fections of the human-but it is the best country on the face of the earth, and those who do not love it enough to work for it, to fight for it, to die for it, are not worthy of the privilege of living in it."

Mr. Gompers said that when the Congress of the United States declared war it handed down a decision from which there could be no appeal, and that no American today had the right to discuss whether or not we should be fighting Germany.

He again paid his respects to the Bolsheviki in America, and said that they had the same theories as the Russians who before any battle was undertaken would vote on whether or not to fight.

"In theory that might be fairly good," he said. "As an academic proposition it sounds good, but when you have opposite you a well-organized gang of scientific murderers who have their guns leveled at you, that is not the time to vote on whether or not you will defend yourself that is a time to fight."

Mr. Gompers said that labor had gained in this war recognition by the Government of the principles for which it had so long fought, and pointed to the participation by labor leaders in the conferences

of war at Washington. "When the war is over," he said, "do you think those representatives of labor are to be thrown aside? Not on your

on

Resolved, That we are one with the whole people of America in our resolve to exert every effort for a triumphant military effort the battlefields of Europe to bring about the final overthrow of autocracy, meanwhile guarding jealously our democratic institutions at home as the foundations of a wider and fuller democracy to come; and be it further

Resolved, That we here again express our appreciation of the farsighted wisdom and singleness of purpose of President Wilson as manifested in his first statement of the aims of our nation in this war, which statement has furnished a rallying point for the advancing democratic thought of the world, and be it further

Resolved, That we forward this declaration of fidelity and loyalty to the President of the United States as our renewed pledge of fealty and true understanding at this most fitting time, the anniversary of the birth of our first Great Liberator.

I

'N the March issue of CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE was printed the official report of Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig on the British operations of 1917 in France up to the battle of Cambrai. His report on the latter engagement appeared a few weeks later. The battle of Cambrai began with a notable British victory on Nov. 20, 1917, and ended in a British reverse. It became the subject of much controversy and brought a Parliamentary inquiry. The report of the commission left the impression that the British had not been taken by surprise, but the chief commander's official report indicates otherwise.

Discussing the reasons for the decision to attack on the Cambrai front, Field Marshal Haig says that the repeated assaults in Flanders had caused a weakening of the enemy's line elsewhere, and that of these weakened sectors that of Cambrai was deemed the most suitable for the surprise operation contemplated, the ground being favorable for the employment of tanks, the plan being to dispense with previous artillery preparation, which would have prevented secrecy, and depend instead on the tanks to smash their way through the enemy's wire.

The enemy [writes the Field Marshal] was laying out fresh lines of defense behind those which he had already completed on the Cambrai front, and it was to be expected his troops would be redistributed as soon as our pressure in Flanders relaxed. He had already brought large forces from Russia in exchange for divisions exhausted in the struggle in the western theatre, and it was practically certain that heavy reinforcements would be brought from the east to the west during the Winter.

Against the arguments in favor of immediate action I had to weigh the fact that my own troops had been engaged many months in heavy fighting. The conditions of the struggle had greatly taxed their strength. Only a part of the losses of my divisions had been replaced, and many of the recently arrived draft were

still far from being fully trained and inIcluded in the ranks of the armies.

Eventually the British commander decided in favor of immediate action. He continues:

The infantry, the tanks, and the artillery, working in combination, were to endeavor to break through all the enemy's lines of defense on the first day. If this were successfully accomplished and the situation developed favorably, cavalry were then to be passed through to raid the enemy's communications, disorganize his system of command, damage his railways, and interfere as much as possible with the arrival of reinforcements.

The attack, the Field Marshal notes, was started at 6:30 o'clock on the morning of Nov. 20. The spectacular successes which first attended it have been told in the correspondents' reports written at the time. It was on the last day of November that the triumph began to give way to disaster.

