons operating a
railroad and that the statute is not unconstitutional as denying
equal protection of the law to railroad corporations because it
does not include natural persons, this court concurs in that view.
Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 280.
10. Raising Federal question; when too late.
A Federal question may not be imported into a record for the first time
by way of assignment of error made for the purpose of review by
this court. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 123.
11. Raising question of rights under full faith and credit clause; timeliness.
As a general rule, for the purpose of review by this court, rights under
the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution are re-
quired to be expressly set up and claimed in the court below. Ib.
12. Record; sufficiency of.
A motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals will
not be denied as premature because the record has not been printed
if the record of proceedings in the District Court is here and this
court is sufficiently advised as to the situation of the case to dispose
of it without doing injustice to the parties. (National Bank v.
Insurance Co., 100 U. S. 43.) Lazarus v. Prentice, 263.
See CLAIMS AGAINST UNITED STATES, 1;
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS, 2; PUBLIC LANDS, 3, 4.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11, 12, 17, 19, 23, 39;
1. Coal lands; knowledge imputed to purchaser from homestead entryman.
A purchaser from a patentee is bound to take notice that the land was
acquired under the homestead law when that appears in the patent,
and if the other circumstances show that the purchase was made
with knowledge that the land was known to be coal land when it
was entered by the patentee, the purchaser must be deemed to have
taken with notice of the fraudulent obtaining of coal lands under
the homestead law. Washington Securities Co. v. United States, 76.
2. Commuted homestead entry; effect of agreement for alienation made
after entry and before commutation; quære.
Quare, as to what is the effect on a commuted homestead entry under
§ 2301, Rev. Stat., of an agreement for alienation made after entry
and before commutation; and see Bailey v. Sanders, 228 U. S. 603.
Gilson v. United States, 380.
3. Floats in lieu of definite tract; location; presumption as to attitude of
Government.
Where, as in this case, in order to accommodate conflicting claims and,
at the instance of the Government, claimants have given up rights
to a definite tract and accepted float grants for an equal amount of
land, it will be presumed that the Government would make provi-
sion for the location of the substituted land as expeditiously as pos-
sible and without expense to the holders of the float. Lane v.
Watts, 525.
4. Fraud; cancellation of patent for; conclusiveness of findings of land
officer; adversary proceedings,
Where the application and proof of an entryman is strictly ex parte, the
proceedings are not adversary, and while the findings of the land
officer may not be open to collateral attack, they are not conclusive,
but only presumptively right, against the Government in a suit to
cancel the patent on the ground that it was obtained by fraud.
Washington Securities Co. v. United States, 76.
5. Location of non-mineral float; effect of approval by Commissioner.
The action of the Commissioner in approving the location of a non-
mineral float cannot be revoked by his successor in office, and an
attempt so to do can be enjoined. (Noble v. Union River Logging
Co., 147 U. S. 165.) Lane v. Watts, 525.
6. Relocations; privity of relocator with defaulting prior locator.
One who relocates land under the mining law (Rev. Stat., § 2324) by
reason of the failure of a prior locator to perform the required an-
nual assessment or development work is not in privity with such
prior locator. Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 669.
7. Surveys; necessity for, to segregate land from public domain.
A survey is necessary to segregate from the public domain lands at-
tempted to be located by a float grant. Stoneroad v. Stoneroad, 158
U. S. 240. In this case, held, that a survey was made and approved.
Lane v. Watts, 525.
8. Patents; authority of Land Department to insert exceptions not contem-
plated by law.
The officers of the Land Department are without authority to insert in
patents exceptions not contemplated by law, and when they place
unauthorized exceptions in patents the exceptions are void. Burke
v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 669.
9. Patents; validity of exception inserted by Land Department.
An exception inserted in patents issued under the grant here under
consideration to the effect that if any of the lands described should
be found to be mineral the same should be excluded from the opera-
tion of the patents is unauthorized and void, because the granting
act contemplated that the patents should effectually and uncondi-
tionally pass the title. Ib.
10. Patents; exceptions in; effect of acquiescence in by patentee.
An agreement between the railroad company and the land officers that
such an exception in the patents should be effective is of no greater
force as an estoppel than the exception itself, and the latter is of
no force whatever. Ib.
11. Patents; terms not open to agreement; status of land officers and
patentee.
The terms of the patent whereby the Government transfers its title to
public land are not open to negotiation or agreement. The patentee
has no voice in the matter. It in no wise depends upon his consent
or will. Neither can the land officers enter into any agreement
upon the subject. They are not principals but agents of the law,
and must heed only its will. Ib.
12. Patents; power of land officers to alter effect which law gives.
If the land officers enter into any forbidden arrangement whereby
public land is transferred to one not entitled to it, the patent may
be annulled at the suit of the Government, but those officers can-
not alter the effect which the law gives to a patent while it is out-
standing. Ib.
13. Patents; exceptions in; authority to insert.
The joint resolution of June 28, 1870, relating to this grant did not
authorize the use of any excepting clause in the patents. Ib.
14. Title to; when beyond divestiture by officers of Land Department.
A title which has passed by location of a grant and its approval by
proper officers of the Land Department cannot be subsequently di-
vested by the then officers of the department. (Ballinger v. Frost,
216 U. S. 240.) Lane v. Watts, 525.
15. Title to; what amounts to survey and finding of character of land suffi-
cient to vest title.
In this case, held, that the report of the Surveyor General and the sub-
sequent proceedings and survey by the Surveyor General of
Arizona amounted to a survey and finding that the lands were non-
mineral and that title thereto vested in the holder of the float grant
selecting the lands and passed out of the United States. Ib.
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