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16. Southern Pacific grant of 1866; exclusion of mineral lands.
The act of July 27, 1866, making a grant of alternate odd numbered
sections of public land to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company
in aid of the construction of its main-line railroad did not include
mineral lands, but on the contrary excluded them from its opera-
tion and provided that the company should receive other lands as
indemnity for them. Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 669.
17. Southern Pacific grant of 1866; administration; duty of Land De-
The administration of the grant, including the issue of patents follow-
ing the construction of the road, was committed to the Land
Department of which the Secretary of the Interior is the supervis-
ing officer. 16.
18. Southern Pacific grant of 1866; determination of mineral or non-
mineral character of lands; duty of Land Department.
It was contemplated by the granting act that the mineral or non-
mineral character of the lands should be determined by the Land
Department and that, depending upon the result, patents should
issue or indemnity be allowed. Ib.
19. Southern Pacific grant of 1866; patent as evidence of title.
The patents were to be the legally appointed evidence that the lands
described in them had passed to the company under the grant. Ib.
20. Southern Pacific grant of 1866; patent as evidence of non-mineral
character of land.
A patent issued under such a grant is to be taken, upon a collateral
attack, as affording conclusive evidence of the non-mineral char-
acter of the land and of the regularity of the acts and proceedings
resulting in its issue, and, upon a direct attack, as affording such
presumptive evidence thereof as to require plain and convincing
proof to overcome it. Ib.
21. Southern Pacific grant of 1866; patent for mineral lands; cancellation
by Government for fraud; right of stranger to attack.
If the land officers are induced by false proofs to issue such a patent
for mineral lands, or if they issue it fraudulently or through mere
inadvertence, a bill in equity on the part of the Government will
lie to cancel the patent and regain the title; or, in the like circum-
stances, a prior mineral claimant who had acquired such rights in
the land as to entitle him to protection may maintain a bill to have
the patentee declared a trustee for him; but such a patent is merely
voidable, not void, and cannot be successfully attacked by a
stranger who had no interest in the land at the time the patent was
issued and was not prejudiced by it. Ib.
See ACTIONS, 1.
See ACTIONS, 1;
PUBLIC WORKS, 2, 3.
See ECCLESIASTICAL BODIES, 1, 3; INDIANS, 1;
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS, 1; STATES, 12;
STATUTES, A 8, 9.
1. Agency of Federal Government in construction of Lake Washington
Under the acts of Congress relative to the Lake Washington Waterway,
no agency of the Federal Government could have arisen prior to the
action involved in this case with respect to anything done in con-
nection with the construction of the canal. Carlson v. Curtiss, 103.
2. Authority of United States; effect of orders of Federal officer.
Orders given by an officer of the United States in connection with work
not authorized by any act of Congress will not justify one violating
the injunction of a state court as doing the act under the direction
of officers of the United States in charge of Government work. Ib.
3. State and Federal responsibility in construction of Lake Washington
After reviewing the congressional and state legislation in regard to the
construction of the Lake Washington Waterway, held that Con-
gress has refrained from authorizing any work on behalf of the
Federal Government with reference to lowering the level of Lake
Washington, and that all responsibility in that respect was as-
sumed by the State and county; and, notwithstanding the contract
was made by an officer of the United States Army, it was not on
behalf of the United States, but as representing the State of Wash-
4. State and Federal responsibility under acts of Congress; Lake Washing-
The fact that title to right of way for a canal has vested in the United
States and after completion the Secretary of War is to take charge
of the canal, does not make the United States responsible, prior to
completion, where Congress has expressly declared that the canal
will only be accepted after completion, and that the local author-
ities shall meanwhile assume all responsibility in connection there-
See CONSPIRACY, 1.
See COMMON CARRIERS, 1, 2, 3; PUBLIC LANDS, 16-21;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12, 32; SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE; STATES, 6, 7.
See FERRIES, 5, 6;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 6, 14, 16, 26–36;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1, 2, 9, 10, 11.
See DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, 2.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 36, 38, 39.
See BANKRUPTCY, 5, 6, 8;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 32;
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF.
See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 12.
Duty of counsel in dealing with case.
In presenting petitions for rehearing a duty rests upon counsel to deal
with the case as it is disclosed by the record. Chapman & Dewey
v. St. Francis Levee District, 667.
RELEASE OF SURETY.
See CONTRACTS, 6, 7, 8.
See ECCLESIASTICAL BODIES.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 25;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
See JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 1.
See INDIANS, 6, 7.
See CORPORATIONS, 7;
JURISDICTION, A 17.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
1. Combinations in, within meaning of Sherman Law.
The Sherman Law, as construed by this court in the Standard Oil Case,
while not reaching normal and usual contracts incident to lawful
purposes and in furtherance of legitimate trade, does broadly con-
demn all combinations and conspiracies which restrain the free
and natural flow of trade in the channels of interstate commerce.
Eastern States Lumber Asso. v. United States, 600.
2. Combinations in; action of association of retail dealers calling members'
attention to actions of wholesale dealers.
Held in this case that the circulation of a so-called official report among
members of an association of retail dealers calling attention to
actions of listed wholesale dealers in selling direct to consumers,
tended to prevent members of the association from dealing with the
listed dealers referred to in the report, and to directly and unrea-
sonably restrain trade by preventing it with such listed dealers,
and was within the prohibitions of the Sherman Law. Ib.
3. Combinations in; effect of agreement among retail dealers not to deal
While a retail dealer may unquestionably stop dealing with a whole-
saler for any reason sufficient to himself, he and other dealers may
not combine and agree that none of them will deal with such whole-
saler without, in case interstate commerce is involved, violating the
Sherman Law. Ib.
See FEDERAL QUESTION, 2;
JURISDICTION, A 12, 13;
SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT.
1. Construction; considerations in.
This court has heretofore construed the letter of the Safety Appliance
Act in the light of its spirit and purpose as indicated by the title no
less than by the enacting clauses and that guiding principle should
be adhered to. Southern Ry. Co. v. Crockett, 725.
2. Locomotive headlights not within.
None of the safety appliance statutes enacted by Congress relate to or
regulate locomotive headlights. Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia,
3. Vehicles contemplated by.
Although the original Safety Appliance Act may not have applied to
vehicles other than freight cars, the amendment of 1903 so broad-
ened its scope as to make its provisions, including those respecting
height of draw-bars, applicable to locomotives other than those
that are excepted in terms. Southern Ry. Co. v. Crockett, 725.
4. Vehicles to which provision of 1903 as to height of draw-bars applicable.
By the amendment of 1903 to the Safety Appliance Act the standard
height of draw-bars was made applicable to all railroad vehicles
used upon any railroad engaged in interstate commerce, and to all
other vehicles, including locomotives, used in connection with
them so far as the respective safety devices and standards are
capable of being installed upon the respective vehicles. Chicago
&c. Ry. Co. v. United States, 196 Fed. Rep. 882, approved. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 32;
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
See ACTIONS, 1;
PUBLIC LANDS, 17.