At the northern end of the Bonavis Ridge and in the Gonnelieu sector the swiftness with which the advance of the enemy's infantry followed the opening of his bombardment appears to have overwhelmed our troops, both in the line and the immediate support, almost before they had realized the attack had begun. The nature of the bombardment, which seems to have been heavy enough to keep our men under cover without at first seriously alarming them, contributed to the success of the enemy's plans.

No steadily advancing barrage gave warning of the approach of the German assault columns, whose secret assembly was assisted by the many deep folds and hollows typical of the chalk formation, and was shielded from observation from the air by the early morning mist. It was only when the attack was upon them that great numbers of low-flying German airplanes rained machine-gun fire upon our infantry, while the extensive use of smoke shells and bombs made it extremely difficult for our troops to see what was happening on other parts of the battlefield or to follow the movements of the enemy.

In short, there is little doubt that, although an attack was expected generally, yet in these areas of the battle, at the

moment of its delivery, the assault effected a local surprise.

The strength the enemy had shown himself able to develop in his attacks made it evident that only by prolonged and severe fighting could I hope to re-establish my right flank on Bonavis Ridge. Unless this was done the situation of my troops in the salient north of Flesquières would be difficult and dangerous, even if our hold on Bourlon Hill were extended. I had therefore to decide either to embark on another offensive battle on a large scale or to withdraw to a more compact line on Flesquières Ridge.

Although the decision involved the giving up of important positions most gallantly won, I had no doubt as to the correct course under the conditions.

Field Marshal Haig notes that the withdrawal was completed successfully without interference from the enemy on the morning of Dec. 7. Summarizing the results of the three weeks' fighting, he says:

There is little doubt that our operations were of considerable indirect assistance to the allied forces in Italy. Large demands were made upon the available German reserves at a time when a great concentration of German divisions was still being maintained in Flanders. There

is evidence that German divisions intended for the Italian theatre were diverted to the Cambrai front, and it is probable that a further concentration of German forces against Italy was suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period, when our allies were making their first stand on the Piave line.

Had Field Marshal Haig not met with a check which compelled him to abandon part of the captured territory, what he might have accomplished he thus discloses:

My intentions as regards subsequent exploitation were to push westward and northwestward, taking the Hindenburg line in the reverse from Moeuvres to the River Scarpe and capturing all the enemy's defenses and probably most of his garrisons lying west of a line from Cambrai northward to the Sensee and south of that river and the Scarpe.

Time would have been required to enable us to develop and complete the operation, but the prospects of gaining the necessary time were, in my opinion, good enough to justify the attempt to execute the plan. am of the opinion that on the 20th and 21st of November we went very near to success sufficiently complete to bring the realization of our full program within our power.

Soon after 9 A. M. large numbers of the enemy were seen coming over the ridge west of Bourlon Wood, against the junction of the 2d and 47th Divisions. Our artillery barrage, which at that time was intense, caught this advance; but, in spite of their losses, the German infantry pressed on. The left of the London Territorials was being forced back. Four posts on the right of the 2d Division were wiped out. The situation was critical.

As the enemy's infantry appeared over the crest of the hill, however, they were engaged with direct fire by our field artillery. Machine guns in position in a sunken road southwest of Bourlon Wood and in the sugar factory on the BapaumeCambrai road swept their advancing lines. The survivors of the 2d Division's posts succeeded in getting to shell holes further back and held on. While the artillery of both British divisions maintained a constant and accurate fire, rifle, Lewis-gun, and machine-gun fire inflicted enormous losses on the enemy, held up his advance, and eventually drove him back after three hours' hard fighting.

A REARGUARD'S SACRIFICE Further west the enemy's advance broke upon the 17th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, 2d Division, which was in the act of withdrawing from an advanced

sap and trench, judged too exposed to be maintained in the face of so powerful an attack.

Owing to the enemy being concealed in some dead ground, the attack developed with unexpected speed and the company holding the advanced position was ordered to leave a rearguard to cover the withdrawal of the remainder. Captain W. N. Stone, who was in command of the company, sent back three platoons, and himself elected to remain with the rearguard, together with Lieutenant Benzecry.

