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the Federal act is not only untenable but so devoid of color as to furnish no basis for this writ of error. See Sawyer v. Piper, 189 U. S. 154.
As it is not claimed that by reason of the shifting from one law to the other the defendant was cut off from presenting any defense which was open only under the latter, or that the course taken by the plaintiff deprived the defendant of a right of removal otherwise existing, we intimate no opinion in either connection.
Writ of error dismissed.
OCAMPO v. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
No. 270. Argued March 12, 13, 1914.-Decided May 25, 1914.
Section 2 of act No. 612 of the Philippine Commission of February 3, 1903, providing that in cases triable before the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila the accused should not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case in which the prosecuting attorney after due investigation shall have presented an information against him, necessarily operated to repeal inconsistent provisions previously in force in the City of Manila.
The Philippine Bill of Rights, as contained in § 5 of the act of July 1, 1902, contains no specific requirement, such as is contained in the Fifth Amendment, of a presentment or indictment by grand jury, nor is such a requirement included within the guaranty of due process of law.
The guaranty of equal protection of the law in the Philippine Bill of Rights does not require territorial uniformity. It is not violated if all persons within the territorial limits of their respective jurisdictions are treated equally.
Section 2 of Act No. 612 is not in conflict with that paragraph of § 5
of the act of July 1, 1902, which provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation; a pre
Opinion of the Court.
liminary investigation by the prosecuting attorney upon which he files a sworn information is a compliance with such provision. A finding of probable cause for arrest by a prosecuting attorney is only quasi-judicial; and a statute, otherwise valid, is not invalidated by delegating the duty of investigation to a prosecuting attorney.
On the evidence in this case the trial court properly held that the defendant was, under the law of the Philippine Islands, the responsible proprietor of the newspaper which published the libel on which the prosecution was based.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands is not confined to errors of law but extends to a review of the whole case. It has power to reverse the judgment of the Court of First Instance in a criminal case and find the accused guilty of a higher crime and increase the sentence. Trono v. United States, 199 U. S. 521.
18 Philippine, 1, affirmed.
THE facts, which involve the validity of a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in a prosecution for criminal libel and the validity of Act No. 612 of the Philippine Commission, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. William R. Harr, with whom Mr. Clement L. Bouve was on the brief, for plaintiffs in error.
The Solicitor General for the United States.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the court.
On November 5, 1908, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, charging plaintiffs in error, with others, as editors, proprietors, owners, directors, writers, managers, administrators, printers, and publishers of the newspaper "El Renacimiento," with publishing in that city a libel against Dean C. Worcester, then a member of the Philippine Commission. The information was subscribed and sworn to by the acting prosecuting attorney, and appended to it, and likewise sworn to by him, was the following declara
Opinion of the Court.
tion: "A preliminary investigation has been conducted under my direction, having examined the witnesses under oath, in accordance with the provisions of section 39 of Act 183 (Manila Charter), as amended by section 2 of Act 612 of the Philippine Commission." Both affidavits were made before the judge of the Court of First Instance, who thereupon issued warrants of arrest, pursuant to which the parties accused were on the same day brought before the court. The information was read to them, and the court allowed them until November 7th to answer. Their attorney, being present, asked that they be furnished with a copy of the information, which request was granted, and a copy was delivered to each of the accused. Thereafter, and on November 7th, before entering any demurrer or answer, they moved to vacate the order of arrest, upon the ground that it was made without any preliminary investigation held by the court, and without any tribunal, magistrate, or other competent authority having first determined that the alleged crime had been committed, and that there was probable cause to believe the defendants guilty of it; the procedure adopted being, as was claimed, in violation of §§ 12 and 13 of General Orders, No. 58, issued by the Military Governor April 23, 1900, and of paragraphs 1, 3, 11, and 18 of § 5 of the Philippines Bill, enacted by the Congress of the United States on July 1, 1902; and it was insisted that § 2 of Act No. 612 of the Philippine Commission, which took from accused persons in the City of Manila the right to a preliminary investigation, was contrary to the cited paragraphs of the Philippines Bill, because it provided that accused persons in that city might be deprived of their liberty without due process of law, denied to the inhabitants of that city the equal protection of the law, deprived persons detained there to answer for a criminal offense of the "proper judicial proceedings," and violated the guaranty against arbitrary detention.
Opinion of the Court.
This motion being overruled, defendants moved for an order requiring the prosecuting attorney to submit to the court and to them for examination the proceedings of the preliminary investigation alleged to have been conducted by him. This motion was likewise overruled.
Defendants then asked the court to hold a preliminary investigation before calling upon them to either demur to or answer the complaint. This motion being denied, demurrers were filed, which were overruled, and the defendants were called upon to plead to the information. They stood mute, and a plea of not guilty was entered for each of them. Upon their request, separate trials were granted. Ocampo was found guilty, and sentenced to six months imprisonment and to pay a fine of 2000 pesos and onefifth of the costs of the action. Kalaw was also found guilty, and sentenced to nine months imprisonment and to pay a fine of 3000 pesos and one-fifth of the costs. Upon their writ of error, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirmed the judgment as to Ocampo, and modified the sentence imposed upon Kalaw so as to increase the period of his imprisonment to twelve months. 18 Phil. Rep. 1. The present writ of error was then sued out.
The insistence is here renewed, that the arrest and trial of plaintiffs in error was without a preliminary finding of probable cause, and therefore in violation of rights secured to them by the Philippine Bill of Rights (Act of July 1, 1902, § 5, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, 692). This act, following the provisions of certain of the Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, declares, inter alia:
"SEC. 5. That no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws
Opinion of the Court.
"That no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law;
234 U. S.
"That no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
Prior to its enactment, and under date April 23, 1900, General Orders, No. 58, had been promulgated by the Military Governor, amending the Criminal Code of Procedure in certain respects, and providing by §§ 12 and 13 that every person making complaint charging the commission of a crime must inform the magistrate of all persons believed to have any knowledge of its commission, whereupon the magistrate must issue subpoenas requiring them to attend as witnesses, and must examine the informant or prosecutor and the witnesses and take their depositions in writing, and if satisfied from the investigation that the crime complained of had been committed and that there was reasonable ground to believe that the party charged had committed it, the magistrate must issue an order of arrest.
By § 40 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission (the Manila Charter, enacted July 31, 1901), municipal courts with criminal jurisdiction were established, and were empowered to conduct preliminary examinations and to release, or commit and bind over any person charged with an offense to secure his appearance before the proper court; it being among other things provided that "every person arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be brought before a municipal court or a court of first instance for preliminary hearing, release on bail or trial."
Section 44 provided for two justices of the peace for the City of Manila, to exercise within the city the civil jurisdiction conferred upon justices of the peace in Act No. 136; but they were debarred from exercising any criminal jurisdiction, such jurisdiction within the city being confined to Courts of First Instance and the municipal courts.