This rearguard, assisted by our machine guns, held off the whole of the German attack until the main position of the 17th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, was fully organized, and they died to a man with their faces to the enemy.

It is impossible to make comparisons in an action such as was fought on this day, in which so many glorious deeds were performed, but the report of the officer commanding the 17th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, concerning this incident adds distinction to the history of the regiment, and will be remembered as a devoted example of the greatest of all sacrifices. It runs:

"Of the heroism of the rearguard it is "difficult to speak. Captain Stone and "Lieutenant Benzecry, although ordered "to withdraw to the main line, elected "to remain with the rearguard. The

"

rearguard was seen fighting with bayonet, bullet, and bomb to the last. "There was no survivor. Captain Stone "by his invaluable information as to "the movements of the enemy prior to "the attack, and his subsequent sacri"fice with the rearguard, saved the "situation at cost of his life. Lieutenant "Benzecry was seen to be wounded in “the head. He continued to fight until "he was killed."

STRAIGHT SHOOTING

The 1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps, on the left of the 17th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, were in action throughout this period, and masses of the enemy moved against them; but by their welldirected and intense volume of fire, delivered from rifles, Lewis guns, and machine guns, the enemy were literally mown down in heaps after topping the rise some 200 or 300 yards from our front line. Throughout the day formed bodies of Germans never got nearer than this to our position; though many individuals endeavored to creep forward until disposed of by our snipers and Lewis-gun detachments.

After midday the enemy again attacked on the whole front of the right brigade of the 2d Division, but was once more hurled back with great slaughter, offering very favorable targets at from 50 to 200 yards' range to machine guns, Lewis guns, and rifles.

Early in the afternoon large masses of the enemy attacked on a front of nearly a mile west of Bourlon Wood.

On

the left of the front attacked he was once more driven off with heavy loss by the accuracy and volume of our fire; but three posts on the extreme right of the 2d Division were captured. The garrisons of the three posts on the front of the 2d Division fell fighting to the last, and, when the line at this point was restored, such a heap of German dead lay in and around the posts that it was impossible to find the bodies of our men.

In this locality five other posts held by a company of the 1st Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment, repulsed all the enemy's attacks and maintained themselves until our reinforcements had re

stored the situation. This company showed the utmost valor and steadfastness in a most critical period, extending over some six hours. The enemy made attack after attack, always in vastly superior numbers, and time after time came right up to our posts, only to be mown down by our fire and driven back in disorder. The casualties of this company were forty-six of all ranks. They claim to have killed over 500 of the enemy.

AT POINTBLANK RANGE

The story of the gallant fight against odds put up by the garrisons of these posts, both those who survived and those who died valiantly, constitutes one out of the many examples furnished by the fighting of this day of the supreme importance of the resistance that can be offered by small parties of determined men who know how to use their weapons and are resolved to use them to the last.

As the result of their efforts on this occasion, the 17th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, reported at 1 P. M. that their line was intact, that they were in close touch with the units on either flank, and that the men were really enjoying the novel experience of killing Germans in large numbers at pointblank range.

During the afternoon a strong hostile attack was made upon the 141st Brigade on the right of the 47th Division. For some days the German artillery had been steadily pouring gas shell into Bourlon Wood, until the thick undergrowth was full of gas. Many casualties were caused to our troops; and gas masks had to be worn continuously for many hours. None the less, when the enemy attacked he was again hurled back with heavy loss. A distinctive feature of the defense was the gallantry of the Lewis gunners, who, when the attack was seen to be beginning, ran out with their guns in front of our line and, from positions of advantage in the open, mowed down the advancing German infantry.

Later in the afternoon the enemy made two other attacks against the right brigade of the 2d Division. In each case he was beaten off with great slaughter, his losses being materially increased by